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drk 09/26/82 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Rives 
Re: No. 82-52, Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris 
Although I may be shortsighted, I see no problem with the 
employer's voluntary plan. The CA's reasoning on this point seems 
flawed. It rejected the employer's arguments that the plan was 
voluntary because it reasoned that the third option, which offered 
tax savings and which was sex based, was itself a fringe benefit or 
condition of employment. Because Title VII prevents any condition 
of employment that discriminates on the basis of sex, the third 
option was in~lid. It seems to
1
me that t~e pensio~' is the fringe 
- 4e;'l" ~ ''M~""...,_~~\'. " 
benefit. The three options are ways to implement the benefit and 
~ 
the fact that one of the options offers a tax benefit seems neither 
the employer's nor the insurer's fault. 
I am not sure, however, that this case merits plenary 
---------... 
review. It would seem that plenary review would be required only if --the Court wanted to cut back on Manhart, which I am not aware that 
there is any desire to do. The effect of the CA's opinion seems 
to offer the first two. The CA's opinion appears to affect two 
interests. It deprives the employees of a tax benefit they would 
otherwise enjoy. Second, it may cause the insurance companies to 
lose business since their plans 
~- .~ ~ ~· 
~~ -
no longer have the advant~~ 
of being made available by the 
I 
the tax benefit and the conveni 
employer. This limited effect does not seem, however, a sufficient 
reason for taking the case. This issue is likely to arise 
frequently and I would recommend waiting to grant cert. There are 
three cases, currently before different circuits, that involve the 
-""' 
application of Manhart to university sponsored pension plans. 
Because I believe these cases present a more substantial conflict 
between state insurance requirements and Title VII, they might ~ , , ...... ~ 
provide a better vehicle for the Court to consider this question. 
~ORRIS,~(employees) Federal/Civil Timely (w/ ext'n) 
SUMMARY: 
,, ~~ 
A voluntary deferred compensation plan allowed retiring 
employees to choose between three forms of payments, including an 
annuity boug~~independent insurance companies ~use ,, ~\ 
sex-based actuarial tables. The question is whether the employer has - · 
violated Title VII by offering this option. 
FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: This case was decided on stipulated 
facts. Petr allows employees to enroll in a State Deferred 
Compensation Plan. The Plan, which is voluntary, works in two phases. - -During the "accumulation phase," employees may contribute as much of 
their pay check as they wish to one of a large variety of investment 
options. The employees pay no tax on the money put into the Plan and 
pay no tax on the money earned by the investment until it is 
distributed. This portion of the plan treats both sexes equally and 
is not under attack. QJ2on retir
1
eme l} t, employees enter the "pay-out" 
phase of the Plan and must choose one of three options for the -
repayment of their deferred compensation. They may (1) have it 
returned in a lump sum (which they can then use, for instance, to buy 
the best annuity they can find), (2) receive a specific sum each month 
for a fixed number of months, or (3) receive a life annuity which 
petrs buy from an independent insurance company. The insurance 
companies providing option (3) 1 use~ex-based mortality tables showing 
that women as a class live to receive more annuity checks than men as 
.... 
a class receive. As a consequence, men receive
1
t igher monthly annuity 
payments than women recieve. From the point of view of tax deferral, 
however, option (3) is the best for both sexes. 
~--------~-------· 
Claiming that option (3) violates the Fourteenth Amendment and, 
under the reasoning of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 u.s. 702 (1978), Title VII, resp brought an action on 
1There is some confusion in the record on this point. Petrs 
claim that the parties have stipulated that there are no 
insurance companies in Arizona who offer annuities based on 
unisex tables. Resp claims that it only stipulated that all 
companies designated as funding media by petr, Ariz. Governing 
Committee for Tax Deferred Compensation Plans, use sex-based 
tables. 
behalf of herself and other women enrolled in the Plan, seeking to 
enjoin petrs from offering a sexed-based annuity, and to require petrs 
to augment the annuity checks of those retired women who chose option 
(3). The DC (Cordova) certified the class, rejected petrs' arguments 
that Title VII is not violated by a voluntary plan or by a plan 
containing nondiscriminatory options, and granted injunctive relief. 
In -addition, the DC directed that retired female employees be paid 
equal annuity payments to men who accumulated the same deferred 
income. The Fourteenth Amendment claim was rejected, however, on the 
ground that resp failed to prove purposeful discrimination. 
On appeal, petrs challenged both the finding of a Title VII 
violation and the relief ordered. On the violation point, petrs 
reiterated the defenses asserted below, and additionally argued that 
the DC's decision unduly interfered with the state's right to regulate 
the insurance business~ that Title VII requires proof of intent, which 
is lacking since petrs did not themselves create the sex-based annuity 
scheme~ that Manhart is limited to self-insured employers~ that petrs' 
Plan falls within the "open market" exception to Manhart ("Nothing in 
our holding implies that it would be unlawful for an employer to set 
aside equal retirement contributions for each employee and let each 
retiree purchase the largest benefit which his or her accumulated 
contributions could command in the open market," 435 U.S. at 717-18)~ 
and that petrs are not responsible for the discrimination in the Plan 
because the options merely reflect the limits in the marketplace. CA9 
affirmed. On the regulatory issue, the DC reasoned that since the 
decision below dealt only with the ability of the employer to offer 
its employees discriminatory fringe benefits, it did not unduly 
interfere with the insurance business. It found that resp showed as 
much intent as Manhart required~ that the existence of an option 
within the "open market" exception and the Plan's voluntary nature did 
not cure the Title VII violation since women are entitled to the same 
benefit options as men; and that Title VII protects against an 
employer affirmatively adopting any discriminatory scheme, even if it 
is the only one available in the marketplace. Most significantly, in 
reliance on language in Manhart saying that "an employer can[not] 
avoid his responsibilities by delegating discriminatory programs to 
corporate shells," 435 u.s. at 718 n.33, CA9 held that Manhart is not 
limited to employer-operated pension schemes, but rather applies even 
when an employer buys annuities from independent companies. 
Petrs' challenges to the award were also rejected. Noting cases 
in CAl and DC's in NY, Cal, Mich, and Or. ordering payments by 
"passive abusers," CA9 held that the order directing payment to 
retired employees was not an abuse of discretion. It rejected a Tenth 
Amendment challenge on the ground that Title VII was enacted under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, thus giving Congress the power to intrude on the 
functioning of the states. 
CONTENTIONS: Petrs claim that this decision extends Manhart to 
ban use of sex-based mortality tables by independent insurance company 
despite clear language in that opinion stating that Title VII was not 
"intended to revolutionize the insurance and pension industries," 435 
u.s. at 717 and swallows the "open market" exception carved out in 
Manhart since it prohibits the employer from going to the open market 
to buy for the employee the best option available. The decision 
ignores the fact that the Plan was voluntary and that the employer has 
no control over the insurance industry's methods of operations. CA9 
dealt incorrectly with the issue of intent. Furthermore, the relief 
granted violates the Tenth Amendment under National League of Cities 
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1973). 
Resp argues that the case involves a staightforward application 
of Manhart and that other courts considering contentions similar to 
petrs' h~ agreed with CA9. 
Four amici briefs were also received. The American Council of 
Life Insurance makes it clear why the insurance industry feels that 
----------~ 
this decision will have a tremendous impact on the insurance business. 
The Council claims that Manhart had little (or no) effect on the 
industry because it involved an unpopula r fringe benefit (employer-
operated annuities). By finding Title VII ~rebrt ity when an employer 
goes out and buys annuities for its employees, this case addresses a 
popular fringe benefit that affects 99% of the pension industry. 
Moreover, insurance companies cannot by most states' laws 
discriminatorily offer only to employers annuities calculated on 
unisex tables. But if they offered both options to everyone, the 
insurance companies would soon be insolvent because women would choose 
I 
to buy unisex annuities, which give them higher monthly payments for a 
lower price, while men would choose annuities based on men-only 
mortality tables since that would maximize their benefits. Without 
men signing up for unisex insurance, that option would be unstable 
because there would be no men paying in more and receiving less to 
subsidize the women who receive more. To make a long argument short, 
this decision will require all insurance companies to use ONLY unisex 
tables, which is a result Manhart claimed it was not mandating. 
The Academy of Actuaries agrees with the above reasoning. It 
notes that it is possible that Congress intended this result when it 
enacted Title VII, but thinks that since the result was not foreseen 
by the Manhart Court, cert should be granted to reconsider the Manhart 
decision before lower courts blithely require the entire industry to 
change its methods of operation. 
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners argues that 
lower courts' extention of Manhart has lead to the federalization of 
the insurance industry, which is a reversal of the long-standing 
practice of reserving its regulation to the states. The Court should 
grant cert in order to decide whether this result is desirable. 
The State of California and its Teachers' Retirement Association 
has filed a brief because it is involved in another case where it is 
making the same arguments rejected by CA9 in this case. 
~ 
DISCUSSION: The Conference should consider this case with Calif. 
v. Retired Public Employees' Ass'n, No. 82-262, also on this list. 
Both cases demonstrate the problems encountered in applying Manhart. 
While none of the parties point to conflicts among the circuits, the 
Court may want to examine the insurance industry's claims about the 
dire results of the many decisions in this area. If cert is granted, 
it should be limited t~e question whether Manhart applies to 
employers who purchase insurance from independent companies and 
perhaps ~he question whether there is a defense in the fact that 
the marketplace did not offer nondiscriminatory choices.2 The intent 
question is well settled (discriminatory impact is all that is 
required~The contentions based on the voluntary nature of the plan 
and the existence of nondiscriminatory options are simply variations 
on the familiar "separate but equal" argument. The Tenth Amendment 
issue borders on frivolous. 
There is a response and four amicus briefs. 
September 20, 1982 Dreyfuss Op'ns in pet'n 
2I assume that the stipulations are in the record, and that the 
Court would request the parties to reproduce them in order to 
resolve the factual dispute referred to in note 1. 
-· . 
Court ................... . ·voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
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March 21, 1983 
ARIZ2 GINA-POW 
MEMORANDUM TO .FILE 
82-52 Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris 
The cert memo, supplemented by a brief memo at the 
time by Rives, gives me considerable background oy this 
case. There must be twenty or more briefs. I ~Lll - s~end 
more time on them before next week. Meanwhile, this memo 
merely records my understanding of the issue. ---.For this 
purpose, I rely primarily on the amicus brief of Dean 
Griswold for the American Counsel of Life Insurance - the 
organization that represents the 555 insurance companies 
that offer 90-plus percent of the life annuity opitions in 
plans such as the one at issue. 
General Information 
Insurance companies traditionally have used six 
specific actuarial tables in calculating benefits. The 
accurate calculation of risks is "essential to maintaining 
the financial integrity of a finite fund that is subject 
to partial liquidation upon the occurrence of events such 
as death or disability that are unpredictable on an 
individual basis". P. 4. 
2. 
An individual's "sex, like age, provides an objective 
statistical basis" for assessing these risks. It is 
asserted in this amicus brief that the decision of CA9, if 
affirmed, would be such a "judically forced break with the 
past [that] it will revolutionize the insurance industry." 
An interanl study conducted by the amicus "estimates that 
a prohibition against using sex specific actuarial tables 
could increase the cost of retirement plans by as much as 
two billion dollars per year". P.3. 
The deferred compensation at issue 
Created by the Arizona legislature, it is a voluntary 
savings and investment plan that provides 35,000 state 
employees with an option to defer compensation and 
taxation on income. The plan is administered by 
petitioners, a governing committee established by Arizona 
law. This Committee has authority to contract with 
private institutions for the purpose of establishing tax 
deferred compensation and annuity programs. 
The plan is offered strictly on an voluntary basis, 
and is funded entirely by employee contributions. No 
state funds are involved. Until retirement, employees are 
free to direct that their contributions be invested in a 
variety of funding media approved by the Committee, 
3. 
including savings accounts, mutual funds, life insurance, 
or annuities. During the "pay-out" phase (i.e., after 
retirement) , the employee may elect to receive his or her 
deferred compensation also in a variety of ways: ( i) lump 
sum payment, (ii) a specific amount each month for a fixed 
number of months, or (iii) a life annuity. Petitioner in 
this case chose to have her contributions invested in a 
life annuity in a life insurance company, and accordingly 
she will have the option of receiving accumulated 
compensation and earnings in any one of the three ways 
mentioned above. 
All insurance companies in the plan use sex specific 
mortality tables in calculating periodic payments under 
the 1 i fe annuity. Because a woman has a statistically 
probability of living longer than a man, the annuity 
contracts provide that a woman shall receive smaller 
monthly payments. 
But the actuarial value of the annunity contracts are 
identical for men and women. The average woman will 
----------~--------------
receive more dollars than the average man because of the 
interest accruing to the woman over a longer period. 
r-----rt-rS" not disPuted in this case that women, as a 
class, 1 ive longer than men. Nor is it disputed that 
actuarial tables enable an 




company to make a 
individual's life 
expectancy than otherwise would be possible. 
Summary of argument for petitoners (i.e. for reversal). 
The question is whether the above plan violates Title 
VII. Although explicit sex classifications generally are 
invalid, Title VII does not set forth a per se rule of 
illegality. There are no exceptions to the rule against 
racial classifications, but distinctions between the 
sexes can be drawn when justified. Here, there is 
justification in the demonstrable statistic relationship 
between a person's sex and longevity. An alternative 
criteria are not available. Nor is this a case based on 
any "archaic sterotype about the appropriate role of women 
in society". 
The effect of CA9's decision is one of reverse 
discrimination. If sex specific mortality tables are not 
permitted, women - in view of their longer life expectancy 
will result in their receiving greater value than 
similarly situated men." Br. p. 9 Is this documented 
in the record? 
Manhart, 435 u.s. 702 is distinguishable 
CA 9 
Manhart". 
said that "Arizona's plan is 
In that case, the employer 
unlawful u 
required female 
employees to make monthly contributions to a retirement 
fund that were 14.84% higher than the contributions 
required of comparable male employees. This Court held 
that this requirement violated Title VII because that 
statute "precludes treatment of individuals 
components of a racial, religious, sexual 




private insurance companies were involved. We expressly 
limited its holding to a violation of Title VII to "an 
employer - operated pension fund". As the Court noted, 
all that was at issue in Manhart was "a requirement [by a 
private employer] that men and women make unequal 
contributions to an employer-operated pension fund" (at p. 
717} • 
Unlike Manhart, in this case independent insurance 
companies - not the employer - provided as one of their 
available options a plan that used sex-based actuarial 
tables. An important distinction is that "no 
contributions are required at all". Moreover, if an 
employee elects to participate he or she still may choose 
b • 
one of the three options available - only one of which 
involves a life annuity. 
Every insurance company in the business of writing 
this type of annuity that is doing business in Arizona is 
said to use sex-based mortality tables. (State's br. p. 
11) • 
Argument by respondents for affirmence 
In addition to respondents brief, the usual briefs 
have been filed by various civil rights organizations, 
women's organizations AFofL-CIO, etc. 
Respondents rely primarily on Manhart, as did CA9. 
They argue that the employer (the State) exercises nearly 
total control of the plan. The basic argument, however, 
is that all women are treated differently from men, and 
that this is the only showing required under Title VII. 
The state here is simply offering a "discriminatory fringe 
benefit". 
Apart from Manhart, I find respondents arguments 
quite thin. Our decision in this case will turn upon how 
we view Manhart. It certainly can be distinguished, 
though one can argue that its logic lends support to an 
affirmence 
7. 
I am interested in Rives' views, as he will have had 
more time to look at the large stack of briefs than I have 
had to date. 
drk 03/26/83 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
.From: Rives 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
March 26, 1983 
No. 82-52, Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris 
Question Presented 
The issue is whether a private employer violates 
Title VII by making available to his employees a life annuity, 
provided by a private insurer using sex based mortality tables. 
I. Background 




plan that is divided into two stages. In 
the first stage, the employees contribute to a general fund. 
All the money paid into the plan is invested and, on 
retirement, the amount the individual employee has contr~buted }--
eJ-~~ 
is calculated. The employee is given three options as to how 
A 
he receives his contributions: i) he may elect to take the 
money in a ~ump sum; ii) he mav receive a ~ ixeii sum for a fixed 
period of time; or iii) he may choose to buy a ~fe annuity 
7 
contract. Arizona has selected the companies with which an 
employee who desires an annuity may contract. All of these 
companies use sex-based mortality tables to calculate the 
monthly amounts due under the annuity. 
P'?J!~.~-Arizona's method of setting up its deferred ~ 




:e::::rf:: ::::r:l:::.t::ea::::::::sc::::i:::i::: ~ 
remain assests of the State. The employee is never taxed on 
the amount of the contribution that is retained and the State 
does not pay tax on any interest that accrues. When the 
employee retires and receives his benefits under the plan, the 
amounts received are taxable to the employee. Thus, as a 
I~ general matter, there is a distinct tax advantage to receiving a stream of payments (the second or third options) rather than 
a lump sum payment (the first option). 
The CA found that offering this third option violated 
Title VII under Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 u.s. 702 (1978). There are three ways in which 
theCA's holding might be considered: (i) whether providing men 
and women an income stream that is of equal value at the time 
, • 
of their retirement violates Title VII; (ii) whether an 
employer who makes available a life annuity plan that is 
calcuated using a sex-based table violates Title VII; and (iii) 
whether the fact that two optional, non-discriminatory penson 
plans are offered cures any defect caused bv offering the sex-
based plan. 
A. Whether Men and Women Received a Benefit of Equal Value 
The first argument made by petr and amici insurance 
companies seems persuasive. ~he risk that an insurance company 
accepts when it writes life annuites results from the inability 
to measure how long any one person will live. But if this risk 
is accepted for a group of people, the insurance company can 
predict with some reliability the rate and frequency of deaths 
within the group based on the past mortality experience of 
similar groups. The accuracy with which an insurance company 
predicts the rate of mortality depends on its ability to 
identify groups with similar mortality rates, and ~efini~ 
groups on the basis of sex has proved to be a reliable index of 
mortality. Thus, when an insurance company seeks to determine 
the stream of payments that $10,000 will buy for a person aged 
65, men have been given higher periodic payments than women 
because men, as a group, will have a shorter lifespan. Women, 
because of their longer lifespan, generally receive lower 
' 
periodic payments for the same amount of money. 
The insurance companies argue that in finding that 
the women are discriminated against, the CA failed to recognize 
what an annuitant receives when he buys a life annuity. He 
buys the right to receive a stream of payments for life. When 
the woman and the man each purchase a $10,000 annuity, the 
right that they purchase--the right to receive a stream of 
payments--is equal in value at the time of their purchase. 
The difficulty with this argument is that it assumes ~ 
that sex may be used to define the groups. As valid as the ~ ~ 
argument seems, Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. ~ 
vr Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1979), rejected it: 
"[T]he question of fairness to various classes 
affected by the statute is essentially a matter of 
policy for the legislature to address. Congress has 
decided that classifications based on sex, like those 
based on national origin or race, are unlawful. 
Actuarial studies could unquestionably identify 
differences in life expectancy based on race or 
national origin, as well as sex. But a statute that 
was designed to make race irrelevant in the 
employment market .•• could not reasonably be 
construed to permit a take-home-pay differential 
based on a racial classification .•.. [T]here is no 
reason to believe that Congress intended a special 
definition of discrimination in the context of 
employee group insurance coverage. It is true that 
insurance is concerned with events that are 
individually unpredictable, but that is 
characteristic of many employment decisions. 
Individual risks, like individual performance, may 
not be predicted by resort to classifications 
proscribed by Title VII." Id., at 709-710. 
-~ 
~~!'' 
~ Manhart can be distinguished by the fact that it involved an 
I ( \.' 
employer practice in which women paid a higher contribution 
.J • 
than men in order to receive the same periodic payment on 
retirement, whereas in this case the women made equal --contributions but received lower periodic payments. But it 
would seem to make little difference whether women make larger 
contributions in order to receive equal period payments or make 
equal contributions but receive lower periodic payments. The 
differential in both cases is attributable to the use of sex-
based mortality tables. 
Although Manhart seems to establish fairly clearly 
that a person's sex may not be used to define the group over 
which the risk is spread, Manhart leads to several anomalies. 
First, Manhart recognized that in establishing the proper 
periodic payment for a particular group, an insurer may 
"conside[r] the composition of an employer's work force in 
determining the probable cost of a retirement or death benefit 
plan." See 435 U.S., at 718 and n. 34. Thus, if the group 
were 90% women and 10% men, the insurer could consider that the 
average lifespan of this group would be longer than it would if 
the group consisted of 30% women and 70% men. The monthly 
payment for the first group would be lower than it would for 
the second. It seems odd that the insurance companies may not 
define the groups by sex but make take the sexual composition 
of groups into account in determining the size of monthly 
payments. 
A related problem arises from "adverse selection." 
Including men and women in the same group means that men - ~ 
receive lower payments than they would if insurance companies
used sex-based tables. Because men are required to subsidize 
the women included in the group, men may opt not to purchase a 
unisex life annuity. They will either go out in the open 
market and purchase a sex-based annuity or will opt to receive 
a fixed number of payments for a fixed number of years. As men 
choose not to enter the group, women will compose an increasing 
percentage of the group and the group payments accordingly will 
be lowered. 
B. Whether Making a Sex-Based Annuity Available Violates Title 
VII 
In Manhart, the employer provided the pension plan 
__.;;;...._..:;;._ I 
and required that its employees join the plan. The Court 
explicitly noted that "[n]o private insurance company is 
involved in the administration or payment of benefits." 435 
U.S., at 705. After considering whether Los Angeles plan 
violated Title VII, the Court stated: 
"Although we conclude that the Department's 
practice violated Title VII, we §o n9 t suggest that 
the statute was intended to revolu tionize the 
ins urance and pens i on i ndustries. All t hat' is at 
i ssue~toaay~ s a regu i remen t €hat men and women make 
unequal contributrons to an employer-operated pension 
fund." Id., at 717 (emphasis added). 
Thus, the Court in Manhart contemplated two situations. It 
held that the provision of an employer-operated fund would 
violate Title VII if it used sex-based tables. It also held --
that Title VII was not intended to require a private insurer to 
abandon the use of sex-based tables. This case presents the -middle situation. Here the employer has gone out into the 
I • 
private market, purchased annuities and made them available to 
its employees. There is a substantial ~eason for its doing so. 
If the employees were given a lump sum payment to purchase 
annuities independently, they would suffer a substantial tax 
loss since the lump sum would be taxed on receipt at a high 
rate. When the employer invests their contributions for them 
in a private annuity, the receipt of their contributions is 
spread out over a longer period of time and the tax bite is 
lessened correspondingly. 
It makes little sense to say that the employee can go 
out and buy a sex-based annuity in the private market, but the 
employer cannot do so to save the employee money. To prevent 
the employer from doing this would undermine the attractiveness 
of annuities considerably and result in the "revolution" that 
Manhart ostensibly sought to avoid. There is no indication 
that Congress intended to extend the reach of Title VII so far. 
Without a clear indication of congessional intent, it could be 
argued that the holding in Manhart should not be extended to 
the situation in this case. This holding, however, would limit \ 
the effectiveness of Manhart substantially. 
The resps argue that an employer would not be 
prevented from offering annuities. Rather, it could negotiate 
with insurance companies to obtain unisex annuities. Placing 
an affirmative duty on employers to negotiate for group plans 
using unisex tables does not seem workable for several reasons. 
First, negotiation would be possible only for large employers 





require the insurance industry to change its practices. While 
} ' \'- cr--these large employers might be able to obtain unisex plans, w-k, 
~maller employers ' would not be able to do so. If these small 
employers were prevented from offering sex-based annuities and 
unable to obtain unisex annuities, then their employees would 
be prevented from receiving the tax benefits available to other 
employees. Second, if you agree with the argument that the 
Court should not require that the insurance industry be 
restructured without a clear mandate from Congress, then it 
would seem that requiring employers to negotiate to obtain 
unisex annuities would achieve the same result. It would do 
indirectly what it is not clear Congress intended to do 
directly. 
~ C. Whether the Presence of the Option Renders This Plan 
Acceptable 
Finally, it could be argued that Title VII only 
Tb~1Zli_ 
prohibits discrimination "against any individual with respect 
t h . . d't' . '1 f ~-;G,-0 1s compensation, terms, con 1 1ons, or pr1v1 eges o /-
employment." The "privilege" that is at issue here is the 
right to participate the State's deferred compensation plan. -- -~ ~~----------------~-------------------
The first two options offered by the State (the lump sum 
payment and the right to receive a fixed sum for a fixed time) 
are concededly non-discriminatory. The fact that the State 
makes a third option available that relies on sex-based 
mortality tables does not mean that the privilege offered--the 
right to participate in the pension plan--violates Title VII. 
~ 
::1 • 
Indeed, if Arizona had offered only the first two options (the 
lump sum payment and the fixed payments ,for a fixed period of 
time), there would be no suit. It is hard to see why adding 
the third option makes Arizona's deferred compensation scheme 
discriminatory. 
Resp and the amici advance two reasons why the 
inclusion of the third option violates Title VII. First, they 
contend that the options cannot be considered equal since the 
lL · L .7 third option results in markedly better ~ consequences than ~ t...4 
the first. This argument, however, lacks merit because the 
second option provides equivalent tax benefits to the employee. 
Under this option, an employee may elect to receive a fixed 
number of payments for a fixed period of time depending on the 
present value of his accrued contributions. By speading out 
the payments that he receives, the employee is able to achieve 
tax consequences that are comparable to those of receiving a 
life annuity. The only detriment is that the second option 
deprives the employee of the security that an annuity 
guarantees. Although there is some disparity between the 
second and third options, the disparity results from conditions 7 
imposed by the tax system and should not be attributed to the 
employer. 
Second, resp argues that an employer may not offer a 
discriminatory choice as an option. Por example, it may not 
say that all employees are entitled to membership in a club and 
provide two options; an integrated facility and a segregated 
one. I must say that I find this argument difficult to refute. 
-------~---
Offering such facilities would give the employer's stamp of 
approval to a discriminatory practice. 
Conclusion 
Because of my concern about the third argument, I 
would recommend not relying on it. Similarly, I am concerned 
that adopting the first argument offered by the petrs would be 
contrary to the central premise of Manhart. Accordingly, I 
would suggest that the opinion be reversed on the second 
ground: that without some clearer indication that Congress - ...... 
intended to extend Title VII beyond the situation in Manhart, 
the Court should not undertake to change the practices in the 
insurance industry. It seems that an undertaking of such 
magnitude is best left to Congress. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-52 
ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITTEE FOR TAX DE-
FERRED ANNUITY AND DEFERRED COMPENSA-
TION PLANS, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. NATHALIE NORRIS ETC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1983] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 
U. S. 702 (1978), this Court held that Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from requiring 
women to make larger contributions in order to obtain the 
same monthly pension benefits as men. The question pre-
sented by this case is whether Title VII also prohibits an em-
ployer from offering its employees the option of receiving re-
tirement benefits from one of several companies selected by 
the employer, all of which pay a woman lower monthly bene-
fits than a man who has made the same contributions. 
I 
A 
Since 1974 the State of Arizona has offered its employees 
the opportunity to enroll in a deferred compensation plan ad-
ministered by the Arizona Governing Committee for Tax De-
ferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans (Govern-
ing Committee). Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §38-371 et seq.; 
Ariz. Regs. 2-9-01 et seq. Employees who participate in the 
plan may thereby postpone the receipt of a portion of their 
wages until retirement. By doing so, they postpone paying 
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federal income tax on the amounts deferred until after retire-
ment, when they receive those amounts and any earnings 
thereon.' 
After inviting private companies to submit bids outlining 
the investment opportunities that they were willing to offer 
State employees, the State selected several companies to 
participate in its deferred compensation plan. Most of the 
companies selected offer three basic retirement options: (1) a 
single lump-sum payment upon retirement, (2) periodic pay-
ments of a fixed sum for a fixed period of time, and (3) 
monthly annuity payments for the remainder of the employ-
ee's life. When an employee decides to take part in the de-
ferred compensation plan, he must designate the company in 
which he wishes to invest his deferred wages. Employees 
must choose one of the companies selected by the State to 
participate in the plan; they are not free to invest their de-
ferred compensation in any other way. At the time an em-
ployee enrolls in the plan, he may also select one of the pay-
out options offered by the company that he has chosen, but 
when he reaches retirement age he is free to switch to one of 
the company's other options. If at retirement the employee 
decides to receive a lump-sum payment, he may also pur-
chase any of the options then being offered by the other com-
panies participating in the plan. Most employees find an an-
nuity contract to be the most attractive option, since receipt 
of a lump sum upon retirement requires payment of taxes on 
the entire sum in one year, and the choice of a fixed sum for a 
fixed period requires an employee to speculate as to how long 
he will live. 
Once an employee chooses the company in which he wishes 
to invest and decides the amount of compensation to be de-
'See 26 U. S. C. § 457; Rev. Rul. 72-25; Rev. Rul. 68-99; Rev. Rul. 
60-31. Arizona's deferred compensation program was approved by the In-
ternal Revenue Service in 1974. 
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ferred each month, the State is responsible for withholding 
the appropriate sums from the employee's wages and chan-
nelling those sums to the company designated by the em-
ployee. The State bears the cost of making the necessary 
payroll deductions and of giving employees time off to attend 
group meetings to learn about the plan, but it does not con-
tribute any monies to supplement the employees' deferred 
wages. 
For an employee who elects to receive a monthly annuity 
following retirement, the amount of the employee's monthly 
benefits depends upon the amount of compensation that the 
employee deferred (and any earnings thereon), the employ-
ee's age at retirement, and the employee's sex. All of the 
companies selected by the State to participate in the plan use 
sex-based mortality tables to calculate monthly retirement 
benefits. App. 12. Under these tables a man receives 
larger monthly payments than a woman who deferred the 
same amount of compensation and retired at the same age, 
because the tables classify annuitants on the basis of sex and 
women on average live longer than men. 2 Sex is the only 
factor that the tables use to classify individuals of the same 
age; the tables do not incorporate other factors correlating 
with longevity such as smoking habits, alcohol consumption, 
weight, medical history, or family history. App. 13. 
As of August 18, 1978, 1,675 of the State's approximately 
35,000 employees were participating in the deferred com-
pensation plan. Of these 1,675 participating employees, 681 
were women, and 572 women had elected some form of future 
' Different insurance companies participating in the plan use different 
means of classifying individuals on the basis of sex. Several companies 
use separate tables for men and women. Another company uses a single 
actuarial table based on male mortality rates, but calculates the annuities 
to be paid to women by using a six-year "setback," i. e. , by treating a 
woman as if she were a man six years younger and had the life expectancy 
of a man that age. App. 12. 
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annuity option. As of the same date, 10 women participat-
ing in the plan had retired, and four of those 10 had chosen a 
life-time annuity. App. 6. 
B 
On May 3, 1975, respondent Nathalie Norris, an employee 
in the Arizona Department of Economic Security, elected to 
participate in the plan. She requested that her deferred 
compensation be invested in the Lincoln National Life Insur-
ance Company's fixed annuity contract. Shortly thereafter 
Arizona approved respondent's request and began withhold-
ing $199.50 from her salary each month. 
On April 25, 1978, after exhausting administrative reme-
dies, respondent brought suit in the United States District 
Court for the District of Arizona against the State, the Gov-
erning Committee, and several individual members of the 
Committee. Respondent alleged that the defendants were 
violating § 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
78 Stat. 255, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a), by admin-
istering an annuity plan that discriminates on the basis of 
sex. Respondent requested that the District Court certify a 
class under Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 23(b)(2) consisting of all fe-
male employees of the · State of Arizona "who are enrolled or 
will in the future enroll in the State Deferred Compensation 
Plan." Complaint ~ V. 
On March 13, 1980, the District Court certified a class ac-
tion and granted summary judgment for the plaintiff class,3 
holding that the State's plan violates Title VII. 4 486 F. 
Supp. 645. The court directed petitioners to cease using 
3 The material facts concerning the State's deferred compensation plan 
were set forth in a statement of facts agreed to by all parties. App. 4-13. 
• Although the District Court concluded that the State's plan violates 
Title VII, the court went on to consider and reject respondent's separate 
claim that the plan violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 486 F. Supp., at 651. Because respondent did not cross ap-
peal from this ruling, it was not passed on by the Court of Appeals and is 
not before us. 
82-52-0PINION 
ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITTEE v. NORRIS 5 
sex-based actuarial tables and to pay retired female employ-
ees benefits equal to those paid to similarly situated men. 5 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed, with one judge dissenting. 671 F. 2d 330 (1982). 
We granted certiorari to decide whether the Arizona plan vi-
olates Title VII and whether, if so, the relief ordered by the 
District Court was proper. -- U. S. -- (1982). 
II 
We consider first whether petitioners would have violated 
Title VII if they had run the entire deferred compensation 
plan themselves, without the participation of any insurance 
companies. Title VII makes it an unlawful employment 
practice "to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex or national origin." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). There 
is no question that the opportunity to participate in a de-
ferred compensation plan constitutes a "conditio[n] or privi-
leg[e] of employment,'' 6 and that retirement benefits consti-
tute a form of "compensation." 7 The issue we must decide is 
whether it is discrimination "because of . . . sex" to pay a re-
tired woman lower monthly benefits than a man who de-
ferred the same amount of compensation. 
In Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 
U. S. 702 (1978), we held that an employer had violated Title 
VII by requiring its female employees to make larger con-
• The court subsequently denied respondent's motion to amend the judg-
ment to include an award of retroactive benefits to retired female employ-
ees as compensation for the benefits they had lost because the annuity 
benefits previously paid them had been calculated on the basis of sex-seg-
regated actuarial tables. Respondent did not appeal this ruling. 
6 See Peters v. Missouri-Pacific R . Co., 483 F . 2d 490, 492, n. 3 (CA5), 
cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1002 (1973). 
7 See Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 
712, n. 23 (1978). 
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tributions to a pension fund than male employees in order to 
obtain the same monthly benefits upon retirement. Noting 
that Title VII's "focus on the individual is unambiguous," id., 
at 708, we emphasized that the statute prohibits an employer 
from treating some employees less favorably than others be-
cause of their race, religion, sex, or national origin. !d., at 
70~709. While women as a class live longer than men, id., 
at 704, we rejected the argument that the exaction of greater 
contributions from women was based on a "factor other than 
sex"-i. e., longevity-and was therefore permissible under 
the Equal Pay Act: 8 
"[A]ny individual's life expectancy is based on a number 
of factors, of which sex is only one .... [O]ne cannot 'say 
that an actuarial distinction based entirely on sex is 
"based on any other factor than sex." Sex is exactly 
8 Section 703(h} of Title VII, the so-called Bennett Amendment, pro-
vides that Title VII does not prohibit an employer from "differentiat[ing] 
upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensa-
tion paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation 
is authorized by [the Equal Pay Act]." 78 Stat. 257, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-2(h). 
The Equal Pay Act, 77 Stat. 56, 29 U. S. C. § 206(d), provides in perti-
nent part: 
"No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section 
shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are 
employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to em-
ployees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays 
wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal 
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and 
:r:esponsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, 
except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a 
merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality 
of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex: 
Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in viola-
tion of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of 
this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee." 77 Stat. 56, 29 
u. s. c. § 206(d). 
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what it is based on.'" 435 U. S., at 712-713, quoting 
553 F. 2d 581, 588 (CA9 1976), and the Equal Pay Act. 
We concluded that a plan requiring women to make greater 
contributions than men discriminates "because of . . . sex" 
for the simple reason that it treats each woman "'in a manner 
which but for [her] sex would [have been] different."' 435 
U. S., at 710, quoting Developments in the Law, Employ-
ment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1174 (1971). 
We have no hesitation in holding, as have all but one of the 
lower courts that have considered the question, 9 that the 
classification of employees on the basis of sex is no more per-
missible at the pay-out stage of a retirement plan than at the 
pay-in stage. 10 We reject petitioners' contention that the Ar-
9 See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n., 691 F. 2d 1054 (CA2 
1982), cert. pending, No. 82-791; Retired Public Employees' Assn. of Cali-
fornia v. California, 677 F. 2d 733 (CA9 1982), cert. pending, No. 82-262; 
Women in City Gov't. United v. City of New York, '515 F. Supp. 295 
(SDNY 1981); Hannahs v. New York State Teachers' Retirement System, 
26 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 527 (SDNY 1981); Probe v. State Teachers' Retire-
ment system, 27 Fair. Emp. Prac. Cas. 1306 (CD Cal. 1981), appeal 
docketed, Nos. 81-5865, 81-5866 (CA9 1981); Shaw v. Internat'l Assn. of 
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 24 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas 995 (CD Cal. 
1980). See also EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F. 2d 1139 (CA11978). 
Only the Sixth Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion. Peters v. 
Wayne State University, 691 F. 2d 235 (1981), cert. pending, No. 82-794. 
10 It is irrelevant that females employees in Manhart were required to 
participate in the pension plan, whereas participation in the Arizona de-
ferred compensation plan is voluntary. Title VII forbids all discrimination 
concerning "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment," not just discrimination concerning those aspects of the employment 
relationship as to which the employee has no choice. It is likewise irrele-
vant that the Arizona plan includes two options-the lump-sum option and 
the fixed-sum-for-a-fixed-period option-that are provided on equal terms 
to men and women. An employer that offers one fringe benefit on a dis-
criminatory basis cannot escape liability because he also offers other bene-
fits on a nondiscriminatory basis. Cf. Mississippi University for Women 
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izona plan does not discriminate on the basis of sex because a 
woman and a man who defer the same amount of compensa-
tion will obtain upon retirement annuity policies having ap-
proximately the same present actuarial value. 11 Arizona has 
simply offered its employees a choice among different benefit 
levels, any one of which, if offered alone, would be equivalent 
to the plan at issue in Manhart, where the employer deter-
mined both the monthly contributions employees were re-
quired to make and the level of benefits that they were paid. 
If a woman participating in the Arizona plan wishes to obtain 
monthly benefits equal to those obtained by a man, she must 
make greater monthly contributions than he, just as the fe-
male employees in Manhart had to make greater contribu-
tions to obtain equal benefits. For any particular level of 
benefits that a woman might wish to receive, she will have to 
make greater monthly contributions to obtain that level a 
benefits than a man would have to make. The fact that Ari-
zona has offered a range of discriminatory benefit levels, 
rather than only one such level, obviously provides no basis 
whatsoever for distinguishing Manhart. 
In asserting that the Arizona plan is nondiscriminatory be-
cause a man and a woman who have made equal contributions 
will obtain annuity policies of roughly equal present actuarial 
value, petitioners incorrectly assume that Title VII permits 
an employer to classify employees on the basis of sex in pre-
dicting their longevity. Otherwise there would be no basis 
v. Hogan,- U.S.-,-, n. 8 (1982). 
11 The present actuarial value of an annuity policy is determined by mul-
tiplying the present value (in this case, the value at the time of the employ-
ee's retirement) of each monthly payment promised by the probability, 
which is supplied by an actuarial table, that the annuitant will live to re-
ceive that payment. An annuity policy issued to a retired female em-
ployee under a sex-based retirement plan will have roughly the same 
present actuarial value as a policy issued to a similarly situated man, since 
the lower value of each monthly payment she is promised is offset by the 
likelihood that she will live longer and therefore receive more payments. 
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for postulating that a woman's annuity policy has the same 
present actuarial value as the policy of a similarly situated 
man even though her policy provides lower monthly bene-
fits. 12 This underlying assumption-that sex may properly 
be used to predict longevity-is flatly inconsistent with the 
basic teaching of Manhart: that Title VII requires employers 
to treat their employees as individuals, not "as simply com-
ponents of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class." 435 
U. S., at 708. Manhart squarely rejected the notion that, 
because women as a class live longer than men, an employer 
may adopt a retirement plan that treats every individual 
woman less favorably than every individual man. I d., at 
71&-717. 
As we observed in Manhart, "[a]ctuarial studies could un-
questionably identify differences in life expectancy based on 
race or national origin, as well as sex." I d., at 709 (footnote 
omitted). If petitioners' interpretation of the statute were 
correct, such studies could be used as a justification for pay-
ing employees of one race lower monthly benefits than em-
ployees of another race. We continue to believe that "a stat-
ute that was designed to make race irrelevant in the 
employment market," ibid., citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U. S. 424, 436 (1971), could not reasonably be construed 
to permit such a racial classification. And if it would be un-
lawful to use race-based actuarial tables, it must also be un-
lawful to use sex-based tables, for under Title VII a distinc-
tion based on sex stands on the same footing as a distinction 
based on race unless it falls within one of a few narrow excep-
tions that are plainly inapplicable here. 13 
12 See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n., supra, 691 F. 2d, at 
1061-1062; Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, Sex Discrimiation in 
Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and Demographic Analy-
sis, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 505, 512-514 (1980). 
18 The exception for bona fide occupational qualifications, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-2(e), is inapplicable since the terms of a retirement plan have noth-
ing to do with occupational qualifications. The only possible relevant ex-
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What we said in Manhart bears repeating: "Congress has 
decided that classifications based on sex, like those based on 
national origin or race, are unlawful." 435 U. S., at 709. 
The use of of sex-segregated actuarial tables to calculate re-
tirement benefits violates Title VII whether or not the tables 
reflect an accurate prediction of the longevity of women as a 
class, for under the statute "[e]ven a true generalization 
about [a] class" cannot justify class-based treatment. 14 Ibid. 
ception recognized in the Bennett Amendment, see n. 8, supra, is inappli-
cable in this case for the same reason it was inapplicable in Manhart: a 
scheme that uses sex to predict longevity is based on sex; it is not based on 
"any other factor than sex." See 435 U. S., at 712 ("any individual's life 
expectancy is based on any number of factors , of which sex is only one"). 
14 In his separate opinion in Manhart, JUSTICE BLACKMUN expressed 
doubt that that decision could be reconciled with this Court's previous deci-
sion in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976). In Gilbert a 
divided Court held that the exclusion of pregnancy from an employer's dis-
ability benefit plan did not constitute discrimination "because of ... sex" 
within the meaning of Title VII. The majority reasoned that the special 
treatment of pregnancy distinguished not between men and women, but 
between pregnant women and nonpregnant persons of both sexes. Id., at 
135. The dissenters in Gilbert asserted that "it offends common sense to 
suggest that a classification revolving around pregnancy is not, at the mini-
mum, strongly 'sex related,'" id., at 149 (BRENNAN, J. , dissenting) (cita-
tion omitted), and that the special treatment of pregnancy constitutes sex 
discrimination because "it is the capacity to become pregnant which pri-
marily differentiates the female from the male." !d., at 162 (STEVENS, J., 
dissenting). 
The tension in our cases that JUSTICE BLACKMUN noted in Manhart has 
since been eliminated by the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act of 1978 (PDA), Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, in which Congress 
overruled Gilbert by amending Title VII to establish that "the terms 
'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include ... because of or on the 
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e(k) (Supp. IV). See Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock 
Co. v. EEOC, - U. S. - (1983). 
The enactment of the PDA buttresses our holding in Manhart that the 
greater cost of providing retirement benefits for women as a class cannot 
justify differential treatment based on sex. 435 U. S., at 716-717. Jus-
82-52-0PINION 
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An individual woman may not be paid lower monthly benefits 
simply because women as a class live longer than men. 15 Cf. 
Connecticut v. Teal, -- U. S. -- (1982) (an individual 
may object that an employment test used in making promo-
tion decisions has a discriminatory impact even if the class of 
which he is a member has not been disproportionately denied 
promotion). 
We conclude that it is just as much discrimination "because 
of . . . sex" to pay a woman lower benefits when she has 
made the same contributions as a man as it is to make her pay 
larger contributions to obtain the same benefits. 
III 
Although petitioners plainly would have violated Title VII 
if they had run the entire deferred compensation plan them-
selves, we must decide whether their conduct is beyond the 
TICE REHNQUIST's opinion for the Court in Gilbert relied heavily on the ab-
sence of proof that the employer's disability program provided less cover-
age for women as a class than for men. 429 U. S., at 138-139. In 
enacting the PDA, Congress recognized that requiring employers to cover 
pregnancy on the same terms as other disabilities would add approximately 
$200 million to their total costs, but concluded that the PDA was necessary 
"to clarify [the] original intent" of Title VII. H. R. Rep. No. 948, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 9 (1978). Since the purpose of the PDA was simply to 
make the treatment of pregnancy consistent with general Title VII princi-
ples, see Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,--
U. S., at --, and n. 16, Congress' decision to forbid special treament of 
pregnancy despite the special costs associated therewith provides further 
support for our conclusion in Manhart that the greater costs of providing 
retirement benefits for female employees does not justify the use of a 
sex-based retirement plan. Cf. id., at--, n. 24. See also 29 CFR 
§ 1604.9(e) (1982) ("It shall not be a defense under Title VII to a charge of 
sex discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with 
respect to one sex than the other"). 
16 As we noted in Manhart, "insurance is concerned with events that are 
individually unpredictable, but that is characteristic of many employment 
decisions" and has never been deemed a justification for "resort to the 
classifications proscribed by Title VII." 435 U. S., at 710. 
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reach of the statute because it is the companies chosen by pe-
titioners to participate in the plan that calculate and pay the 
retirement benefits. 
Title VII "primarily govern[s] relations between employ-
ees and their employer, not between employees and third 
parties." 16 Manhart, 435 U. S., at 718, n. 33. Recognizing 
this limitation on the reach of the statute, we noted in 
Manhart that 
"Nothing in our holding implies that it would be unlawful 
for an employer to set aside equal retirement contribu-
tions for each employee and let each retiree purchase the 
largest benefits which his or her accumulated contribu-
tions could command in the open market." I d., at 
717-718 (footnote omitted). 
Relying on this caveat, petitioners contend that they have 
not violated Title VII because the life annuities offered by 
the companies participating in the Arizona plan reflect what 
is available in the open market. Petitioners cite a statement 
in the stipulation of facts entered into in the District Court 
that "[a]ll tables presently in use provide a larger sum to a 
male than to a female of equal age, account value and any 
guaranteed payment period." App. 10. 17 
It is no defense that all annuities available in the open mar-
ket may have been based on sex-segregated actuarial tables. 
16 The statute applies to employers and "any agent" of an employer. 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e(b). 
17 Although petitioners also emphasize that an employee participating in 
the Arizona plan can elect to receive a lump-sum payment upon retirement 
and then "purchase the largest benefits which his or her accumulated con-
tributions could command in the open market," the fact that the lump-sum 
option permits this has no bearing on whether petitioners have discrimi-
nated because of sex in offering an annuity option to its employees. As we 
have pointed out above, ante, at note 10, it is no defense to discrimination 
in the provision of a fringe benefit that another fringe benefit is provided 
on a nondiscriminatory basis. 
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In context it is reasonably clear that the stipulation on which 
petitioners rely means only that all the tables used by the 
companies taking part in the Arizona plan are based on sex, 18 
but our conclusion does not depend upon whether petitioner's 
construction of the stipulation is accepted or rejected. It is 
irrelevant whether any other insurers offered annuities on a 
sex-neutral basis, since the State did not simply set aside re-
tirement contributions and let employees purchase annuities 
on the open market. On the contrary, the State provided 
the opportunity to obtain an annuity as part of its own de-
ferred compensation plan. It invited insurance companies to 
submit bids outlining the terms on which they would supply 
retirement benefits 19 and selected the companies that were 
permitted to participate in the plan. Once the State selected 
these companies, it entered into contracts with them govern-
ing the terms on which benefits were to be provided to em-
ployees. Employees enrolling in the plan could obtain re-
tirement benefits only from one of those companies, and no 
employee could be contacted by a company except as permit-
ted by the State. Ariz. Regs. 2-9-06.A, 2-9-20.A. 
Under these circumstances there can be no serious ques-
tion that petitioners are legally responsible for the discrimi-
natory terms on which annuities are offered by the companies 
chosen to participate in the plan. Having created a plan 
whereby employees can obtain the advantages of using de-
ferred compensation to purchase an annuity only if they in-
vest in one of the companies specifically selected by the 
State, the State cannot disclaim responsibility for the dis-
criminatory features of the insurers' options. 20 Since em-
18 This is the natural reading of the statement, since it appears in the 
portion of the stipulation discussing the options offered by the companies 
participating in the State's plan. 
19 The State's contract procurement documents asked the bidders to 
quote annuity rates for men and women. 
00 See Peters v. Wayne State University, supra, 691 F . 2d, at 238; EEOC 
v. Colby College, supra, at 1141; Van Alstyne, Equality for Individuals or 
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ployers are ultimately responsible for the "compensation, 
terms, conditions, [and] privileges of employment" provided 
to employees, an employer that adopts a fringe-benefit 
scheme that discriminates among its employees on the basis 
of race, religion, sex, or national origin violates Title VII re-
gardless of whether third parties are also involved in the dis-
crimination. 21 In this case the State of Arizona was itself a 
party to contracts concerning the annuities to be offered by 
the insurance companies, and it is well established that both 
parties to a discriminatory contract are liable for any dis-
criminatory provisions the contract contains, regardless of 
Equality for Groups: Implications of the Supreme Court Decision in the 
Manhart Case, 64 AAUP Bulletin 150, 152-155 (1978). 
21 An analogy may usefully be drawn to our decision in Ford Motor Co. v. 
NLRB, 441 U. S. 488 (1979). The employer in that case provided in-plant 
food services to its employees under a contract with an independent ca-
terer. We held that the prices charged for the food constituted "terms 
and conditions of employment" under the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) and were therefore mandatory subjects for collective bargaining. 
We specifically rejected the employer's argument that, because the food 
was provided by a third party, the prices did not implicate " 'an aspect of 
the relationship between the employer and employees."' Id., at 501, 
quoting Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 
404 U. S. 157, 176 (1971). We emphasized that the selection of an inde-
pendent contractor to provide the food did not change the fact that "the 
matter of in-plant food prices and services is an aspect of the relationship 
between Ford and its own employees." 441 U. S., at 501. 
Just as the issue in Ford was whether the employer had refused to bar-
gain with respect to "terms and conditions of employment," 29 U. S. C. 
§ 158(d), the issue here is whether petitioners have discriminated against 
female employees with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions or priv-
ileges of employment." Even more so than in-plant food prices, retire-
ment benefits are matters "of deep concern" to employees, id., at 498, and 
plainly constitute an aspect of the employment relationship. Indeed, in 
Ford we specifically compared in-plant food services to "other kinds of 
benefits, such as health insurance, implicating outside suppliers." Id., at 
503, n. 15. We do not think it makes any more difference here than it did 
in Ford that the employer engaged third parties to provide a particular 
benefit rather than directly providing the benefit itself. 
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which party initially suggested inclusion of the discrimina-
tory provisions. 22 It would be inconsistent with the broad re-
medial purposes of Title VII 23 to hold that an employer who 
adopts a discriminatory fringe benefit plan can avoid liability 
on the ground that he could not find a third party willing to 
treat his employees on a nondiscriminatory basis. An em-
ployer who confronts such a situation must either supply the 
fringe benefit himself, without the assistance of any third 
party, or not provide it at all. 
IV 
We turn finally to the relief awarded by the District Court. 
The court enjoined petitioners to ensure that future annuity 
payments to retired female employees shall be equal to the 
payments received by similarly situated male employees. 24 
tft In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975), we 
22 See Williams v. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n, 673 F. 2d 742, 750-751 
(CA5 1982), cert. denied, -- U. S. -- (1983); Williams v. Owens-
Illinois, Inc., 665 F. 2d 918, 926 (CA9), mod. and reh. denied, 28 Fair 
Emp. Cas. 1820, cert. denied, -- U. S. -- (1982); Farmer v. ARA 
Services , Inc., 660 F. 2d 1096, 1104 (CA6 1981); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel 
Corp., 635 F. 2d 1007, 1014 (CA2 1980), cert. denied, 452 U. S. 940 (1981); 
United States v. N. L. Industries, Inc. , 479 F. 2d 354, 37~80 (CA8 1973); 
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F. 2d 791, 799 (CA4), cert. dismissed, 404 
u. s. 1006 (1971). 
23 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-418, 421 
(1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S., at 429-430. 
24 The court did not explain its reasons for choosing this remedy. 
Apart from their contention that they have not violated Title VII, which 
we have rejected, petitioners do not challenge so much of the District 
Court's judgment as enjoins them from carrying out their statutory obliga-
tions in the future through the use of sex-based actuarial tables. (We 
were informed at oral argument that the State no longer offers employees 
the opportunity to invest in annuity contracts. Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment, at 8.) 
Since respondents did not appeal the District Court's refusal to award 
damages for benefit payments made prior to the court's decision, see n. 5, 
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emphasized that one of the main purposes of Title VII is "to 
make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlaw-
ful employment discrimination." Id., at 418. We recog-
nized that there is a strong presumption that "[t]he injured 
party is to be placed, as near as may be, in the situation he 
would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed." 
Id., at 418--419, quoting Wicker v. Hoppock, 6 Wall. 94, 99 
(1867). Once a violation of the statute has been found, retro-
active relief "should be denied only for reasons which, if ap-
plied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory 
purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the econ-
omy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through 
past discrimination." 422 U. S., at 421 (footnote omitted). 
Applying this standard, we held that the mere absence of bad 
faith on the part of the employer is not a sufficient reason for 
denying such relief. I d., at 422--423. 
Although this Court noted in Manhart that "[t]he Albe-
marle presumption in favor of retroactive liability can seldom 
be overcome," 435 U. S., at 719, the Court concluded that 
under the circumstances the District Court had abused its 
discretion in requiring the employer to refund to female em-
ployees all contributions they were required to make in ex-
cess of the contributions demanded of men. The Court ex-
plained that "conscientious and intelligent administrators of 
pension funds, who did not have the benefit of the extensive 
briefs and arguments presented to us, may well have as-
sumed that a program like the Department's was entirely 
lawful," since "[t]he courts had been silent on the question, 
and the administrative agencies had conflicting views." Id., 
at 720 (footnote omitted). The Court also noted that retro-
active relief based on "[ d]rastic changes in the legal rules 
governing pension and insurance funds" can "jeopardiz[e] the 
insurer's solvency and, ultimately, the insureds' benefits," 
id., at 721, and that the burden of such relief can fall on inno-
cent third parties. I d., at 722--723. 
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While the relief ordered here affects only benefit payments 
made after the date of the District Court's judgment, it does 
not follow that the relief is wholly prospective in nature, as 
an injunction concerning future conduct ordinarily is, and 
should therefore be routinely awarded once liability is estab-
lished. When a court directs a change in benefits based on 
contributions made before the court's order, the court is 
awarding relief that is fundamentally retroactive in nature. 
This is true because retirement benefits under a plan such as 
that at issue here represent a return on contributions which 
were made during the employee's working years and which 
were intended to fund the benefits without any additional 
contributions from any source after retirement. 
A recognition that the relief awarded by the District Court 
is partly retroactive is only the beginning of the inquiry. 
Absent special circumstances a victim of a Title VII violation 
is entitled to whatever retroactive relief is necessary to undo 
any damage resulting from the violation. See Albemarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S., at 418-419, 421. As to any 
disparity in benefits that is attributable to contributions 
made after our decision in Manhart, we conclude that there 
are no special circumstances justifying the denial of retroac-
tive relief. Our ruling today was clearly foreshadowed by 
Manhart. That decision should have put petitioners on no-
tice that a man and a woman who make the same contribu-
tions to a retirement plan must be paid the same monthly 
benefits. 25 To the extent that any disparity in benefits com-
25 0nly one of the several lower court decisions since Manhart has ac-
cepted the argument that the principle established in that decision is lim-
ited to plans that require women to make greater contributions than men, 
seen. 9, supra, and no court has held that an employer can assert as a de-
fense that the calculation and payment of retirement benefits is made by 
third parties selected by the employer. See also Van Alstyne, supra, 64 
AAUP Bulletin, at 152-155 (predicting that the the involvement of an inde-
pendent insurer would not be recognized as a defense and noting that an 
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ing due after the date of the District Court's judgment is 
attributable to contributions made after Manhart, there is 
therefore no unfairness in requiring petitioners to pay retired 
female employees whatever sum is necessary each month to 
bring them up to the benefit level that they would have en-
joyed had their post-M anhart contributions been treated in 
the same way as those of similarly situated male employees. 
To the extent, however, that the disparity in benefits that 
the District Court required petitioners to eliminate is attrib-
utable to contributions made before Manhart, we think the 
court gave insu~cient attention to this Court's recognition in 
Manhart that until that decision the use of sex-based tables 
might reasonably have been assumed to be lawful. Insofar 
as this portion of the disparity is concerned, we think the Dis-
trict Court should have inquired into the circumstances in 
which petitioners, after Manhart, could have applied sex-
neutral tables to the pre-M anhart contributions of a female 
employee and a similarly situated male employee without vi-
olating any contractual rights that the latter might have had 
on the basis of his pre-M anhart contributions. If, in the case 
of a particular female employee and a similarly situated male 
employee, petitioners could have applied sex-neutral tables 
to pre-M anhart contributions without violating any contrac-
tual right of the male employee, they should have done so in 
order to prevent further discrimination in the payment of re-
tirement benefits in the wake of this Court's ruling in 
Manhart. 26 Since a female employee in this situation should 
employer offering a sex-based retirement plan funded by such an insurer 
would be well advised to act expeditiously to bring himself into compliance 
with the law). 
211 Since the actual calculation and payment of retirement benefits was in 
the hands of third parties under the Arizona plan, petitioners would not 
automatically have been able to apply sex-neutral tables to pre-Manhart 
contributions even if pre-existing contractual rights posed no obstacle. 
However, petitioners were in a position to exert influence on the compa-
nies participating in the plan, which depended upon the State for the busi-
82--52-0PINION 
ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITTEE v. NORRIS 19 
have had sex-neutral tables applied to her pre-Manhart con-
tributions, it is only fair that petitioners be required to sup-
plement any benefits coming due after the District Court's 
judgment by whatever sum is necessary to compensate her 
for their failure to adopt sex-neutral tables. 
If, on the other hand, sex-neutral tables could not have 
been applied to the pre-M anhart contributions of a particular 
female employee and any similarly situated male employee 
without violating the male employee's contractual rights, it 
would be inequitable to award such relief. To do so would be 
to require petitioners to compensate the female employee for 
a disparity attributable to pre-M anhart conduct even though 
such conduct might reasonably have been assumed to be law-
ful and petitioners could not have done anything after 
Manhart to eliminate that disparity short of expending State 
funds. With respect to any female employee determined to 
fall in this category, petitioners need only ensure that her 
monthly benefits are no lower than they would have been had 
her post-M anhart contributions been treated in the same 
way as those of a similarly situated male employee. 
The record before us does not indicate whether some or all 
of the male participants in the plan who had not retired at the 
time Manhart was decided 2:1 had any contractual right to a 
particular level of benefits that would have been impaired by 
the application of sex-neutral tables to their pre-Manhart 
ness generated by the deferred compensation plan, and we see no reason 
why petitioners should stand in a better position because they engaged 
third parties to pay the benefits than they would be in had they run the 
entire plan themselves. 
27 Since the amount of monthly annuity payments is ordinarily fixed by 
the time of retirement, we assume that sex-neutral tables could not have 
been applied after Manhart to male employees who had retired before that 
decision without violating their contractual rights. If this assumption is 
correct, it would follow from what we have said above that no member of 
the respondent class who retired before Manhart would be entitled to 
relief. 
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contributions. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is affirmed in part and vacated in part and the case 
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.§u.vumt <!Jcltd cf tltt 'Jihtittb .:§taft.s' 
~fringtcn. ~. <!J. 20c?Jt.~ 
.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
June 3, 1983 
Re: 82-52 -
Arizona Governing Committee for Tax 
Deferred Annuity and Deferred 





cc: The Conference 
cpm 
CHAMBERS OF 
.§u:punu <!Jcurl cf tlf~ ~ub ~hrlt$ 
:.MJrittghnt. ~. elf. 2.llgi'!' 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 3, 1983 
Re: 82-52 - Arizona Governing Committee 
for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred 
Compensation Plans v. Norris 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
,"June 6, 1.qa3 
82-52 Arizona Governing Cornmitt~. ~ v. 'Piforris 
D~~r T.hur.good: 
I am working on a dissent, and hope to qet it out 
b~fore too much longer. 
Si ncP.reJv, 
· Justice M~rshall 
lfp/ss 




.JUSTICE w .. . .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
.§n:prtntt <qanrt af flrt ~b .§httt,tr 
.. &SJri:ttgtlltt. ~· <!f. 20.?~~ 
June 9, 1983 
No. 82-52 
Arizona Governing Committee 








I • ' I I (. 
\ ' 
Copies to the Conference 
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NORRISll SALLY-POW 
Its purpose, of course, is broadly to proscribe 
discrimination in employment practices. But as we 
recognized in Menhart 
lfp/ss 06/18/83 Rider A, p. 7 (Norris) 
NORRIS? SALLY-POW 
Moreover, Congress consistently has chosen to leave the 
regulation of the insurance industry to the respective 
states. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33, as amended, 
15 u.s.c. §1011, et seq. 
lfp/ss 06/18/83 Rider A, p. 9 (Norris) 
NORRIS9 SALLY-POW 
Of course, nothing in the language of Title VII 
supports this preemption of state jurisdiction nor has the 
Court identified any evidence in the legislative history 
that Congress considered the widespread use sex-based 
mortality tables to be discriminatory or that Congress 
intended to modify its previous grant by the McCarran-
Ferguson Act of exclusive jurisdiction to the states to 
regulate the terms of protection offered by insurance 
companies. 
lfp/ss 06/18/83 Rider B, p. 11 (Norris) 
NORRISllB SALLY-POW 
8. The effect of employment practices on the 
individual that Title VII addresses simply is inapplicable 
to a determination of the risk element where one's life 
span is a relevant factor. It is precisely because the 
life span of a single individual cannot be predicted that 
insurance companies must rely on mortality tables based on 
long experience of identifiable groups. As is conceded, 
actuarial statistics establish beyond question that women 
as a group outlive men. Similarly, though with far less 
reliability, different actuarial predictions are made 
based upon a variety of other factors that distinguish 
large groups of people. (Rives: Do our briefs give us 
any list of such factors? If not, the foregoing sentence 
2. 
should be modified or eliminated. What I am thinking 
about, of course, are ethnic, geographic location, certain 
inherited or developed conditions that affect health -
such as high blood, excessive obesity, etc.) 
lfp/ss 06/18/83 Rider A, p. 13 (Norris} 
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III 
The policies underlying Title VII, rather than 
supporting the Court's decision, strongly suggest - at 
least for me - the opposite. This remedial statute was 
enacted to eradicte the types of discrimination in 
employment that then were pervasive in our society. The 
entire thrust of Title VII is directed against 
~ 
discrimination. As Justice Blackmun made clear with 
~ 
clarity and brevity, life expectancy is a "non-
stigmatizing factor that demonstrably differentiates 
females from males and that is not measurable on an 
individual basis .... [T]here is nothing arbitrary, 
irrational or discriminatory about recognizing the 
2. 
objective and accepted ••• disparity in the female-male 
life expectancies in computing rates for retirement 
plans". Manhart, 435 u.s., at 724 (concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). Despite the absence of any 
discrimination in the normal understanding of that term, 
and also ignoring the proven accuracy and efficiency of 
mortality tables, the Court reads into Title VII a meaning 
and purpose never intended. A justification curiously 
relied on by the Court is its view that sex 
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Ante, at 9 (Rives: 
would it make any sense to cite in footnote cases where we 
have refused to apply strict strutiny to sex 
classifications?) 
"effect" of unisex 
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tables ~ca ~m.~ r:;1lt of 
) 
3. 
~Adisparte impact on me~ . Men as a class, if this type of 
benefit continues to be offered by insurance carriers, 
will receive less aggregate benefits for the same price 
than women. If an employer were to adopt a f~ 
-~ 
impac 
on a racially identifi group, no one would doubt that 
facie Title VII violation. See 
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) If the 
Court is correct in finding sex and race comparable for 
the purposes of its decision today on a theory of 
disparate impact, what will it say when 
~~~ 
men - as) teey wi l-l 
~ 
- assert a violation of Title VII based on disparate 
1\ 
treatment of them. 11 The difficulty, of course, arises 
~ 
not because of discrimination in its normal sense but from 
.1\ 
today's decision that wholly distorts that understanding. 
Rives: I may not be "on target" in suggesting 
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~d. Yet, I believe the basic thought is correct, and 
if we can state it in a sound and lawyerlike way, I would 
like to do it. In this connection, to what extent do 
briefs may this argument? 
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NORRIS6 SALLY-POW 
As indicated above, the consequences of the 
~ -/<,4,~~~~~ .· 
Court's holding are ..unlikely to be beneficial: (i) 
~ 
insurance carriers may choose, as some already have, not 
to write unisex annuities; (ii) those that do choose to 
offer such annuities will pass on the increased cost to 
someone, certainly not excluding the purchasers; or (iii) 
employers will elect simply not to provide these 
annuities. There is no evidence that Congress intended 
this result. Nor does Menhart fairly support this 
sweeping extension of Title VII. 
lfp/ss 06/18/83 Rider A, p. 18 (Norris) 
NORRIS18 SALLY-POW 
Rives: Add a footnote along the following lines: 
This case involves the state of Arizona. 
Presumably other state and local governments will be 
directly affected by today's decision. Imposing 
unanticipated financial burdens of the magnitude indicated 
comes at a time when many states and local governments 
already are struggling to meet substantial fiscal 
deficits. Income, excise and property taxes are being 
increased. I can perceive of no justification whatever 
for the United States Supreme Court, particularly in view 
of the question left open in Manhart, imposing this 
2. 
enormous retroactive burden upon the public - and, of 
course, it will be the public who bear it. 
lfp/ss 06/18/83 Rider A, p. 13 (Norris) 
NORRIS13 SALLY-POW 
III 
The policies underlying Title VII, rather than 
supporting the Court's decision, strongly suggest - at 
least for me - the opposite. This remedial statute was 
enacted to eradicte the types of discrimination in 
employment that then were pervasive in our society. The 
entire thrust of Title VII is directed against 
discrimination. As Justice Blackmun has made clear with 
clarity and brevity, life expectancy is a "non-
stigmatizing factor that demonstrably differentiates 
females from males and that is not measurable on an 
individual basis •••• [T]here is nothing arbitrary, 
irrational or discriminatory about recognizing the 
2. 
objective and accepted ••. disparity in the female-male 
life expectancies in computing rates for retirement 
plans". Manhart, 435 u.s., at 724 (concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). Despite the absence of any 
discrimination in the normal understanding of that term, 
and also ignoring the proven accuracy and efficiency of 
mortality tables, the Court reads into Title VII a meaning 
and purpose never intended. A justification curiously 
relied on by the Court is its view that sex 
classifications should be treated no differently - in the 
context of this case - from racial classification. Ante, 
at 9 (Rives: would it make any sense to cite in footnote 
cases where we have refused to apply strict strutiny to 
sex classifications?) This reasoning, based solely on the 
perceived "effect" of unisex tables, also would apply to 
3. 
the disparte impact on men that will result from today's 
decision. Men as a class, if this type of benefit 
continues to be offered by insurance carriers, will 
receive less aggregate benefits for the same price than 
women. If the Court is correct in finding sex and race 
comparable for the purposes of its decision today on a 
theory of disparate impact, what will it say when men - as 
well they may- assert a violation of Title VII based on 
the disparate treatment of them. 11 The difficulty, of 
course, arises not because of any discrimination in its 
normal sense but from today's decision that wholly 
distorts that understanding. 
Rives: I may not be "on target" in suggesting 
revision of pages 13 and 14. I realize this is a "touchy" 
4. 
area. Yet, I believe the basic thought is correct, and if 
we can state it in a sound and lawyerlike way, I would 
like to do it. In this connection, to what extent do 
briefs may this argument? In my view, HAB's 
position on non-discrimination is a more telling point 
than the impact on the insurance industry. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court today holds that an employer may not offer its 
employees life annuities from a private insurance company 
that uses sex-based mortality tables. This holding will have 
a far-reaching effect on the operation of insurance and pen-
sion plans. Employers may be forced to discontinue offering 
life annuities, or potentially disruptive changes may be re-
quired in long-established methods of calculating insurance 
and pensions. 1 Either course will work a major change in 
'The cost of continuing to provide annuities may become prohibitive. 
The minimum additional cost necessary to equalize benefits prospectively 
would range from $85 to $93 million each year for at least the next 15 years. 
United States Department of Labor, Cost Study of the Impact of an Equal 
Benefits Rule on Pension Benefits 4 (1983) (hereinafter Department of 
Labor Cost Study). This minimum cost assumes that employers 'will be 
free to use the least costly method of adjusting benefits. This assumption 
may be unfounded. Employers may be required to "top up" benefits-
i. e., calculate women's benefits at the rate applicable to men rather than 
apply a unisex rate to both men and women. See n. 10, infra. If so, the 
cost of providing purely prospective benefits would range from $428 to 
$676 million each year for at least the next 15 years. Department of Labor 
Cost Study 31. No one seriously suggests that these costs will not be 
passed on-in large part-to the annuity beneficiaries or, in the case of 
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the way the cost of insurance is determined-probably to the 
detriment of all employees. This is contrary to our explicit 
recognition in Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 717 (1978), that Title VII "was [not] 
intended to revolutionize the insurance and pension indus-
tries." The Court adds to this disruption by making its deci-
sion retroactive, thereby imposing potentially crippling bur-
dens on both public and private employers. 2 
I 
The State of Arizona provides its employees with a volun-
tary pension plan that allows them to defer receipt of a por-
tion of their compensation until retirement. If an employee 
chooses to participate, an amount designated by the em-
ployee is withheld from each paycheck and invested by the 
State on the employee's behalf. When an employee retires, 
he or she may receive the amount that has accrued in one of 
three ways. The employee may withdraw the total amount 
accrued, arrange for periodic payments of a fixed sum for a 
fixed time, or use the accrued amount to purchase a life 
annuity. 
There is no contention that the State's plan discriminates 
between men and women when an employee contributes to 
the fund. The plan is voluntary and each employee may con-
tribute as much as he or she chooses. Nor does anyone con-
tend that either of the first two methods of repaying the ac-
crued amount at retirement is discriminatory. Thus, if 
Arizona had adopted the same contribution plan but provided 
only the first two repayment options, there would be no dis-
pute that its plan complied with Title VII of the Civil Rights 
state and local governments, to the public. 
2 The Court's limited retroactive remedy may entail additional annual 
costs of $572 million to $886 million for at least the next 15 years. Depart-
ment of Labor Cost Study 33. These figures assume, as the Court appears 
to require, see ante, at 18, that employers will have to top up benefit~. 
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Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e. The first two 
options, however, have disadvantages. If an employee 
chooses to take a lump-sum payment, the tax liability will be 
substantial. 3 The second option ameliorates the tax prob-
lem by spreading the receipt of the accrued amount over a 
fixed period of time. This option, however, does not guard 
against the possibility that the finite number of payments se-
lected by the employee will fail to provide income for the re-
mainder of his or her life. 
The third option-the purchase of a life annuity-resolves 
both of these problems. It reduces an employee's tax liabil-
ity by spreading the payments out over time, and it guaran-
tees that the employee will receive a stream of payments for 
life. State law prevents Arizona from accepting the financial 
uncertainty of funding life annuities. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 38--871(C)(l). But to achieve tax benefits under federal 
law, the life annuity must be purchased from a company des-
ignated by the retirement plan. Rev. Rul. 72-25, 1972-1 
Cum. Bull. 127; Rev. Rul. 68--99, 1968--1 Cum. Bull193. Ac-
cordingly, Arizona contracts with private insurance compa-
nies to make life annuities available to its employees. The 
companies that underwrite the life annuities, as do the vast 
majority of private insurance companies in the United States, 
use sex-based mortality tables. Thus, the only effect of Ari-
zona's third option is to allow its employees to purchase at a 
tax saving the same annuities they otherwise would purchase 
on the open market. 
The Court holds that Arizona's voluntary plan violates 
Title VII. In its view, Title VII requires an employer to fol-
low one of three courses. An employer must provide unisex 
annuities itself, contract with insurance companies to provide 
such annuities, or provide no annuities to its employees. 
Ante, at 15. The Court's first option is largely illusory. 
' The employee will be required to include the entire amount received as 
income. See 26 U. S. C. § 457; Rev. Rul. 68-99, 1968-1 Cum, Bull 193. 
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Most employers do not have either the financial resources or 
administrative ability to underwrite annuities. Or, as in this 
case, state law may prevent an employer from providing an-
nuities. If unisex annuities are available, an employer may 
contract with private insurance companies to provide them. 
It is stipulated, however, that the insurance companies with 
which Arizona contracts do not provide unisex annuities, nor 
do insurance companies generally underwrite them. The in-
surance industry either is prevented by state law from doing 
so 4 or it views unisex mortality tables as actuarially un-
sound. An employer, of course, may choose the Court's 
third option. It simply may decline to offer its employees 
the right to purchase annuities at a substantial tax saving. 
It is difficult to see the virtue in such a compelled choice. 
II 
As indicated above, the consequences of the Court's hold-
ing are unlikely to be beneficial. If the cost to employers of 
offering unisex annuities is prohibitive or if insurance carri-
ers choose not to write such annuities, employees will be de-
nied the opportunity to purchase life annuities-concededly 
the most advantageous pension plan-at lower cost. 5 If, al-
ternatively, insurance carriers and employers choose to offer 
4 See Cal. Ins. Code Ann. § 790.03(0 (West) (requiring differentials 
based on the sex of the individual insured); Spirt v. Teachers Insurance 
and Annuity Assn., 691 F. 2d 1054, 1066 (CA2 1982) (noting that State of 
New York has disapproved certain uses of unisex rates). 
5 This is precisely what has happened in this case. Faced with the liabil-
ity resulting from the Court of Appeals' judgment, the State of Arizona dis-
continued making life annuities available to its employees. Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 8. Any employee who now wishes to have the security provided by a 
life annuity must withdraw his or her accrued retirement savings from the 
state pension plan, pay federal income tax on the amount withdrawn, and 
then use the remainder to purchase an annuity on the open market-which 
most likely will be sex-based. The adverse effect of today's holding appar-
ently will fall primarily on the State's employees. 
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these annuities, the heavy cost burden of equalizing benefits 
probably will be passed on to current employees. There is 
no evidence that Congress intended Title VII to work such a 
change. Nor does Manhart support such a sweeping read-
ing of this statute. That case expressly recognized the lim-
ited reach of its holding-a limitation grounded in the legisla-
tive history of Title VII and the inapplicability of Title VII's 
policies to the insurance industry. 
A 
We were careful in Manhart to make clear that the ques-
tion before us was narrow. We stated: "All that is at issue 
today is a requirement that men and women make unequal 
contributions to an employer-operated pension fund." 435 
U. S., at 717 (emphasis added). And our holding was lim-
ited expressly to the precise issue before us. We stated that 
"[a]lthough we conclude that the Department's practice vio-
lated Title VII, we do not suggest that the statute was in-
tended to revolutionize the insurance and pension indus-
tries." Ibid. 
The Court in Manhart had good reason for recognizing the 
narrow reach of Title VII in the particular area of the insur-
ance industry. Congress has chosen to leave the primary 
responsibility for regulating the insurance industry to the re-
spective States. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33, 
as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq. 6 This Act reflects the 
6 When, for example, this Court held for the first time that the federal 
government had the power to regulate the business of insurance, see 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944), 
Congress responded quickly by passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The 
Act commits the regulation of the insurance and pension industry presump-
tively to the States. Section 2(b) of the Act provides: "No Act of Congress 
shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by 
any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . .. un-
less such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance." 15 
U. S. C. § 1012(b). 
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long-held view that the "continued regulation ... by the sev-
eral States of the business of insurance is in the public inter-
est." 15 U. S. C. § 1011; see SEC v. National Securities, 
Inc., 393 U. S. 453, 458-459 (1969). Given the consistent 
policy of entrusting insurance and pension regulation to the 
States, the Court is not justified in assuming that Congress 
intended in 1964 to require the industry to change long-
standing actuarial methods, approved over decades by state 
insurance commissions. 7 
Nothing in the language of Title VII supports this pre-
emption of state jurisdiction. Nor has the Court identified 
any evidence in the legislative history that Congress consid-
ered the widespread use of sex-based mortality tables to be 
discriminatory or that it intended to modify its previous 
grant by the McCarran-Ferguson Act of exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the States to regulate the terms of protection offered 
by insurance companies. Rather, the legislative history in-
dicates precisely the opposite. 
The only reference to this issue occurs in an explanation of 
the Act by Senator Humphrey during the debates on the Sen-
ate floor. He stated that it was "unmistakably clear" that 
Title VII did not prohibit different treatment of men and 
women under industrial benefit plans. See 110 Gong. Rec. 
13663--13664 (1964). As we recognized in Manhart, "[al-
t]hough he did not address differences in employee contribu-
tions based on sex, Senator Humphrey apparently assumed 
' Most state laws regulating insurance and annuities require that there 
be no "unfair discrimination between persons in the same class." Bailey, 
Hutchinson & Narber, The Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance Classi-
fication, 25 Drake L. Rev. 779, 783 (1976). Most of these States have de-
termined that the use of sex-based mortality tables comports with this 
state definition of discrimination. Given the presumption of the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act that Congress intends to supersede state insur-
ance regulation only when it enacts laws that "specifically relat[e] to the 
business of insurance," seen. 6, supra, the Court offers no satisfactory rea-
sons for concluding that Congress intended Title VII to pre-empt this im-
portant area of state jurisdiction. 
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that the 1964 Act would have little, if any, impact on existing 
pension plans." 435 U. S., at 714. This statement was not 
sufficient, as Manhart held, to preclude the application of 
Title VII to an employer-operated plan. See ibid. But Sen-
ator Humphrey's explanation provides strong support for 
Manhart's recognition that Congress intended Title VII to 
have only that indirect effect on the private insurance 
industry. 
B 
As neither the language of the statute nor the legislative 
history supports its holding, the Court is compelled to rely on 
its perception of the policy expressed in Title VII. The pol-
icy, of course, is broadly to proscribe discrimination in em-
ployment practices. But the statute itself focuses specifi-
cally on the individual and "precludes treatment of 
individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual 
or national class." I d., at 708. This specific focus has little 
relevance to the business of insurance. See id., at 724 
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). Insurance and life annuities exist because it is 
impossible to measure accurately how long any one individual 
will live. Insurance companies cannot make individual 
determinations of life expectancy; they must consider instead 
the life expectancy of identifiable groups. Given a suffi-
ciently large group of people, an insurance company can pre-
dict with considerable reliability the rate and frequency of 
deaths within the group based on the past mortality experi-
ence of similar groups. Title VII's concern for effect of em-
ployment practices on the individual thus is simply inapplica-
ble to the actuarial predictions that must be made in writing 
insurance and annuities. 
c 
The accuracy with which an insurance company predicts 
the rate of mortality depends on its ability to identify groups 
with similar mortality rates. The writing of annuities thus 
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requires that an insurance company group individuals accord-
ing to attributes that have a significant correlation with mor-
tality. The most accurate classification system would be to 
identify all attributes that have some verifiable correlation 
with mortality and divide people into groups accordingly, but 
the administrative cost of such an undertaking would be pro-
hibitive. Instead of identifying all relevant attributes, most 
insurance companies classify individuals according to criteria 
that provide both an accurate and efficient measure of lon-
gevity, including a person's age and sex. These particular 
criteria are readily identifiable, stable, and easily verifiable. 
See Benston, The Economics of Gender Discrimination in 
Employee Fringe Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 489, 499-501 (1982). 
It is this practice-the use of a sex-based group classifica-
tion-that the Court ultimately condemns. See ante, at 
8-10. The policies underlying Title VII, rather than sup-
porting the Court's decision, strongly suggest-at least for 
me-the opposite conclusion. This remedial statute was en-
acted to eradicate the types of discrimination in employment 
that then were pervasive in our society. The entire thrust of 
Title VII is directed against discrimination-disparate 
treatment on the basis of race or sex that intentionally or ar-
bitrarily affects an individual. But as JusTICE BLACKMUN 
has stated, life expectancy is a "nonstigmatizing factor that 
demonstrably differentiates females from males and that is 
not measurable on an individual basis . . . . [T]here is noth-
ing arbitrary, irrational, or 'discriminatory' about recogniz-
ing the objective and accepted ... disparity in female-male 
life expectancies in computing rates for retirement plans". 
Manhart, 435 U. S., at 724 (opinion concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). Explicit sexual classifications, 
to be sure, require close examination, but they are not auto-
matically invalid. 8 Where, as here, the use of sex-based 
• Title VII does not preclude the use of all sex classifications, but rather 
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mortality tables does not entail discrimination in any normal 
understanding of that term, 9 I would be reluctant to hold the 
practice invalid. 
Congress may choose to forbid the use of any sexual classi-
fications in insurance, but nothing suggests that it intended 
to do so in Title VII. Nor does the policy underlying Title 
VII provide any warrant for extending the reach of the stat-
ute beyond Congress' intent. 
III 
The Court compounds the consequences of its decision by 
making it retroactive. It holds that an employer must "pay 
retired female employees whatever sum is necessary each 
month to bring them up to the benefit level they would have 
enjoyed had their post-M anhart contributions been treated 
in the same way as those of similarly situated male employ-
ees." Ante, at 18. An employer also may be liable for an 
additional amount. If an employer could have applied unisex 
tables to an employee's pre-Manhart contributions without 
altering existing contractual rights, the Court would require 
an employer to contribute an additional amount to compen-
sate employees for its failure to adopt unisex tables after 
Manhart was announced. In my view, retroactive relief is 
both unprecedented and manifestly unjust. 
We recognized in Manhart that retroactive relief was nor-
mally appropriate in the typical Title VII case, but concluded 
those that are based "on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes." 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 333 (1977). Indeed, while Manhart 
held that an employer could not require women to contribute more to a 
pension fund than a similarly situated man, it recognized that Title VII 
does not prevent employers from offering annuity payments that reflect 
the sexual composition of the workforce, see 435 U. S., at 718, and n. 34. 
9 Indeed, if employers and insurance carriers offer annuities based on 
unisex mortality tables , men as a class will receive less aggregate benefits 
than similarly situated women. The courts may find themselves faced 
with suits in which men claim that this disparate treatment is itself a Title 
VII violation. 
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that the District Court had abused its discretion in awarding 
such relief. As we noted, the employer in that case may well 
have assumed that its pension program was lawful. More 
importantly, a retroactive remedy would have had a poten-
tially disruptive impact on the operation of the employer's 
pension plan. As the Court explained, the business of un-
derwriting pensions requires actuarial approximation of risk. 
Reserves normally are sufficient to cover only the cost of 
funding and administering the plan. Should an unforeseen 
contingency occur, such as a drastic change in the legal rules 
governing pension and insurance funds, both the insurer's 
solvency and the insured's benefits could be jeopardized. 
Manhart, 435 U. S., at 721. 
This case presents no different considerations. Manhart 
did put all employer-operated pension funds on notice that 
they could not "requir[e] that men and women make unequal 
contributions to [the] fund," id., at 717, but it expressly ex-
cepted the insurance industry in general from the reach of its 
holding. Given this explicit limitation, an employer reason-
ably could have assumed that it would be lawful to make 
available to its employees the same annuities that could be 
purchased on the open market. 
As in Manhart, making the holding retroactive, even in a 
limited fashion, could have devastating results. The holding 
applies to all employer-sponsored pension plans, and the cost 
of compliance is estimated to range from $572 million to $886 
million annually for the next 15 to 30 years. 10 Department of 
'
0 The cost of equalizing benefits for employers will vary according to 
three factors: (i) whether the plan is a defined-contribution or a defined-
benefit plan; (ii) whether benefits are to be equalized retroactively or pro-
spectively; and (iii) whether the insurer may reallocate resources between 
men and women by applying unisex rates to existing reserves or must top 
up women's benefits. The last two factors have the most significant effect 
on cost. The Court today embraces a form of limited retroactivity. It 
also appears to require that benefits must be topped up. See ante, at 18. 
In any event, if annuity payments are regarded as a form of compensation, 
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Labor Cost Study 33. In this case, the cost will fall on the 
State of Arizona. Presumably other state and local govern-
ments will be directly affected by today's decision. Impos-
ing unanticipated financial burdens of the magnitude indi-
cated comes at a time when many States and local 
governments already are struggling to meet substantial fiscal 
deficits. Income, excise, and property taxes are being in-
creased. I can perceive of no justification for this Court, 
particularly in view of the question left open in Manhart, to 
impose this magnitude of burden retroactively upon the pub-
lic-and, of course, it will be the public that bears it. 
as the Court also appears to suggest, see ante, at 5, the Equal Pay Act may 
require independently that all benefits be topped up, see 77 Stat. 56, 29 
u. s. c. § 206(d). 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court today holds that an employer may not offer its 
employees life annuities from a private insurance company 
that uses sex-based mortality tables. This holding will have 
a far-reaching effect on the operation of insurance and pen-
sion plans. Employers may be forced to discontinue offering 
life annuities, or potentially disruptive changes may be re-
quired in long-established methods of calculating insurance 
and pensions. 1 Either course will work a major change in 
1 The cost of continuing to provide annuities may become prohibitive. 
The minimum additional cost necessary to equalize benefits prospectively 
would range from $85 to $93 million each year for at least the next 15 years. 
United States Department of Labor, Cost Study of the Impact of an Equal 
Benefits Rule on Pension Benefits 4 (1983) (hereinafter Department of 
Labor Cost Study). This minimum cost assumes that employers will be 
free to use the least costly method of adjusting benefits. This assumption 
may be unfounded. Employers may be required to "top up" benefits-
i . e. , calculate women's benefits at the rate applicable to men rather than 
apply a unisex rate to both men and women. Seen. 11, infra. If so, the 
cost of providing purely prospective benefits would range from $428 to 
$676 million each year for at least the next 15 years. Department of Labor 
Cost Study 31. No one seriously suggests that these costs will not be 
passed on-in large part-to the annuity beneficiaries or, in the case of 
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the way the cost of insurance is determined-probably to the 
detriment of all employees. This is contrary to our explicit 
recognition in Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 717 (1978), that Title VII "was [not] 
intended to revolutionize the insurance and pension indus-
tries." The Court adds to this disruption by making its deci-
sion retroactive, thereby imposing potentially crippling bur-
dens on both public and private employers. 2 
I 
The State of Arizona provides its employees with a volun-
tary pension plan that allows them to defer receipt of a por-
tion of their compensation until retirement. If an employee 
chooses to participate, an amount designated by the em-
ployee is withheld from each paycheck and invested by the 
State on the employee's behalf. When an employee retires, 
he or she may receive the amount that has accrued in one of 
three ways. The employee may withdraw the total amount 
accrued, arrange for periodic payments of a fixed sum for a 
fixed time, or use the accrued amount to purchase a life 
annuity. 
There is no contention that the State's plan discriminates 
between men and women when an employee contributes to 
the fund. The plan is voluntary and each employee may con-
tribute as much as he or she chooses. Nor does anyone con-
tend that either of the first two methods of repaying the ac-
crued amount at retirement is discriminatory. Thus, if 
Arizona had adopted the same contribution plan but provided 
only the first two repayment options, there would be no dis-
pute that its plan complied with Title VII of the Civil Rights 
state and local governments, to the public. 
' The Court's limited retroactive remedy may entail additional annual 
costs of $572 million to $886 million for at least the next 15 years. Depart-
ment of Labor Cost Study 33. These figures assume, as the Court appears 
to require, see ante, at 18, that employers will have to top up benefits. 
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Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e. The first two 
options, however, have disadvantages. If an employee 
chooses to take a lump-sum payment, the tax liability will be 
substantial. 3 The second option ameliorates the tax prob-
lem by spreading the receipt of the accrued amount over a 
fixed period of time. This option, however, does not guard 
against the possibility that the finite number of payments se-
lected by the employee will fail to provide income for the re-
mainder of his or her life. 
The third option-the purchase of a life annuity-resolves 
both of these problems. It reduces an employee's tax liabil-
ity by spreading the payments out over time, and it guaran-
tees that the employee will receive a stream of payments for 
life. State law prevents Arizona from accepting the financial 
uncertainty of funding life annuities. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 38-871(C)(1). But to achieve tax benefits under federal 
law, the life annuity must be purchased from a company des-
ignated by the retirement plan. Rev. Rul. 72-25, 1972-1 
Cum. Bull. 127; Rev. Rul. 6~99, 196~1 Cum. Bull193. Ac-
cordingly, Arizona contracts with private insurance compa-
nies to make life annuities available to its employees. The 
companies that underwrite the life annuities, as do the vast 
majority of private insurance companies in the United States, 
use sex-based mortality tables. Thus, the only effect of Ari-
zona's third option is to allow its employees to purchase at a 
tax saving the same annuities they otherwise would purchase 
on the open market. 
The Court holds that Arizona's voluntary plan violates 
Title VII. In its view, Title VII requires an employer to fol-
low one of three courses. An employer must provide unisex 
annuities itself, contract with insurance companies to provide 
such annuities, or provide no annuities to its employees. 
Ante, at 15. The Court's first option is largely illusory. 
3 The employee will be required to include the entire amount received as 
income. See 26 U. S. C. § 457; Rev. Rul. 68-99, 1968-1 Cum. Bull193. 
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Most employers do not have either the financial resources or 
administrative ability to underwrite annuities. Or, as in this 
case, state law may prevent an employer from providing an-
nuities. If unisex annuities are available, an employer may 
contract with private insurance companies to provide them. 
It is stipulated, however, that the insurance companies with 
which Arizona contracts do not provide unisex annuities, nor 
do insurance companies generally underwrite them. The in-
surance industry either is prevented by state law from doing 
so 4 or it views unisex mortality tables as actuarially un-
sound. An employer, of course, may choose the Court's 
third option. It simply may decline to offer its employees 
the right to purchase annuities at a substantial tax saving. 
It is difficult to see the virtue in such a compelled choice. 
II 
As indicated above, the consequences of the Court's hold-
ing are unlikely to be beneficial. If the cost to employers of 
offering unisex annuities is prohibitive or if insurance carri-
ers choose not to write such annuities, employees will be de-
nied the opportunity to purchase life annuities-concededly 
the most advantageous pension plan-at lower cost. 5 If, al-
ternatively, insurance carriers and employers choose to offer 
'See Cal. Ins. Code Ann. § 790.03(f) (West) (requiring differentials 
based on the sex of the individual insured); Spirt v. Teachers Insurance 
and Annuity Assn., 691 F. 2d 1054, 1066 (CA2 1982) (noting that State of 
New York has disapproved certain uses of unisex rates). 
• This is precisely what has happened in this case. Faced with the liabil-
ity resulting from the Court of Appeals' judgment, the State of Arizona dis-
continued making life annuities available to its employees. Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 8. Any employee who now wishes to have the security provided by a 
life annuity must withdraw his or her accrued retirement savings from the 
state pension plan, pay federal income tax on the amount withdrawn, and 
then use the remainder to purchase an annuity on the open market-which 
most likely will be sex-based. The adverse effect oftoday's holding appar-
ently will fall primarily on the State's employees. 
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these annuities, the heavy cost burden of equalizing benefits 
probably will be passed on to current employees. There is 
no evidence that Congress intended Title VII to work such a 
change. Nor does Manhart support such a sweeping read-
ing of this statute. That case expressly recognized the lim-
ited reach of its holding-a limitation grounded in the legisla-
tive history of Title VII and the inapplicability of Title VII's 
policies to the insurance industry. 
A 
We were careful in Manhart to make clear that the ques-
tion before us was narrow. We stated: "All that is at issue 
today is a requirement that men and women make unequal 
contributions to an employer-operated pension fund." 435 
U. S., at 717 (emphasis added). And our holding was lim-
ited expressly to the precise issue before us. We stated that 
"[a]lthough we conclude that the Department's practice vio-
lated Title VII, we do not suggest that the statute was in-
tended to revolutionize the insurance and pension indus-
tries." Ibid. 
The Court in Manhart had good reason for recognizing the 
narrow reach of Title VII in the particular area of the insur-
ance industry. Congress has chosen to leave the primary 
responsibility for regulating the insurance industry to the re-
spective States. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33, 
as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq. 6 This Act reflects the 
long-held view that the "continued regulation ... by the sev-
6 When this Court held for the first time that the federal government 
had the power to regulate the business of insurance, see United States v. 
South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944), Congress re-
sponded quickly by passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The Act com-
mits the regulation of the insurance and pension industry presumptively to 
the States. Section 2(b) of the Act provides: "No Act of Congress shall be 
construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State 
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act 
specifically relates to the business of insurance." 15 U. S. C. § 1012(b). 
.~ 
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eral States of the business of insurance is in the public inter-
est." 15 U. S. C. § 1011; see SEC v. National Securities, 
Inc., 393 U. S. 453, 458-459 (1969). Given the consistent 
policy of entrusting insurance and pension regulation to the 
States, the Court is not justified in assuming that Congress 
intended in 1964 to require the industry to change long-
standing actuarial methods, approved over decades by state 
insurance commissions. 7 
7 Most state laws regulating insurance and annuities require that there 
be no "unfair discrimination between persons in the same class." Bailey, 
Hutchinson & Narber, The Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance Classi-
fication, 25 Drake L. Rev. 779, 783 (1976). Most of these States have de-
termined that the use of sex-based mortality tables comports with this 
state definition of discrimination. Given the presumption of the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act that Congress intends to supersede state insur-
ance regulation only when it enacts laws that "specifically relat[e] to the 
business of insurance," seen. 6, supra, the Court offers no satisfactory rea-
sons for concluding that Congress intended Title VII to pre-empt this im-
portant area of state jurisdiction. 
The Court states that the McCarran-Ferguson Act is not relevant be-
cause the petitioners did not raise the issue in their brief. See ante, at 
13-14, n. 17. This misses the point. The question presented is whether 
Congress intended Title VII to prevent employers from offering their em-
ployees actuarially sound sex-based annuities. The McCarran-Ferguson 
Act is explicitly relevant to determining congressional intent. It provides 
that courts should not presume that Congress intended to supersede state 
regulation of insurance unless the act in question specifically relates to the 
business of insurance. See n. 6, supra. It therefore is necessary to con-
sider the applicability of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. This presents two 
questions: whether the action at issue under Title VII involves the "busi-
ness of insurance" and whether the application of Title VII would "invali-
date, impair, or supersede" state law. 
No one doubts that the determination of how risk should be spread 
among classes of insureds is an integral part of the "business of insurance." 
See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U. S. 205, 213 
(1979); SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 U. S. 65, 73 (1959). The Court 
argues, nevertheless, that the McCarran-Ferguson Act is inapposite be-
cause Title VII will not supersede any state regulation. See ante, at 14, n. 
17. This argument simply ignores self-evident facts. State insurance 
·" 
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Nothing in the language of Title VII supports this pre-
emption of state jurisdiction. Nor has the Court identified 
any evidence in the legislative history that Congress consid-
ered the widespread use of sex-based mortality tables to be 
discriminatory or that it intended to modify its previous 
grant by the McCarran-Ferguson Act of exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the States to regulate the terms of protection offered 
by insurance companies. Rather, the legislative history in-
dicates precisely the opposite. 
The only reference to this issue occurs in an explanation of 
the Act by Senator Humphrey during the debates on the Sen-
ate floor. He stated that it was "unmistakably clear" that 
Title VII did not prohibit different treatment of men and 
women under industrial benefit plans. 8 See 110 Cong. Rec. 
laws allow employers to purchase sex-based annuities for their employees, 
as Arizona does here. Title VII, as the Court interprets it, would prohibit 
employers from purchasing such annuities for their employees. It begs 
reality to say that a federal law that prevents a purchaser of insurance 
from doing what state insurance laws allow does not "invalidate, impair, or 
supersede" state law. Cf. 359 U. S., at 67. Because the Court seeks to 
extend Title VII in a way that would pre-empt state regulatory authority, 
the commands of the McCarran-Ferguson Act are directly applicable. 
8 Senator Humphrey's statement was based on the adoption of the Ben-
nett amendment, which incorporated the affirmative defenses of the Equal 
Pay Act, 77 Stat. 56, 29 U. S. C. § 206(d), into Title VII. See County of 
Washington, Ore. v. Gunther, 452 U. S. 161, 175, n. 15 (1981). Although 
not free from ambiguity, the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act pro-
vides ample support for Senator Humphrey's interpretation of that Act. 
In explaining the affirmative defenses, the Senate Report on the Equal 
Pay Act noted that pension costs were "higher for women than men . . . 
because of the longer life span of women." S. Rep. No. 176, 88th Cong., 
1st Sess. 39 (1963). It then explained that the question of the associated 
additional cost was one "that can only be answered by an ad hoc investiga-
tion." Ibid. Thus, it concluded that where it could be shown that there 
were in fact higher costs for women than men, an exception to the Equal 
Pay Act could be permitted "similar to those ... for a bona fide seniority 
system or other exception noted above." Ibid. 
Even if other meanings might be drawn from the Equal Pay Act's legis-
. ~ 
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13663-13664 (1964). As we recognized in Manhart, "(al-
t]hough he did not address differences in employee contribu-
tions based on sex, Senator Humphrey apparently assumed 
that the 1964 Act would have little, if any, impact on existing 
pension plans." 435 U. S., at 714. This statement was not 
sufficient, as Manhart held, to preclude the application of 
Title VII to an employer-operated plan. See ibid. But Sen-
ator Humphrey's explanation provides strong support for 
Manhart's recognition that Congress intended Title VII to 
have only that indirect effect on the private insurance 
industry. 
B 
As neither the language of the statute nor the legislative 
history supports its holding, the Court is compelled to rely on 
its perception of the policy expressed in Title VII. The pol-
icy, of course, is broadly to proscribe discrimination in em-
ployment practices. But the statute itself focuses specifi-
cally on the individual and "precludes treatment of 
individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual 
or national class." I d., at 708. This specific focus has little 
relevance to the business of insurance. See id., at 724 
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). Insurance and life annuities exist because it is 
impossible to measure accurately how long any one individual 
will live. Insurance companies cannot make individual 
determinations of life expectancy; they must consider instead 
the life expectancy of identifiable groups. Given a suffi-
ciently large group of people, an insurance company can pre-
dict with considerable reliability the rate and frequency of 
deaths within the group based on the past mortality experi-
lative history, the crucial question is how Congress viewed the Equal Pay 
Act in 1964 when it incorporated it into Title VII. The only relevant leg-
islative history that exists on this point demonstrates unmistakably that 
Con,gress perceived-with good reason-that "the 1964 Act would have lit-
tle, if any, impact on existing pension plans." Manhart, 435 U. S. , at 714 . 
. ~ 
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ence of similar groups. Title VII's concer_n for effect of em-
ployment practices on the individual thus is simply inapplica-
ble to the actuarial predictions that must be made in writing 
insurance and annuities. 
c 
The accuracy with which an insurance company predicts 
the rate of mortality depends on its ability to identify groups 
with similar mortality rates. The writing of annuities thus 
requires that an insurance company group individuals accord-
ing to attributes that have a significant correlation with mor-
tality. The most accurate classification system would be to 
identify all attributes that have some verifiable correlation 
with mortality and divide people into groups accordingly, but 
the administrative cost of such an undertaking would be pro-
hibitive. Instead of identifying all relevant attributes, most 
insurance companies classify individuals according to criteria 
that provide both an accurate and efficient measure of lon-
gevity, including a person's age and sex. These particular 
criteria are readily identifiable, stable, and easily verifiable. 
See Benston, The Economics of Gender Discrimination in 
Employee Fringe Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 489, 499-501 (1982). 
It is this practice-the use of a sex-based group classifica-
tion-that the Court ultimately condemns. See ante, at 
8-10. The policies underlying Title VII, rather than sup-
porting the Court's decision, strongly suggest-at least for 
me-the opposite conclusion. This remedial statute was en-
acted to eradicate the types of discrimination in employment 
that then were pervasive in our society. The entire thrust of 
Title VII is directed against discrimination-disparate 
treatment on the basis of race or sex that intentionally or ar-
bitrarily affects an individual. But as JUSTICE BLACKMUN 
has stated, life expectancy is a "nonstigmatizing factor that 
demonstrably differentiates females from males and that is 
not measurable on an individual basis . . . . [T]here is noth-
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ing arbitrary, irrational, or 'discriminatory' about recogniz-
ing the objective and accepted ... disparity in female-male 
life expectancies in computing rates for retirement plans" . 
Manhart, 435 U. S., at 724 (opinion concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). Explicit sexual classifications, 
to be sure, require close examination, but they are not auto-
matically invalid. 9 Where, as here, the use of sex-based 
mortality tables does not entail discrimination in any normal 
understanding of that term, 10 I would be reluctant to hold the 
practice invalid. 
Congress may choose to forbid the use of any sexual classi-
fications in insurance, but nothing suggests that it intended 
to do so in Title VII. Nor does the policy underlying Title 
VII provide any warrant for extending the reach of the stat-
ute beyond Congress' intent. 
III 
The Court compounds the consequences of its decision by 
making it retroactive. It holds that an employer must "pay 
retired female employees whatever sum is necessary each 
month to bring them up to the benefit level they would have 
enjoyed had their post-Manhart contributions been treated 
in the same way as those of similarly situated male employ-
ees." Ante, at 18. An employer also may be liable for an 
additional amount. If an employer could have applied unisex 
tables to an employee's pre-Manhart contributions without 
altering existing contractual rights, the Court would require 
an employer to contribute an additional amount to compen-
sate employees for its failure to adopt unisex tables after 
9 Title VII does not preclude the use of all sex classifications, and there 
is no reason for assuming that it intended to do so in this instance. See n. 
8, supra. 
10 Indeed, if employers and insurance carriers offer annuities based on 
unisex mortality tables, men as a class will receive less aggregate benefits 
than similarly situated women. 
.-
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Manhart was announced. In my view, retroactive relief is 
both unprecedented and manifestly unjust. 
We recognized in Manhart that retroactive relief was nor-
mally appropriate in the typical Title VII case, but concluded 
that the District Court had abused its discretion in awarding 
such relief. As we noted, the employer in that case may well 
have assumed that its pension program was lawful. More 
importantly, a retroactive remedy would have had a poten-
tially disruptive impact on the operation of the employer's 
pension plan. As the Court explained, the business of un-
derwriting pensions requires actuarial approximation of risk. 
Reserves normally are sufficient to cover only the cost of 
funding and administering the plan. Should an unforeseen 
contingency occur, such as a drastic change in the legal rules 
governing pension and insurance funds, both the insurer's 
solvency and the insured's benefits could be jeopardized. 
Manhart, 435 U. S., at 721. 
This case presents no different considerations. Manhart 
did put all employer-operated pension funds on notice that 
they could not "requir[e] that men and women make unequal 
contributions to [the] fund," id., at 717, but it expressly ex-
cepted the insurance industry in general from the reach of its 
holding. Given this explicit limitation, an employer reason-
ably could have assumed that it would be lawful to make 
available to its employees the same annuities that could be 
purchased on the open market. 
As in Manhart, making the holding retroactive, even in a 
limited fashion, could have devastating results. The holding 
applies to all employer-sponsored pension plans, and the cost 
of compliance is estimated to range from $572 million to $886 
million annually for the next 15 to 30 years. 11 Department of 
11 The cost of equalizing benefits for employers will vary according to 
three factors: (i) whether the plan is a defined-contribution or a defined-
benefit plan; (ii) whether benefits are to be equalized retroactively or pro-
spectively; and (iii) whether the insurer may reallocate resources between 
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Labor Cost Study 33. In this case, the cost will fall on the 
State of Arizona. Presumably other state and local govern-
ments will be directly affected by today's decision. Impos-
ing unanticipated financial burdens of the magnitude indi-
cated comes at a time when many States and local 
governments already are struggling to meet substantial fiscal 
deficits. Income, excise, and property taxes are being in-
creased. I can perceive of no justification for this Court, 
particularly in view of the question left open in Manhart, to 
impose this magnitude of burden retroactively upon the pub-
lic-and, of course, it will be the public that bears it. 
men and women by applying unisex rates to existing reserves or must top 
up women's benefits. The last two factors have the most significant effect 
on cost. The Court today embraces a form of limited retroactivity. It 
also appears to require that benefits must be topped up. See ante, at 18. 
In any event, if annuity payments are regarded as a form of wages, as the 
Court also appears to suggest, see ante, at 5, the Equal Pay Act may re-
quire independently that all benefits be topped up, see 77 Stat. 56, 29 
u. s. c. § 206(d). 
-
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etc. v. Norris 
Revision of note 7, pages 6-7: 
Most state laws regulating insurance and annuities require 
that there be no "unfair discrimination between persons in the same 
class." Bailey, Hutchinson, & Narber, The Regulatory Challenge to 
Life Insurance Classification, 25 Drake L. Rev. 779, 783 (1976). 
Arizona insurance law similarly provides that there shall be "no 
unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class." Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. §20-448 (1982). Most of these States, including 
Arizona, have determined that the use of sex-based mortality tables 
comports with this state definition of discrimination. Given the 
presumption of the McCarran-Ferguson Act that Congress intends to 
supersede state insurance regulation only when it enacts laws that 
"specifically relate to the business of insurance," see n. 6, supra, 
the Court offers no satisfactory reason for concluding that Congress 
intended Title VII to pre-empt this important area of state 
regulation. 
The Court states that the McCarran-Ferguson Act is not 
relevant because the petitioners did not raise the issue in their 
brief. See ante, at 13, n. 17. This misses the point. The 
question presented is whether Congress intended Title VII to prevent 
employers from offering their employees actuarially sound, sex-based 
annuities. The McCarran-Ferguson Act is explicitly relevant to 
determining congressional intent. It provides that courts should 
not presume that Congress intended to supersede state regulation of 
2. 
insurance unless the act in question s~ecifically relates to the 
business of insurance. See n. 6, supra. It therefore is necessary 
to consider the applicability of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. This 
presents two questions: whether the action at issue under Title VII 
involves the "business of insurance" and whether the application of 
Title VII would "invalidate, impair, or supersede" state law. 
No one doubts that the determination of how risk should be 
spread among classes of insureds is an integral part of the 
"business of insurance." See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal 
Drug Co., 440 u.s. 205, 213 (1979); SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 
U.S. 65, 73 (1959). The Court argues, nevertheless, that the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act is inapposite because Title VII will not 
supersede any state regulation. In the Court's view, "Arizona has 
not purported to regulate the business of insurance, but has merely 
created a deferred compensation plan for its employees in which 
certain insurance companies participate." Ante, at 13, n. 17 
(emphasis in original). This argument ignores self-evident facts. 
State insurance laws, such as Arizona's, provide that there shall be 
no unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class, and 
employers have been allowed under these state laws to purchase sex-
based annuities for their employees. Title VII, as the Court 
interprets it, would prohibit employers from purchasing such 
annuities for their employees. It begs reality to say that a 
federal law that prevents a purchaser of insurance from doing what 
state insurance law allows does not "invalidate, impair, or 
supersede" state law. Cf. SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 U.S., at 
67. Because the Court seeks to extend Title VII in a way that would 
3. 
pre-empt state regulatory authority, the commands of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act are directly relevant to determining Congress' intent. 
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Circulated: _________ _ 
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3rd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-52 
ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITTEE FOR TAX DE-
FERRED ANNUITY AND DEFERRED COMPENSA-
TION PLANS, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. NATHALIE NORRIS ETC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1983) 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Jus-
TICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting. 
The Court today holds that an employer may not offer its 
employees life annuities from a private insurance company 
that uses sex-based mortality tables. This holding will have 
a far-reaching effect on the operation of insurance and pen-
sion plans. Employers may be forced to discontinue offering 
life annuities, or potentially disruptive changes may be re-
quired in long-established methods of calculating insurance 
and pensions. 1 Either course will work a major change in 
' The cost of continuing to provide annuities may become prohibitive. 
The minimum additional cost necessary to equalize benefits prospectively 
would range from $85 to $93 million each year for at least the next 15 years. 
United States Department of Labor, Cost tudy of the Impact of an Equal 
Benefits Rule on Pension Benefits 4 0983) (hereinafter Department of 
Labor Cost Study). This minimum cost assumes that employers will be 
free to use the least costly method of adjusting benefits. This assumption 
may be unfounded. Employers may be required to "top up" benefits-
i. e., calculate women's benefits at the rate applicable to men rather than 
apply a unisex rate to both men and women. Seen. 11, infra. If so, the 
cost of providing purely prospective benefits would range from $428 to 
$676 million each year for at least the next 15 years. Department of Labor 
Cost Study 31. No one seriously suggests that these costs will not be 
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the way the cost of insurance is determined-probably to the 
detriment of all employees. This is contrary to our explicit 
recognition in Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 717 (1978), that Title VII "was [not] 
intended to revolutionize the insurance and pension indus-
tries." The Court adds to this disruption by making its deci-
sion retroactive, thereby imposing potentially crippling bur-
dens on both public and private employers. 2 
I 
The State of Arizona provides its employees with a volun-
tary pension plan that allows them to defer receipt of a por-
tion of their compensation until retirement. If an employee 
chooses to participate, an amount designated by the em-
ployee is withheld from each paycheck and invested by the 
State on the employee's behalf. When an employee retires, 
he or she may receive the amount that has accrued in one of 
three ways. The employee may withdraw the total amount 
accrued, arrange for periodic payments of a fixed sum for a 
fixed time, or use the accrued amount to purchase a life 
annuity. 
There is no contention that the State's plan discriminates 
between men and women when an employee contributes to 
the fund. The plan is. voluntary and each employee may con-
tribute as much as he or she chooses. Nor does anyone con-
tend that either of the first two methods of repaying the ac-
crued amount at retirement is discriminatory. Thus, if 
Arizona had adopted the same contribution plan but provided 
only the first two repayment options, there would be no dis-
passed on-in large part-to the annuity beneficiaries or, in the case of 
state and local governments, to the public. 
2 The Court's limited retroactive remedy may entail additional annual 
costs of $572 million to $886 million for at least the next 15 years. Depart-
ment of Labor Cost Study 33. These figures assume, as the Court appears 
to require , see ante, at 18, that employers will have to top up benefits. 
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pute that its plan complied with Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e. The first two 
options, however, have disadvantages. If an employee 
chooses to take a lump-sum payment, the tax liability will be 
substantial. 3 The second option ameliorates the tax prob-
lem by spreading the receipt of the accrued amount over a 
fixed period of time. This option, however, does not guard 
against the possibility that the finite number of payments se-
lected by the employee will fail to provide income for the re-
mainder of his or her life. 
The third option-the purchase of a life annuity-resolves 
both of these problems. It reduces an employee's tax liabil-
ity by spreading the payments out over time, and it guaran-
tees that the employee will receive a stream of payments for 
life. State law prevents Arizona from accepting the financial 
uncertainty of funding life annuities. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 38-871(C)(1) (1983). But to achieve tax benefits under fed-
eral law, the life annuity must be purchased from a company 
designated by the retirement plan. Rev. Rul. 72-25, 1972-1 
Cum. Bull. 127; Rev. Rul. 68-99, 1968-1 Cum. Bull193. Ac-
cordingly, Arizona contracts with private insurance compa-
nies to make life annuities available to its employees. The 
companies that underwrite the life annuities, as do the vast 
majority of private insurance companies in the United States, 
use sex-based mortality tables. Thus, the only effect of Ari-
zona's third option is to allow its employees to purchase at a 
tax saving the same annuities they otherwise would purchase 
on the open market. 
The Court holds that Arizona's voluntary plan violates 
Title VII. In its view, Title VII requires an employer to fol-
low one of three courses. An employer must provide unisex 
annuities itself, contract with insurance companies to provide 
such annuities, or provide no annuities to its employees. 
3 The employee will be required to include the entire amount received as 
income. See 26 U. S. C. § -liii: Rev. Rul. 68--99, 1968--1 Cum. Bull 193. 
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Ante, at 15. The Court's first option is largely illusory. 
Most employers do not have either the financial resources or 
administrative ability to underwrite annuities. Or, as in this 
case, state law may prevent an employer from providing an-
nuities. If unisex annuities are available, an employer may 
contract with private insurance companies to provide them. 
It is stipulated, however, that the insurance companies with 
which Arizona contracts do not provide unisex annuities, nor 
do insurance companies generally underwrite them. The in-
surance industry either is prevented by state law from doing 
so~ or it views unisex mortality tables as actuarially un-
sound. An employer, of course, may choose the Court's 
third option. It simply may decline to offer its employees 
the right to purchase annuities at a substantial tax saving. 
It is difficult to see the virtue in such a compelled choice. 
II 
As indicated above, the consequences of the Court's hold-
ing are unlikely to be beneficial. If the cost to employers of 
offering unisex annuities is prohibitive or if insurance carri-
ers choose not to write such annuities, employees will be de-
nied the opportunity to purchase life annuities-concededly 
the most advantageous pension plan-at lower cost. 5 If, al-
'See Cal. Ins. Code Ann. § 790.03(f) (West) (1983) (requiring differen-
tials based 0:1 the sex of the individual insured); Spirt v. Teachers I nsur-
ance and Annuity Assn., 691 F. 2d 1054, 1066 (CA2 1982) (noting that 
State of New York has disapproved certain uses of unisex rates). 
; This is precisely what has happened in this case. Faced with the liabil-
ity resulting from the Court of Appeals' judgment, the State of Arizona dis-
continued making life annuities available to its employees. Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 8. Any employee who now wishes to have the security provided by a 
life annuity must withdraw his or her accrued retirement savings from the 
state pension plan, pay federal income tax on the amount withdrawn, and 
then use the remainder to purchase an annuity on the open market-which 
most likely will be sex-based. The adverse effect of today's holding appar-
ently will fall primarily on the State's employees. 
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ternatively, insurance carriers and employers choose to offer 
these annuities, the heavy cost burden of equalizing benefits 
probably will be passed on to current employees. There is 
no evidence that Congress intended Title VII to work such a 
change. Nor does Manhart support such a sweeping read-
ing of this statute. That case expressly recognized the lim-
ited reach of its holding-a limitation grounded in the legisla-
tive history of Title VII and the inapplicability of Title VII's 
policies to the insurance industry. 
A 
We were careful in Manhart to make clear that the ques-
tion before us was narrow. We stated: "All that is at issue 
today is a requirement that men and women make unequal 
contributions to an employer-operated pension fund." 435 
U. S., at 717 (emphasis added). And our holding was lim-
ited expressly to the precise issue before us. We stated that 
"[a]lthough we conclude that the Department's practice vio-
lated Title VII, we do not suggest that the statute was in-
tended to revolutionize the insurance and pension indus-
tries." Ibid. 
The Court in Manhart had good reason for recognizing the 
narrow reach of Title VII in the particular area of the insur-
ance industry. Congress has chosen to leave the primary 
responsibility for regulating the insurance industry to the re-
spective States. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33, 
as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq. 0 This Act reflects the 
' When this Court held for the first time that the federal government 
had the power to regulate the business of insurance, see United States v. 
South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944). Congress re-
sponded quickly by passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The Act com-
mits the regulation of the insurance and pension industry presumptively to 
the States. Section 2(b) of the Act provides: "No Act of Congress shall be 
construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any Jaw enacted by any State 
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act 
specifically relates to the business of insurance." 15 e. S. C. ~ 1012(b). 
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long-held view that the "continued regulation ... by the sev-
eral States of the business of insurance is in the public inter-
est." 15 U. S. C. § 1011; see SEC v. National Securities, 
Inc., 393 U. S. 453, 458-459 (1969). Given the consistent 
policy of entrusting insurance regulation to the States, the 
Court is not justified in assuming that Congress intended in 
1964 to require the industry to change long-standing actuarial 
methods, approved over decades by state insurance 
commissions.' 
'Most state laws regulating insurance and annuities require that there 
be no "unfair discrimination between persons in the same class." Bailey, 
Hutchinson, & Narber, The Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance 
Classification, 25 Drake L. Rev. 779. i8:3 (1976). Arizona insurance law 
similarly provides that there shall be "no unfair discrimination between in-
dividuals of the same class." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-448 (1983). Most 
of these States. including Arizona, have determined that the use of sex-
based mortality tables comports with this state definition of discrimination. 
Given the presumption of the McCarran-Ferguson Act that Congress in-
tends to supersede state insurance regulation only when it enacts laws that 
"specifically relate to the business of insurance," seen. 6, supra, the Court 
offers no satisfactory reason for concluding that Congress intended Title 
VII to pre-empt this important area of state regulation. 
The Court states that the McCarran-Ferguson Act is not relevant be-
cause the petitioners did not raise the issue in their brief. See ante, at 13, 
n. 17. This misses the point. The question presented is whether Con-
gress intended Title VII to prevent employers from offering their employ-
ees actuarially sound, sex-based annuities. The McCarran-Ferguson Act 
is explicitly relevant to determining congressional intent. It provides that 
courts should not presume that Congress intended to supersede state regu-
lation of insurance unless the act in question specifically relates to the busi-
ness of insurance. See n. 6, supra. It therefore is necessary to consider 
the applicability of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. This presents two ques-
tions: whether the action at issue under Title VII involves the "business of 
insurance" and whether the application of Title VII would ''im·aliclate. im-
pair, or supersede" state law. 
No one doubts that the determination of how risk should be spread 
among classes of insureds is an integral part of the "business of insurance." 
See Group Life & Health Ins . Co. v. Royal D1·ug Co., 440 U. S. 205, 213 
(19i9); SEC v. Variable Annuity Co .. 359 L' . S. 65, i3 (1959). The Court 
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Nothing in the language of Title VII supports this pre-
emption of state jurisdiction. Nor has the Court identified 
any evidence in the legislative history that Congress consid-
ered the widespread use of sex-based mortality tables to be 
discriminatory or that it intended to modify its previous 
grant by the McCarran-Ferguson Act of exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the States to regulate the terms of protection offered 
by insurance companies. Rather, the legislative history in-
dicates precisely the opposite. 
The only reference to this issue occurs in an explanation of 
the Act by Senator Humphrey during the debates on the Sen-
ate floor. He stated that it was "unmistakably clear" that 
Title VII did not prohibit different treatment of men and 
women under industrial benefit plans. 8 See 110 Cong. Rec. 
argues, nevertheless, that the McCarran-Ferguson Act is inapposite be-
cause Title VII will not supersede any state regulation. In the Court's 
view, "Arizona has not purported to regulate the business of insurance, 
but has merely created a deferred compensation plan for its employees in 
which certain insurance companies participate." Ante, at 13, n. 17 (em-
phasis in original). This argument ignores self-evident facts. State in-
surance laws, such as Arizona's, provide that there shall be no unfair dis-
crimination between individuals of the same class, and employers have 
been allowed under these state laws to purchase sex-based annuities for 
their employees. Title VII, as the Court interprets it, would prohibit em-
ployers from purchasing such annuities for their employees. It begs real-
ity to say that a federal law that prevents a purchaser of insurance from 
doing what state insurance law allows does not "invalidate, impair, or su-
persede" state Jaw. Cf. SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 U. S., at 67. 
Because the Court seeks to extend Title VII in a way that would pre-empt 
state regulatory authority, the commands of the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
are directly relevant to determining Congress' intent. 1 
' Senator Humphrey's statement was based on the adoption of the Ben-
nett amendment, which incorporated the affirmative defenses of the Equal 
Pay Act, 77 Stat. 56, 29 U. S. C. § 206(d), into Title VII. See Co zwty r~f' 
Washington, Ore. v. Gunther, 452 U. S. 161, 175, n. 15 (1981). Although 
not free from ambiguity, the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act pro-
vides ample support for Senator Humphrey's interpretation of that Act. 
In explaining the affirmative defenses. the Senate Report on the Equal 
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13663-13664 (1964). As we recognized in Manhart, "[al-
t]hough he did not address differences in employee contribu-
tions based on sex, Senator Humphrey apparently assumed 
that the 1964 Act would have little, if any, impact on existing 
pension plans." 435 U. S., at 714. This statement was not 
sufficient, as Manhart held, to preclude the application of 
Title VII to an employer-operated plan. See ibid. But Sen-
ator Humphrey's explanation provides strong support for 
Manhart's recognition that Congress intended Title VII to 
have only that indirect effect on the private insurance 
industry. 
B 
As neither the language of the statute nor the legislative 
history supports its holding, the Court is compelled to rely on 
its perception of the policy expressed in Title VII. The pol-
icy, of course, is broadly to proscribe discrimination in em-
ployment practices. But the statute itself focuses specifi-
cally on the individual and "precludes treatment of 
individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual 
or national class." I d., at 708. This specific focus has little 
relevance to the business of insurance. See id., at 724 
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
Pay Act noted that pension costs were "higher for women than men . . . 
because of the longer life span of women." S. Rep. No. 176, 88th Cong., 
1st Sess. 39 (1963). It then explained that the question of the associated 
additional cost was one "that can only be answered by an ad hoc investiga-
tion." Ibid. Thus, it concluded that where it could be shown that there 
were in fact higher costs for women than men, an exception to the Equal 
Pay Act could be permitted "similar to those ... for a bona fide seniority 
system or other exception noted above." Ibid. 
Even if other meanings might be drawn from the Equal Pay Act's legis-
lative history, the crucial question is how Congress viewed the Equal Pay 
Act in 1964 when it incorporated it into Title VII. The only relevant leg-
islative history that exists on this point demonstrates unmistakably that 
Congress perceived-with good reason-that "the 1964 Act would have lit-
tle , if any, impact on existing pension plans." Manhart, 435 U.S. , at 714. 
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judgment). Insurance and life annuities exist because it is 
impossible to measure accurately how long any one individual 
will live. Insurance companies cannot make individual 
determinations of life expectancy; they must consider instead 
the life expectancy of identifiable groups. Given a suffi-
ciently large group of people, an insurance company can pre-
dict with considerable reliability the rate and frequency of 
deaths within the group based on the past mortality experi-
ence of similar groups. Title VII's concern for effect of em-
ployment practices on the individual thus is simply inapplica-
ble to the actuarial predictions that must be made in writing 
insurance and annuities. 
c 
The accuracy with which an insurance company predicts 
the rate of mortality depends on its ability to identify groups 
with similar mortality rates. The writing of annuities thus 
requires that an insurance company group individuals accord-
ing to attributes that have a significant correlation with mor-
tality. The most accurate classification system would be to 
identify all attributes that have some verifiable correlation 
with mortality and divide people into groups accordingly, but 
the administrative cost of such an undertaking would be pro-
hibitive. Instead of identifying all relevant attributes, most 
insurance companies classify individuals according to criteria 
that provide both an accurate and efficient measure of lon-
gevity, including a person's age and sex. These particular 
criteria are readily identifiable, stable, and easily verifiable. 
See Benston, The Economics of Gender Discrimination in 
Employee Fringe Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 489, 499-501 (1982). 
It is this practice-the use of a sex-based group classifica-
tion-that the Court ultimately condemns. See ante, at 
8--10. The policies underlying Title VII, rather than sup-
porting the Court's decision, strongly suggest-at least for 
me-the opposite conclusion. This remedial statute was en-
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acted to eradicate the types of discrimination in employment 
that then were pervasive in our society. The entire thrust of 
Title VII is directed against discrimination-disparate 
treatment on the basis of race or sex that intentionally or ar-
bitrarily affects an individual. But as JUSTICE BLACKMUN 
has stated, life expectancy is a "nonstigmatizing factor that 
demonstrably differentiates females from males and that is 
not measurable on an individual basis . . . . [T]here is noth-
ing arbitrary, irrational, or 'discriminatory' about recogniz-
ing the objective and accepted ... disparity in female-male 
life expectancies in computing rates for retirement plans." 
Manhart, 435 U. S., at 724 (opinion concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). Explicit sexual classifications, 
to be sure, require close examination, but they are not auto-
matically invalid. 9 Where, as here, the use of sex-based 
mortality tables does not entail discrimination in any normal 
understanding of that term, 10 I would be reluctant to hold the 
practice invalid. 
Congress may choose to forbid the use of any sexual classi-
fications in insurance, but nothing suggests that it intended 
to do so in Title VII. Nor does the policy underlying Title 
VII provide any warrant for extending the reach of the stat-
ute beyond Congress' intent. 
III 
The Court compounds the consequences of its decision by 
making it retroactive. It holds that an employer must "pay 
retired female employees whatever sum is necessary each 
month to bring them up to the benefit level they would have 
enjoyed had their post-Manhart contributions been treated 
9 Title VII does not preclude the use of all sex classifications. and there 
is no reason for assuming that it intended to do so in this instance. See n. 
8, supra. 
'
0 Indeed, if employers and insurance carriers offer annuities based on 
unisex mortality tables, men as a class will receive less aggregate benefits 
than similarly situated women. 
-
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in the same way as those of similarly situated male employ-
ees." Ante, at 18. An employer also may be liable for an 
additional amount. If an employer could have applied unisex 
tables to an employee's pre-M anhart contributions without 
altering existing contractual rights, the Court would require 
an employer to contribute an additional amount to compen-
sate employees for its failure to adopt unisex tables after 
Manhart was announced. In my view, retroactive relief is 
both unprecedented and manifestly unjust. 
We recognized in Manhart that retroactive relief was nor-
mally appropriate in the typical Title VII case, but concluded 
that the District Court had abused its discretion in awarding 
such relief. As we noted, the employer in that case may well 
have assumed that its pension program was lawful. More 
importantly, a retroactive remedy would have had a poten-
tially disruptive impact on the operation of the employer's 
pension plan. As the Court explained, the business of un-
derwriting pensions requires actuarial approximation of risk. 
Reserves normally are sufficient to cover only the cost of 
funding and administering the plan. Should an unforeseen 
contingency occur, such as a drastic change in the legal rules 
governing pension and insurance funds, both the insurer's 
solvency and the insured's benefits could be jeopardized. 
Manhart, 435 U. S., at 721. 
This case presents no different considerations. Manhart 
did put all employer-operated pension funds on notice that 
they could not "requir[e] that men and women make unequal 
contributions to [the] fund," id., at 717, but it expressly ex-
cepted the insurance industry in general from the reach of its 
holding. Given this explicit limitation, an employer reason-
ably could have assumed that it would be lawful to make 
available to its employees the same annuities that could be 
purchased on the open market. 
As in Manhart, making the holding retroactive, even in a 
limited fashion, could have devastating results. The holding 
applies to all employer-sponsored pension plans, and the cost 
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of compliance is estimated to range from $572 million to $886 
million annually for the next 15 to 30 years. 11 Department of 
Labor Cost Study 33. In this case, the cost will fall on the 
State of Arizona. Presumably other state and local govern-
ments will be directly affected by today's decision. Impos-
ing unanticipated financial burdens of the magnitude indi-
cated comes at a time when many States and local 
governments already are struggling to meet substantial fiscal 
deficits. Income, excise, and property taxes are being in-
creased. I can perceive of no justification for this Court, 
particularly in view of the question left open in Manhart, to 
impose this magnitude of burden retroactively upon the pub-
lic-and, of course, it will be the public that bears it. 
" The cost of equalizing benefits for employers will vary according to 
three factors: (i) whether the plan is a defined-contribution or a defined-
benefit plan; (ii) whether benefits are to be equalized retroactively or pro-
spectively; and (iii) whether the insurer may reallocate resources between 
men and women by applying unisex rates to existing reserves or must top 
up women's benefits. The last two factors have the most -ignificant effect 
on cost. The Court today embraces a fonn of limited retroacti\·ity. It 
also appears to require that benefits must be topped up. See ante. at 18. 
In any event, if annuity payments are regarded as a form of wages, as the 
Court also appears to suggest, see ante, at 5, the Equal Pay Act may re-
quire independently that all benefits be topped up. see 77 Stat. 56, 29 
U. S. C. § 206(d). 
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I 
June 28, 1983 
Re: No. 82-52-Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
In response to the revision in footnote 7 of the dissent 
to include Arizona Stat. Ann. 1320-448, I have revised the 
second and third paragraphs of footnote 17 on pages 13 and 14 
of my opinion to read as follows: 
Although petitioners contended in the Court of 
Appeals that their conduct was exempted from the 
reach of Title VII by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 
59 Stat. 33, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §lOll et seq., 
they have made no mention of the Act in either their 
petition for certiorari or their brief on the merits. 
"[O]nly in the most exceptional cases will we consider 
issues not raised in the petition," Stone v. Powell, 
428 U.S. 465, 481 n. 15 (1976); see Sup. Ct. R. 2l(a), 
and but for the discussion of the question in the 
dissent we would have seen no reason to address a 
contention that petitioners deliberately chose to 
abandon after it was rejected by the Court of Appeals. 
Since the dissent relies on the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act, however, post, at 5-7, we think it is appropriate 
to lay the matter to rest. The McCarran-Ferguson Act 
provides that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed 
to invalidate, impair, or supercede any law enacted by 
any State for the purpose of regulating the business of 
insurance, ... unless such Act specifically relates 
to the business of insurance." 15 U.S.C. 131012(b). 
The application of Title VII in this case does not 
supercede the application of any state law regulating 
"the business of insurance." As the Court of · Appeals 
explained, 671 F.2d, at 333, the plaintiffs in this 
case have not challenged the conduct of the business 
of insurance. No insurance company has been joined 
as a defendant, and our judgment will in no way preclude 
any insurance company from offering annuity benefits 
that are calculated on the basis of sex-segregated 
- 2 -
actuarial tables. All that is at issue in this case 
is an employment practice: the practice of offering 
a male employee the opportunity to obtain greater 
monthly annuity benefits than could be obtained by a 
similarly situated female employee. It is this 
conduct of the employer that is prohibited by Title 
VII. By its own terms, the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
applies only to the business of insurance and has no 
application to employment practices. Arizona plainly 
is not itself involved in the business of insurance, 
since it has not underwritten any risks. See Union 
Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, U.S. , (1982) 
(McCarran-Ferguson Act was "intended primarily to 
protect 'intra-industry cooperation' in the under-
writing or risks") (emphasis in original), quoting 
Group Life & He alth Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 
U.S. 205, 221 (1979); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life 
Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 69 (1959) ("the concept of 
'insurance' [for purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act] involves some investment risk-taking on the part 
of the company"). Because the application of Title 
VII in this case does not superce de any state law 
governing the business of insurance, see Spirt v. 
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n., 691 F.2d, at 1064; 
EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co., 523 F. Supp. 1256, 1266 
(N.D. Ohio 1981), we need not decide whether Title 
VII "specifically relates to the business of insurance" 
within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Cf. 
Women in City Gov't United v. City of New York, 515 
F. Supp., at 302-306. 
I have sent this change to the printer. 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS OP 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~u:prtnu Qf!tttrlllf flrt~ftb ~fatt.tr 
.. agJrhtgttttt. ~. <q. 21lpJl.~ 
June 29, 1983 
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On a more serious vein, you have my proxy. 
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part and dissent~ 
in part. ( ~ 'f4-J-"fJL "'( ~ ~J 
This case requires us to determine whether Title VII 
prohibits an employer from offering an annuity plan in 
which the participating insurance company uses sex-based 
tables for calculating monthly benefit payments. It is 
important to stress that our judicial role is simply to 
discern the intent of the 88th Congress in enacting Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1 a statute covering 
only discrimination in employment. What we, if sitting as 
legislators, might consider wise legislative policy is 
irrelevant to our task. Nor, as the majority notes, ante, 
at 4, n. 4, do we have before us any constitutional chal-
lenge. Finally, our decision must ignore (and our holding 
has no necessary effect on) the larger issue of whether 
considerations of sex should be barred from all insurance 
plans, including individual purchases of insurance, an 
issue that Congress is currently debating. See S. 372, 
1The 92nd Congress made important amendments to Title 
VII, including extending its coverage to state employers 
such as the State of Arizona. The 1972 Amendments did not 
change the substantive requirements of Title VII, however. 
Thus, it is the intent of the 88th Congress that is con-
trolling here. 
\ 2. 
98th Cong., 1st Sess. {1983) ~ H. R. 100, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. {1983) • 
Although the issue presented for our decision is a 
narrow one, the answer is far from self-evident. As with 
many other narrow issues of statutory construction, the 
general language chosen by Congress does not clearly re-
solve the precise question. Our polestar, however, must 
be the intent of Congress, and the guiding lights are the 
language, structure, and legislative history of Title VII. 
Our inquiry is made somewhat easier by the fact that this 
Court, in City of Los Angeles Department of Water And Pow-
~ v. Manhart, 435 u.s. 702 {1978), analyzed the int~nt of 
the 88th Congress on a related question. The Court in 
Manhart found Title VII's focus on the individual to be 
dispositive of the question before it. Congress in enact-
ing Title VII intended to prohibit an employer from sin-
gling out an employee by race or sex for the purpose of 
imposing a greater burden or denying an equal benefit be-
cause of a characteristic statistically identifiable with 
the group but empirically false in many individual cases. 
See Manhart; 435 U.S., at 708-710. 
Despite the dissent's argument, ultimately I am per-
suaded that the result in Manhart is notdistinguishable 
3. 
from the present situation. Manhart did note that Title 
VII would allow an employer to set aside equal retirement 
contributions for each employee and let the retiree pur-
chase whatever annuity his or her accumulated contr ibu-
tions could command on the open market. Id., at 717-718. 
In that situation, the employer is treating each employee 
without regard to sex. If an independent insurance compa-
ny then classifies persons on the basis of sex, the disad-
vantaged female worker cannot claim she was denied a priv-
ilege of employment, any more than she could complain of 
employment discrimination when the employer pays equal 
wages in a community where local merchants charge women 
more than men for identical items. As I stressed above, 
Title VII covers only discrimination in employment, and 
thus simply does not reach these other situations. 
Unlike these examples, however, the employer here 
has done more than set aside equal lump sums for all em-
ployees. Title VII clearly does not allow an employer to 
offer a plan to employees under which it will collect 
equal contributions, hold them in a trust account, and 
upon retirement disburse greater monthly checks to men 
than women. Nor could an employer escape Title VII's man-
date by using a third-party bank to hold and manage the 
4. 
account. In the situation at issue here, the employer has 
used third-party insurance companies to administer the 
plan, but the plan remains essentially a ''privileg[e] of 
employment,'' and thus is covered by Title VII. 42 u.s.c. 
§2000e-2 (a) (1). 2 
For these reasons, I join Parts I, II, and III of 
the opinion of the Court. I also share the concern ex-
pressed in Part IV that our mandate not apply retroactive-
ly to contributions collected before it became clear that 
the plans at issue were inconsistent with Title VII. The 
Court would use the date of our decision in Manhart as the 
triggering date. For reasons set forth below, however, I 
would use the date of today' s decision as the critical 
point. I therefore join Part III of JUSTICE POWELL'S 
opinion. 
In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 105-109 
( 1971) , we set forth three criteria for determining when 
to apply a decision of statutory interpretation prospec-
2The distinction between employment-related discrimina-
tion and discrimination not covered by Title VII is ably 
discussed by Van Alstyne, Equality for Individuals or 
Equality for Groups: Implications of the Supreme Court 
Decision in the Manhart Case, 64 A. A. U. P. Bulletin 150 
(1978). 
5. 
tively. First, the decision must establish a new princi-
ple of law, either by overruling clear past precedent or 
by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution 
was not clearly foreshadowed. Id., at 106. Ultimately, I 
find this case controlled by the same principles of Title 
VII articulated by the Court in Manhart. If this first 
criterion were the sole consideration for prospectivity, I 
might find it difficult to make today•s decision prospec-
tive. As reflected in JUSTICE POWELL 1 S dissent, however, 
whether Manhart foreshadows today•s decision is suffi-
ciently debatable that the first criteria of the Chevron 
test does not compel retroactivity here. Therefore, we 
must examine the remaining criteria of the Chevron test as 
well. 
The second criterion is whether retroactivity will 
further or retard the operation of the statute. Chevron, 
supr~, at 106-107. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 
422 u.s. 405, 421 {1975) {backpay should be denied only 
for reasons that will not frustrate the central statutory 
purposes). Manhart held that a central purpose of Title 
VII is to prevent employers from treating individual work-
ers on the basis of sexual or racial group characteris-
tics. Although retroactive application will not retard 
6. 
the achievement of this purpose, that goal in no way re-
quires retroactivity. I see no reason to believe that a 
retroactive holding is necessary to ensure that pension 
plan administrators, who may have thought until our deci-
sion today that Title VII did not extend to plans involv-
ing third-party insurers, will not now quickly conform 
their plans to ensure that individual employees are al-
lowed equal monthly benefits regardless of sex. See 
Manhart, supra, at 720-721. 3 
In my view, the third criterion--whether retroactive 
application would impose inequitable results--compels a 
prospective decision in these circumstances. Many working 
men and women have based their retirement decisions on 
expectations of a certain stream of income during retire-
ment. These decisions depend on the existence of adequate 
reserves to fund these pensions. A retroactive holding by 
this Court that employers must disburse greater annuity 
3Another goal of Title VII is to make persons whole for 
injuries suffered from unlawful employment discrimination. 
See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 u.s. 405, 418 
(1975). Although this goal would suggest that the present 
decision should be made retroactive, it does not necessar-
ily control the decision on retroactivity. See Manhart, 
supra, at 719. 
7. 
benefits than the collected contributions can support 
would jeopardize the entire pension fund. If a fund can-
not meet its obligations, '' [t]he harm would fall in large 
part on innocent third parties.'' Manhart, supra, at 722-
723. This real danger of bankrupting pension funds re-
quires that our decision be made prospective. Such a pro-
spective holding is, of course, consistent with our equi-
table powers under Title VII to fashion an appropriate 
remedy. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (g): Manhart, supra, at 
718-719. 
In my view, then, our holding should be made pro-
spective in the following sense. I would require employ-
ers to ensure that benefits derived from contributions 
collected after our decision today be calculated without 
regard to the sex of the beneficiary. 4 For contributions 
4In other words, I would require employers to use 
longevity tables that reflect the average longevity of all 
their workers. The Equal Pay Act proviso, 29 u.s.c. 
§206 (d) (1) (proviso), which forbids employers from curing 
violations of the Act by reducing the wage rate of any 
employee, would not require that employers ''top up'' 
benefits by using male-longevity tables for all workers. 
First, although the Bennett Amendment of Title VII, 42 
u.s.c. §2000e-2(h), incorporates the Equal Pay Act de-
fenses for disparate ''compensation'' as well as disparate 
''wages,'' see Manhart, supra, at 712, n. 22, the language 
Footnote continued on next page. 
8. 
collected before our decision today, however, I would 
allow employers and participating insurers to calculate 
the resulting benefits as they have in the past. 
of the Equal Pay Act proviso seems to apply only to wages. 
Thus, it is questionable whether the proviso would apply 
at all to the retirement plan at issue here. Second, even 
if the proviso has some relevance here, it should not be 
read to require a pension plan, whose entire function is 
actuar ially to balance contributions with outgoing bene-
fits, to calculate benefits on the basis of tables that do 
not reflect the composition of the work force. Cf. 
Manhart, supra, at 720, n. 36 {remedy should at least con-
sider ''ordering a refund of only the difference between 
contributions made by women and the contributions they 
would have made under an actuarially sound and nondiscrim-
inatory plan''). 
CHAMBERS OF 
~uvrtmt <qcurt llf tqt 'Jllnittb' ~faft_s­
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JUSTICE SA N DRA DAY O'CONNOR 
June 29, 1983 
No. 82-52 Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris 
Lewis, 
I am unable to join your position on the merits, 
but I would like to join Part III of your opinion, where you 
discuss prospectivity. Could you consider making the 
following changes for me so that I may do so? 
1) In my view, you speak of Manhart's open-market 
exception somewhat too broadly. Could you replace the 
second two sentences in the first full paragraph on page 10 
with something like the following: 
"Manhart did put all employer-
operated pension funds on notice that they 
could not "requir[e] that men and women make 
unequal contributions to [the] fund," id., at 
717, but it expressly confirmed that an--
employer could set aside equal contributions 
and let each retiree purchase whatever 
benefit his or her contributions could 
command "on the open market." Id., at 718. 
Given this explicit limitation,-an employer 
reasonably could have assumed that it would 
be lawful to make available to its employees 
annuities offered by insurance companies on 
the open market." 
2) Could you delete th~ last two sentences of 
footnote 11? In my separate writing, I will state that 
employers should use unisex tables in the future rather than 
male-longevity tables for all workers. It seems to me it 
would be useful to secure statements in your opinion as well 
as mine that "topping up" is not required. 
2. 
3) Finally, in my last paragraph I express the view 
that prospectivity means using unisex tables for 
contributions made after our decision in Norris. I wonder 
if you could state explicitly that this is your view of 
prospectivity also. 
Sincerely, 
Sandra D. O'Connor 
Justice Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
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Petitioners in this case administer a 
plan for employees of the State of Arizona. The respondent class 
consists of all female employees who are enrolled in the plan or 
will enroll in the plan in the future. Certiorari was granted to 
decide whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
amended, 42 u.s.c. §2000e et seq., prohibits an employer from 
offering its employees the option of receiving retirement 
benefits from one of several companies selected by the employer, 
all of which pay a woman lower monthly retirement benefits than a 
man who has made the same contributions; and whether, if so, the 
relief awarded by the District Court was proper. The Court holds 
that this practice does constitute discrimination on the basis of ..___.. 
sex in violation of Title VII, and that all retirement benefits 
derived from contributions made after the decision today must be 
calculated without regard to the sex of the ben This 
position is expressed in Parts I, II, 7 
opinion of JUSTICE MARSHALL, post, p. _ __.,_.. by 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE and JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR. The Court further holds that enefits derived from 
contributions made prior may be calculated as 
provided by the existing terms of plan. This 
position is expressed in Part III the opinion of JUSTICE 
POWELL, post ,_ p. __ , THE CHIEF JUSTICE, 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE REHNQU ST, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR. 
It is so ordered. 
drk 06/30/83 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Rives 
Re: Justice Marshall's proposed per~uriam in Norris: 
I have no problem with most of the per curiam that Justice 
Marshall circulated. The only question that I have about it is his 
reference to Part IV-A, which he lists Justice O'Connor as joining. 
As things now stand, there is no Part IV-A, and Justice O'Connor has 
joined only parts I, II, and III of his opinion. 
According to Justice Marshall's clerk, they were thinking 
of breaking their existing Part IV, which deals with remedy, into 
two parts. Part IV-A would say that having found liability, the 
remedy should at the least be prospective--as Justice O'Connor 
defines prospectivity. Part IV-B would go on to say that Justice 
Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, White and Stevens, would 
require retroactive relief. In this posture, Justice Marshall's 
opinion would be sufficient to establish that at least there should 
be prospective relief. And Justice O'Connor's opinion, joining Part 
IV-A but not Part IV-B, would limit the liability to prospective /~ 
relief only. 
My concern is that Part III of your opinion discussing 
retroactivity might be seen as unnecessary. Part IV-A of Justice 
Marshall's opinion, combined with Justice O'Connor's opinion, would 
2. 
limit the relief in this case. Your opinion would just be 
expressing an additional sentiment on the issue. The only virtue of 
retaining Part III of your opinion would be a matter of emphasis. 
Part IV-A of Justice Marshall's opinion would say at least 
prospective relief is necessary and Part III of your opinion would 
say at the most relief should be prospective. I understand from 
Justice O'Connor's clerk that she wants you to retain Part III if 
possible. It seems odd to me, however, for her to join -Marshall's section on relief and yours as well. Other 
see no problems with Justice Marshall's proposal. I 
interested in seeing what he drafts as Part IV-A. hanges 
will be required in the opening paragraph of Par III. 
1- s ) 
J 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-52 
ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITTEE FOR TAX DE-
FERRED ANNUITY AND DEFERRED COMPENSA-
TION PLANS, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. NATHALIE NORRIS ETC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[July 5, 1983] 
JusTICE O'CONNOR, concurring. / 
This case requires us to determine whether Title VII pro-
hibits an employer from offering an annuity plan in which the 
participating insurance company uses sex-based tables for 
calculating monthly benefit payments. It is important to 
stress that our judicial role is simply to discern the intent of 
the 88th Congress in enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 1 a statute covering only discrimination in em-
ployment. What we, if sitting as legislators, might consider 
wise legislative policy is irrelevant to our task. Nor, as Jus-
TICE MARSHALL notes, ante, at 4, n. 4, do we have before us ) 
any constitutional challenge. Finally, our decision must ig-
nore (and our holding has no necessary effect on) the larger 
issue of whether considerations of sex should be barred from 
all insurance plans, including individual purchases of insur-
ance, an issue that Congress is currently debating. See S. 
'The 92nd Congress made important amendments to Title VII, includ-
ing extending its coverage to state employers such as the State of Arizona. 
The 1972 Amendments did not change the substantive requirements of 
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372, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H. R. 100, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1983). 
Although the issue presented for our decision is a narrow 
one, the answer is far from self-evident. As with many 
other narrow issues of statutory construction, the general 
language chosen by Congress does not clearly resolve the 
precise question. Our polestar, however, must be the intent 
of Congress, and the guiding lights are the language, struc-
ture, and legislative history of Title VII. Our inquiry is 
made somewhat easier by the fact that this Court, in City of 
Los Angeles Department of Water And Power v. Manhart, 
435 U. S. 702 (1978), analyzed the intent of the 88th Congress 
on a related question. The Court in Manhart found Title 
VII's focus on the individual to be dispositive of the present 
question. Congress in enacting Title VII intended to pro-
hibit an employer from singling out an employee by race or 
sex for the purpose of imposing a greater burden or denying 
an equal benefit because of a characteristic statistically iden-
tifiable with the group but empirically false in many individ-
ual cases. See Manhart, 435 U. S., at 708-710. 
Despite JUSTICE POWELL's argument, ultimately I am J 
persuaded that the result in Manhart is not distinguishable 
from the present situation. Manhart did note that Title VII 
would allow an employer to set aside equal retirement con-
tributions for each employee and let the retiree purchase 
whatever annuity his or her accumulated contributions could 
command on the open market. ld., at 717-718. In that 
situation, the employer is treating each employee without re-
gard to sex. If an independent insurance company then clas-
sifies persons on the basis of sex, the disadvantaged female 
worker cannot claim she was denied a privilege of employ-
ment, any more than she could complain of employment dis-
crimination when the employer pays equal wages in a com-
munity where local merchants charge women more than men 
for identical items. As I stressed above, Title VII covers 
82-52-CONCUR 
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only discrimination in employment, and thus simply does not 
reach these other situations. 
Unlike these examples, however, the employer here has 
done more than set aside equal lump sums for all employees. 
Title VII clearly does not allow an employer to offer a plan to 
employees under which it will collect equal contributions, 
hold them in a trust account, and upon retirement disburse 
greater monthly checks to men than women. Nor could an 
employer escape Title VII's mandate by using a third-party 
bank to hold and manage the account. In the situation at 
issue here, the employer has used third-party insurance com-
panies to administer the plan, but the plan remains essen-
tially a "privileg[e] of employment," and thus is covered by 
Title VII. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 2 
For these reasons, I join Parts I, II, and III of JUSTICE 
MARSHALL's opinion. Unlike JUSTICE MARSHALL, however, I 
would not make our holding retroactive. Rather, for rea-
sons explained below, I agree with JUSTICE POWELL that our 
decision should be prospective. I therefore join Part III of 
JUSTICE POWELL's opinion. 
In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97, 105-109 (1971), 
we set forth three criteria for determining when to apply a 
decision of statutory interpretation prospectively. First, 
the decision must establish a new principle of law, either by 
overruling clear past precedent or by deciding an issue of 
first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshad-
owed. I d., at 106. Ultimately, I find this case controlled by 
the same principles of Title VII articulated by the Court in 
Manhart. If this first criterion were the sole consideration 
2 The distinction . between employment-related discrimination and dis-
crimination not covered by Title VII is ably discussed by Van Alstyne, 
Equality for Individuals or Equality for Groups: Implications of the Su-
preme Court Decision in the Manhart Case, 64 A. A. U. P. Bulletin 150 
(1978). 
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for prospectivity, I might find it difficult to make today's de-
cision prospective. As reflected in JUSTICE POWELL'S dis-
sent, however, whether Manhart foreshadows today's deci-
sion is sufficiently debatable that the first criterion of the 
Chevron test does not compel retroactivity here. Therefore, 
we must examine the remaining criteria of the Chevron test 
as well. 
The second criterion is whether retroactivity will further 
or retard the operation of the statute. Chevron, supra, at 
10~107. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 
405, 421 (1975) (backpay should be denied only for reasons 
that will not frustrate the central statutory purposes). 
Manhart held that a central purpose of Title VII is to prevent 
employers from treating individual workers on the basis of 
sexual or racial group characteristics. Although retroactive 
application will not retard the achievement of this purpose, 
that goal in no way requires retroactivity. I see no reason to 
believe that a retroactive holding is necessary to ensure that 
pension plan administrators, who may have thought until our 
decision today that Title VII did not extend to plans involv-
ing third-party insurers, will not now quickly conform their 
plans to ensure that individual employees are allowed equal 
monthly benefits regardless of sex. See Manhart, supra, at 
720-721. 3 
In my view, the third criterion-whether retroactive appli-
cation would impose inequitable results-compels a prospec-
tive decision in these circumstances. Many working men 
and women have based their retirement decisions on expecta-
tions of a certain stream of income during retirement. 
These decisions depend on the existence of adequate reserves 
3 Another goal of Title VII is to make persons whole for injuries suf-
fered from unlawful employment discrimination. See Albemarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 418 (1975). Although this goal would sug-
gest that the present decision should be made retroactive, it does not nec-
essarily control the decision on retroactivity. See Manhart, supra, at 719. 
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to fund these pensions. A retroactive holding by this Court 
that employers must disburse greater annuity benefits than 
the collected contributions can support would jeopardize the 
entire pension fund. If a fund cannot meet its obligations, 
"[t]he harm would fall in large part on innocent third par-
ties." Manhart, supra, at 722-723. This real danger of 
bankrupting pension funds requires that our decision be 
made prospective. Such a prospective holding is, of course, 
consistent with our equitable powers under Title VII to fash-
ion an appropriate remedy. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(g); 
Manhart, supra, at 718-719. 
In my view, then, our holding should be made prospective 
in the following sense. I would require employers to ensure 
that benefits derived from contributions collected after the 
effective date of our judgment be calculated without regard 
to the sex of the beneficiary. 1 For contributions collected 
before the effective date of our judgment, however, I would 
allow employers and participating insurers to calculate the 
resulting benefits as they have in the past. 
'In other words, I would require employers to use longevity tables that 
reflect the average longevity of all their workers. The Equal Pay Act pro-
viso, 29 U. S. C. § 206(d)(l) (proviso), which forbids employers from curing 
violations of the Act by reducing the wage rate of any employee, would not 
require that employers "top up" benefits by using male-longevity tables for 
all workers. First, although the Bennett Amendment of Title VII, 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h), incorporates the Equal Pay Act defenses for dispar-
ate "compensation" as well as disparate "wages," see Manhart, supra, at 
712, n. 22, the language of the Equal Pay Act proviso seems to apply only 
to wages. Thus, it is questionable whether the proviso would apply at all 
to the retirement plan at issue here. Second, even if the proviso has some 
relevance here, it should not be read to require a pension plan, whose en-
tire function is actuarially to balance contributions with outgoing benefits, 
to calculate benefits on the basis of tables that do not reflect the compo-
sition of the work force. Cf. Manhart, supra, at 720, n. 36 (remedy should 
at least consider "ordering a refund of only the difference between con-
tributions made by women and the contributions they would have made 
under an actuarially sound and nondiscriminatory plan"). 
I 
3rd Draft Recirculated: July 1, 1983 ~ 
No. 82-52, Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris. 
PER CURIAM. 
Petitioners in this case administer a deferred compensation 
plan for employees of the State of Arizona. The respondent class 
consists of all female employees who are enrolled in the plan or 
will enroll in the plan in the future. Certiorari was granted to 
decide whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq., prohibits an employer from 
offering its employees the option of receiving retirement 
benefits from one of several companies selected by the employer, 
all of which pay a woman lower monthly retirement benefits than a 
man who has made the same contributions; and whether, if so, the 
relief awarded by the District Court was proper. The Court holds 
that this practice does constitute discrimination on the basis of 
sex in violation of Title VII, and that all retirement benefits 
derived from contributions made after the decision today must be 
calculated without regard to the sex of the beneficiary. This 
position is expressed in Parts I, II, and III of the opinion of 
JUSTICE MARSHALL, post, p. __ , which are joined by JUSTICE 
BRENNAN, JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE STEVENS, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR. 
The Court further holds that benefits derived from contributions 
made prior to this decision may be calculated as provided by the 
existing terms of the Arizona plan. This position is expressed 
in Part III of the opinion of JUSTICE POWELL, post, p. __ , which 
is joined by~HE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE 
)
REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR. Accordingly, the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
- 2 -
I the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 




Petitioners in this case administer a deferred compensation 
plan for employees of the State of Arizona. Respondent brought 
this class action challenging the plan under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 u.s.c. §2000e et seq. 
The District Court certified a class action and entered summary 
judgment for the respondent class, holding that the Arizona plan 
discriminates on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII. The 
District Court ordered petitioners to cease offering employees 
annuities calculated on the basis of sex-based actuarial tables, 
and to make such payments to retired female employees as are 
necessary to ensure that the future monthly benefits they receive 
are equal to those received by similarly situated male employees. 
486 F. Supp. 645 (D. Ariz. 1980). The Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed. 671 F.2d 330 (1982). We granted 
certiorari to decide whether the Arizona plan violates Title VII 
and whether, if so, the relief ordered by the District Court was 
appropriate. u.s. (1982). 
The Court affirms so much of the Court of Appeals' judgment 
as holds that the Arizona plan discriminates on the basis of sex 
in violation of Title VII. The position of the majority upon 
this point is expressed by Parts I, II, and III of the opinion of 
JUSTICE MARSHALL, post, p. However, the Court reverses so 
much of the judgment below as requires petitioners to eliminate 
-
any disparity in the benefits received by members of the 
respondent class that is attributable to contributions made prior 
to our decision today. The position of the majority upon this 
- 2 -
point is expressed by Part III of the opinion of JUSTICE POWELL, 
post, p. 
It is so ordered. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.§u:prttttt C!fcurt of tlrt ~tb .§ta.tts 
'llJasJringfcn. ~. C!J. 2U,?~.;l 
June 29, 1983 
Re: No. 82-52-Arizona v. Norris 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
/ 
I have just received Sandra's opinion, "concurring 
in part" which does not concur in . the judgment. That 
means that I now have only three votes to join me in the 
judgment. At this late date, I do not have a court and 
do not know what to do at this stage. Any suggestions will 





THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.:§n.prm:t <!fonrtllf t4t ~~ .:§f:attg 
~rurfringht~ ~. Qt. 2ll~'t~ 
June 30, 1983 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
J 
RE: Case No. 82-52 - Arizona Governing Committee for Tax 
Deferred Annuity & Deferred 
Compensation Plans, etc. et al. v. 
Norris, etc. 
It is desirable that we confer immediately after we rise 
Friday. 
Among other things, the treatment of the split holding in 
Arizona v. Norris can be discussed. Thurg'ood has five votes on 
the merits of the central issue and Sandra has five votes on non-
retroactivity. 
The central issue, of course, is covered by Thurgood. 
Regard£] 
Copies to the Conference 
' ' ' 
July 1 , 1983 
82-52 A:d.zona Governing Committee v. Norris 
near Sandra.: 
I agree with your suggestion that the mandate 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
~tt.prtmt Qfllltd cf tqt ~itt~ ,§taft$' 
~a.9'fti:n¢tm, ~. <!f. 2ll,?.J!.~ 
..JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR I 
July 1, 1983 
No. 82-52 Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
With reference to the effective date of the 
judgment, Frank Lorson suggested the following language 
could be added as the last sentence of the~ curiam if the 
Conference so desires: 
The Clerk is directed to issue the 
judgment August 1, 1983. 
I think the addition would probably be appropriate 




To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Rives 
Re: No. 82-52, Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris 
This copy reflects the changes that you had approved and a 
few stylistic changes that struck me on rereading the opinion. I 
tried to change the use of the word Court to be consistent with the 
fact that there is a per curiam opinion. "Court" is used only when 
your opinion refers to the holding contained in the per curiam. 
When the opinion refers to the reasoning in Justice Marshall's 
opinion explaining why Arizona's plan violates Title VII, it uses 
the term "majority." Reference to the majority usually is followed 
by a cite to Justice Marshall's opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. I did this to be consistent with the per 
curiam, which states that the majority's view on liability is 
expressed in Justice Marshall's opinion. 
1, /7 J 1?1 ;) I 
S.f., JiJ l,' ~ cl!M ~ 













From: Justice Marshall 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES circulated:----:~--­
JUl5 
No. 82--52 
ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITTEE FOR TAX DE-
FERRED ANNUITY AND DEFERRED COMPENSA-
TION PLANS, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. NATHALIE NORRIS ETC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
----<0 
[July , 1983] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUS- , .I 
~CE WHITE, JUSTICE STEVENS, and JUSTICE O'CONN~
- - .JOin\ as to Parts I, II, and I.ll,'"concurring in the judgment m 
part, and with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE WHITE, 
and JUSTICE STEVENS join as to Part IV~~sel'ltiag in ~art ~ 0 
In Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 
U. S. 702 (1978), this Court held that Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from requiring 
women to make larger contributions in order to obtain the 
same monthly pension benefits as men. The question pre-
sented by this case is whether Title VII also prohibits an em-
ployer from offering its employees the option of receiving re-
tirement benefits from one of several companies selected by 
the employer, all of which pay a woman lower monthly bene-
fits than a man who has made the same contributions. 
I 
A 
Since 1974 the State of Arizona has offered its employees 
the opportunity to enroll in a deferred compensation plan ad-
ministered by the Arizona Governing Committee for Tax De-
ferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans (Govern-
82-52-CONCUR & DISSENT 
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ing Committee). Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38--371 et seq.; 
Ariz. Regs. 2-9-01 et seq. Employees who participate in the 
plan may thereby postpone the receipt of a portion of their 
wages until retirement. By doing so, they postpone paying 
federal income tax on the amounts deferred until after retire-
ment, when they receive those amounts and any earnings 
thereon. 1 
After inviting private companies to submit bids outlining 
the investment opportunities that they were willing to offer 
State employees, the State selected several companies to 
participate in its deferred compensation plan. Many of the 
companies selected offer three basic retirement options: (1) a 
single lump-sum payment upon retirement, (2) periodic pay-
ments of a fixed sum for a fixed period of time, and (3) 
monthly annuity payments for the remainder of the employ-
ee's life. When an employee decides to take part in the de-
ferred compensation plan, he must designate the company in 
which he wishes to invest his deferred wages. Employees 
must choose one of the companies selected by the State to 
participate in the plan; they are not free to invest their de-
ferred compensation in any other way. At the time an em-
ployee enrolls in the plan, he may also select one of the pay-
out options offered by the company that he has chosen, but 
when he reaches retirement age he is free to switch to one of 
the company's other options. If at retirement the employee 
decides to receive a lump-sum payment, he may also pur-
chase any of the options then being offered by the other com-
panies participating in the plan. Many employees find an an-
nuity contract to be the most attractive option, since receipt 
of a lump sum upon retirement requires payment of taxes on 
the entire sum in one year, and the choice of a fixed sum for a 
fixed period requires an employee to speculate as to how long 
he will live. 
'See 26 U. S. C. § 457; Rev. Rul. 72-25; Rev. Rul. 68-99; Rev. Rul. 
60-31. Arizona's deferred compensation program was approved by the In-
ternal Revenue Service in 1974. 
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Once an employee chooses the company in which he wishes 
to invest and decides the amount of compensation to be de-
ferred each month, the State is responsible for withholding 
the appropriate sums from the employee's wages and chan-
nelling those sums to the company designated by the em-
ployee. The State bears the cost of making the necessary 
payroll deductions and of giving employees time off to attend 
group meetings to learn about the plan, but it does not con-
tribute any monies to supplement the employees' deferred 
wages. 
For an employee who elects to receive a monthly annuity 
following retirement, the amount of the employee's monthly 
benefits depends upon the amount of compensation that the 
employee deferred (and any earnings thereon), the employ-
ee's age at retirement, and the employee's sex. All of the 
companies selected by the State to participate in the plan use 
sex-based mortality tables to calculate monthly retirement 
benefits. App. 12. Under these tables a man receives 
larger monthly payments than a woman who deferred the 
same amount of compensation and retired at the same age, 
because the tables classify annuitants on the basis of sex and 
women on average live longer than men. 2 Sex is the only 
factor that the tables use to classify individuals of the same 
age; the tables do not incorporate other factors correlating 
with longevity such as smoking habits, alcohol consumption, 
weight, medical history, or family history. App. 13. 
As of August 18, 1978, 1,675 of the State's approximately 
35,000 employees were participating in the deferred com-
pensation plan. Of these 1,675 participating employees, 681 
were women, and 572 women had elected some form of future 
2 Different insurance companies participating in the plan use different 
means of classifying individuals on the basis of sex. Several companies 
use separate tables for men and women. Another company uses a single 
actuarial table based on male mortality rates, but calculates the annuities 
to be paid to women by using a six-year "setback," i. e., by treating a 
woman as if she were a man six years younger and had the life expectancy 
of a man that age. App. 12. 
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annuity option. As of the same date, 10 women participat-
ing in the plan had retired, and four of those 10 had chosen a 
life-time annuity. App. 6. 
B 
On May 3, 1975, respondent Nathalie Norris, an employee 
in the Arizona Department of Economic Security, elected to 
participate in the plan. She requested that her deferred 
compensation be invested in the Lincoln National Life Insur-
ance Company's fixed annuity contract. Shortly thereafter 
Arizona approved respondent's request and began withhold-
ing $199.50 from her salary each month. 
On April 25, 1978, after exhausting administrative reme-
dies, respondent brought suit in the United States District 
Court for the District of Arizona against the State, the Gov-
erning Committee, and several individual members of the 
Committee. Respondent alleged that the defendants were 
violating § 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
78 Stat. 255, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a), by admin-
istering an annuity plan that discriminates on the basis of 
sex. Respondent requested that the District Court certify a 
class under Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 23(b)(2) consisting of all fe-
male employees of the State of Arizona "who are enrolled or 
will in the future enroll in the State Deferred Compensation 
Plan." Complaint ~V. 
On March 13, 1980, the District Court certified a class ac-
tion and granted summary judgment for the plaintiff class,3 
holding that the State's plan violates Title VII. 4 486 F. 
Supp. 645. The court directed petitioners to cease using 
3 The material facts concerning the State's deferred compensation plan 
were set forth in a statement of facts agreed to by all parties. App. 4-13. 
'Although the District Court concluded that the State's plan violates 
Title VII, the court went on to consider and reject respondent's separate 
claim that the plan violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 486 F. Supp., at 651. Because respondent did not cross ap-
peal from this ruling, it was not passed on by the Court of Appeals and is 
not before us. 
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sex-based actuarial tables and to pay retired female employ-
ees benefits equal to those paid to similarly situated men. 5 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed, with one judge dissenting. 671 F. 2d 330 (1982). 
We granted certiorari to decide whether the Arizona plan vi-
olates Title VII and whether, if so, the relief ordered by the 
District Court was proper. -- U. S. -- (1982). 
II 
We consider first whether petitioners would have violated 
Title VII if they had run the entire deferred compensation 
plan themselves, without the participation of any insurance 
companies. Title VII makes it an unlawful employment 
practice "to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex or national origin." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). There 
is no question that the opportunity to participate in a de-
ferred compensation plan constitutes a "conditio[n] or privi-
leg[e] of employment," 6 and that retirement benefits consti-
tute a form of "compensation." 7 The issue we must decide is 
whether it is discrimination "because of ... sex" to pay a re-
tired woman lower monthly benefits than a man who de-
ferred the same amount of compensation. 
In Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 
U. S. 702 (1978), we held that an employer had violated Title 
VII by requiring its female employees to make larger con-
5 The court subsequently denied respondent's motion to amend the judg-
ment to include an award of retroactive benefits to retired female employ-
ees as compensation for the benefits they had lost because the annuity 
benefits previously paid them had been calculated on the basis of sex-
segregated actuarial tables. Respondent did not appeal this ruling. 
6 See Peters v. Missouri-Pacific R. Co., 483 F. 2d 490, 492, n. 3 (CA5), 
cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1002 (1973). 
7 See Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 
712, n. 23 (1978). 
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tributions to a pension fund than male employees in order to 
obtain the same monthly benefits upon retirement. Noting 
that Title VII's "focus on the individual is unambiguous," id., 
at 708, we emphasized that the statute prohibits an employer 
from treating some employees less favorably than others be-
cause of their race, religion, sex, or national origin. I d., at 
708-709. While women as a class live longer than men, id., 
at 704, we rejected the argument that the exaction of greater 
contributions from women was based on a "factor other than 
sex"-i. e., longevity-and was therefore permissible under 
the Equal Pay Act: 8 
"[A]ny individual's life expectancy is based on a number 
8 Section 703(h) of Title VII, the so-called Bennett Amendment, pro-
vides that Title VII does not prohibit an employer from "differentiat[ing] 
upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensa-
tion paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differenti-
ation is authorized by [the Equal Pay Act]." 78 Stat. 257, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-2(h). 
The Equal Pay Act, 77 Stat. 56, 29 U. S. C. § 206(d), provides in perti-
nent part: 
"No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section 
shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are 
employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to em-
ployees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays 
wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal 
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and 
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, 
except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a 
merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality 
of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex: 
Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in viola-
tion of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of 
this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee." 77 Stat. 56, 29 
u. s. c. § 206(d). 
As in Manhart, 435 U. S., at 712, n. 23, we need not decide whether re-
tirement benefits constitute "wages" under the Equal Pay Act, because the 
Bennett Amendment extends the four exceptions recognized in the Act to 
all forms of "compensation" covered by Title VII. 
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of factors, of which sex is only one .... [O]ne cannot 'say 
that an actuarial distinction based entirely on sex is 
"based on any other factor than sex." Sex is exactly 
what it is based on."' 435 U. S., at 712-713, quoting 
553 F. 2d 581, 588 (CA9 1976), and the Equal Pay Act. 
We concluded that a plan requiring women to make greater 
contributions than men discriminates "because of . . . sex" 
for the simple reason that it treats each woman "'in a manner 
which but for [her] sex would [have been] different.'" 435 
U. S., at 710, quoting Developments in the Law, Employ-
ment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1174 (1971). 
We have no hesitation in holding, as have all but one of the 
lower courts that have considered the question, 9 that the 
classification of employees on the basis of sex is no more per-
missible at the pay-out stage of a retirement plan than at the 
pay-in stage. 10 We reject petitioners' contention that the Ar-
9 See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n., 691 F. 2d 1054 (CA2 
1982), cert. pending, No. 82-791; Retired Public Employees' Assn. of Cali-
fornia v. California, 677 F. 2d 733 (CA9 1982), cert. pending, No. 82-262; 
Women in City Gov't. United v. City of New York, 515 F. Supp. 295 
(SDNY 1981); Hannahs v. New York State Teachers' Retirement System, 
26 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 527 (SDNY 1981); Probe v. State Teachers' Retire-
ment system, 27 Fair. Emp. Prac. Cas. 1306 (CD Cal. 1981), appeal 
docketed, Nos. 81-5865, 81-5866 (CA9 1981); Shaw v. Internat'l Assn. of 
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 24 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas 995 (CD Cal. 
1980). Cf. EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F. 2d 1139 (CA11978). See also 
29 CFR § 1604.9(f) (1982) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer to have a pension or retirement plan ... which differentiates 
in benefits on the basis of sex"). 
Only the Sixth Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion. Peters v. 
Wayne State University, 691 F. 2d 235 (1981), cert. pending, No. 82-794. 
10 It is irrelevant that females employees in Manhart were required to 
participate in the pension plan, whereas participation in the Arizona de-
ferred compensation plan is voluntary. Title VII forbids all discrimination 
concerning "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment," not just discrimination concerning those aspects of the employment 
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izona plan does not discriminate on the basis of sex because a 
woman and a man who defer the same amount of compensa-
tion will obtain upon retirement annuity policies having ap-
proximately the same present actuarial value. 11 Arizona has 
simply offered its employees a choice among different levels 
of annuity benefits, any one of which, if offered alone, ' would 
be equivalent to the plan at issue in Manhart, where the em-
ployer determined both the monthly contributions employees 
were required to make and the level of benefits that they 
were paid. If a woman participating in the Arizona plan 
wishes to obtain monthly benefits equal to those obtained by 
a man, she must make greater monthly contributions than 
he, just as the female employees in Manhart had to make 
greater contributions to obtain equal benefits. For any par-
ticular level of benefits that a woman might wish to receive, 
she will have to make greater monthly contributions to obtain 
that level a benefits than a man would have to make. The 
fact that Arizona has offered a range of discriminatory bene-
fit levels, rather than only one such level, obviously provides 
no basis whatsoever for distinguishing Manhart. 
In asserting that the Arizona plan is nondiscriminatory be-
relationship as to which the employee has no choice. It is likewise irrele-
vant that the Arizona plan includes two options-the lump-sum option and 
the fixed-sum-for-a-fixed-period option-that are provided on equal terms 
to men and women. An employer that offers one fringe benefit on a dis-
criminatory basis cannot escape liability because he also offers other bene-
fits on a nondiscriminatory basis. Cf. Mississippi University for Women 
v. Hogan, -- U. S. --, --, n. 8 (1982). 
11 The present actuarial value of an annuity policy is determined by mul-
tiplying the present value (in this case, the value at the time of the employ-
ee's retirement) of each monthly payment promised by the probability, 
which is supplied by an actuarial table, that the annuitant will live to re-
ceive that payment. An annuity policy issued to a retired female em-
ployee under a sex-based retirement plan will have roughly the same 
present actuarial value as a policy issued to a similarly situated man, since 
the lower value of each monthly payment she is promised is offset by the 
likelihood that she will live longer and therefore receive more payments. 
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cause a man and a woman who have made equal contributions 
will obtain annuity policies of roughly equal present actuarial 
value, petitioners incorrectly assume that Title VII permits 
an employer to classify employees on the basis of sex in pre-
dicting their longevity. Otherwise there would be no basis 
for postulating that a woman's annuity policy has the same 
present actuarial value as the policy of a similarly situated 
man even though her policy provides lower monthly bene-
fits. 12 This underlying assumption-that sex may properly 
be used to predict longevity-is flatly inconsistent with the 
basic teaching of Manhart: that Title VII requires employers 
to treat their employees as individuals, not "as simply com-
ponents of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class." 435 
U. S., at 708. Manhart squarely rejected the notion that, 
because women as a class live longer than men, an employer 
may adopt a retirement plan that treats every individual 
woman less favorably than every individual man. I d., at 
716-717. 
As we observed in Manhart, "[a]ctuarial studies could un-
questionably identify differences in life expectancy based on 
race or national origin, as well as sex." I d., at 709 (footnote 
omitted). If petitioners' interpretation of the statute were 
correct, such studies could be used as a justification for pay-
ing employees of one race lower monthly benefits than em-
ployees of another race. We continue to believe that "a stat-
ute that was designed to make race irrelevant in the 
employment market," ibid., citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U. S. 424, 436 (1971), could not reasonably be construed 
to permit such a racial classification. And if it would be un-
lawful to use race-based actuarial tables, it must also be un-
lawful to use sex-based tables, for under Title VII a distinc-
'
2 See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n., supra, 691 F. 2d, at 
1061-1062; Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, Sex Discrimiation in 
Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and Demographic Analy-
sis, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 505, 512-514 (1980). 
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tion based on sex stands on the same footing as a distinction 
based on race unless it falls within one of a few narrow excep-
tions that are plainly inapplicable here. 13 
What we said in Manhart bears repeating: "Congress has 
decided that classifications based on sex, like those based on 
national origin or race, are unlawful." 435 U. S., at 709. 
The use of of sex-segregated actuarial tables to calculate re-
tirement benefits violates Title VII whether or not the tables 
reflect an accurate prediction of the longevity of women as a 
class, for under the statute "[e]ven a true generalization 
about [a] class" cannot justify class-based treatment. 14 Ibid. 
13 The exception for bona fide occupational qualifications, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-2(e), is inapplicable since the tenns of a retirement plan have noth-
ing to do with occupational qualifications. The only possible relevant ex-
ception recognized in the Bennett Amendment, see n. 8, supra, is inappli-
cable in this case for the same reason it was inapplicable in Manhart: a 
scheme that uses sex to predict longevity is based on sex; it is not based on 
"any other factor than sex." See 435 U. S., at 712 ("any individual's life 
expectancy is based on any number of factors, of which sex is only one"). 
14 In his separate opinion in Manhart, JUSTICE BLACKMUN expressed 
doubt that that decision could be reconciled with this Court's previous deci-
sion in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976). In Gilbert a 
divided Court held that the exclusion of pregnancy from an employer's dis-
ability benefit plan did not constitute discrimination "because of ... sex" 
within the meaning of Title VII. The majority reasoned that the special 
treatment of pregnancy distinguished not between men and women, but 
between pregnant women and nonpregnant persons of both sexes. I d., at 
135. The dissenters in Gilbert asserted that "it offends common sense to 
suggest that a classification revolving around pregnancy is not, at the mini-
mum, strongly 'sex related,"' id., at 149 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (cita-
tion omitted), and that the special treatment of pregnancy constitutes sex 
discrimination because "it is the capacity to become pregnant which pri-
marily differentiates the female from the male." !d., at 162 (STEVENS, J., 
dissenting). 
The tension in our cases that JusTICE BLACKMUN noted in Manhart has 
since been eliminated by the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act of 1978 (PDA), Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, in which Congress 
overruled Gilbert by amending Title VII to establish that "the tenns 
'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include ... because of or on the 
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An individual woman may not be paid lower monthly benefits 
simply because women as a class live longer than men. 16 Cf. 
Connecticut v. Teal, -- U. S. -- (1982) (an individual 
may object that an employment test used in making promo-
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e(k) (Supp. IV). See Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock 
Co. v. EEOC, - U. S. - (1983). 
The enactment of the PDA buttresses our holding in Manhart that the 
greater cost of providing retirement benefits for women as a class cannot 
justify differential treatment based on sex. 435 U. S., at 71&-717. Jus-
TICE REHNQUIST's opinion for the Court in Gilbert relied heavily on the ab-
sence of proof that the employer's disability program provided less cover-
age for women as a class than for men. 429 U. S., at 138-139. In 
enacting the PDA, Congress recognized that requiring employers to cover 
pregnancy on the same terms as other disabilities would add approximately 
$200 million to their total costs, but concluded that the PDA was necessary 
"to clarify [the] original intent" of Title VII. H. R. Rep. No. 948, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 9 (1978). Since the purpose of the PDA was simply to 
make the treatment of pregnancy consistent with general Title VII princi-
ples, see Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,--
U. S., at--, and n. 16, Congress' decision to forbid special treament of 
pregnancy despite the special costs associated therewith provides further 
support for our conclusion in Manhart that the greater costs of providing 
retirement benefits for female employees does not justify the use of a 
sex-based retirement plan. Cf. id., at--, n. 24. See also 29 CFR 
§ 1604.9(e) (1982) ("It shall not be a defense under Title VII to a charge of 
sex discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with 
respect to one sex than the other.") 
15 As we noted in Manhart, "insurance is concerned with events that are 
individually unpredictable, but that is characteristic of many employment 
decisions" and has never been deemed a justification for "resort to the 
classifications proscribed by Title VII." 435 U. S., at 710. It is true that 
properly designed tests can identify many job qualifications before employ-
ment, whereas it cannot be determined in advance when a particular em-
ployee will die. See id., at 724 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). For some jobs, however, there may be rele-
vant skills that cannot be identified by testing. Yet Title VII clearly 
would not permit use of race, national origin, sex, or religion as a proxy for 
such an employment qualification, regardless of whether a statistical cor-
relation could be established. 
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tion decisions has a discriminatory impact even if the class of 
which he is a member has not been disproportionately denied 
promotion). 
We conclude that it is just as much discrimination "because 
of . . . sex" to pay a woman lower benefits when she has 
made the same contributions as a man as it is to make her pay 
larger contributions to obtain the same benefits. 
III 
Since petitioners plainly would have violated Title VII if 
they had run the entire deferred compensation plan them-
selves, the only remaining question as to liability is whether 
their conduct is beyond the reach of the statute because it is 
the companies chosen by petitioners to participate in the plan 
that calculate and pay the retirement benefits. 
Title VII "primarily govern[s] relations between employ-
ees and their employer, not between employees and third 
parties." 16 Manhart, 435 U. S., at 718, n. 33. Recognizing 
this limitation on the reach of the statute, we noted in 
Manhart that 
"Nothing in our holding implies that it would be unlawful 
for an employer to set aside equal retirement contribu-
There is no support in either logic or experience for the view, referred to 
by JUSTICE POWELL, post, at 4, that an annuity plan must classify on the 
basis of sex to be actuarially sound. Neither Title VII nor the Equal Pay 
Act "makes it unlawful to determine the funding requirements for an 
establishment's benefit plan by considering the [sexual] composition of the 
entire force," Manhart, 435 U. S., at 718, n. 34, and it is simply not neces-
sary either to exact greater contributions from women than from men or to 
pay women lower benefits than men. For example, the Minnesota Mutual 
Life Insurance Company and the Northwestern National Life Insurance 
Company have offered an annuity plan that treats men and women equally. 
See The Chronicle of Higher Education, Vol. 25, No. 7, Oct. 13, 1982, at 
2~26. 
16 The statute applies to employers and "any agent" of an employer. 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e(b). 
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tions for each employee and let each retiree purchase the 
largest benefits which his or her accumulated contribu-
tions could command in the open market." I d., at 
717-718 (footnote omitted). 
Relying on this caveat, petitioners contend that they have 
not violated Title VII because the life annuities offered by 
the companies participating in the Arizona plan reflect what 
is available in the open market. Petitioners cite a statement 
in the stipulation of facts entered into in the District Court 
that "[a]ll tables presently in use provide a larger sum to a 
male than to a female of equal age, account value and any 
guaranteed payment period." App. 10. 17 
17 Petitioners also emphasize that an employee participating in the Ari-
zona plan can elect to receive a lump-sum payment upon retirement and 
then "purchase the largest benefits which his or her accumulated contribu-
tions could command in the open market." The fact that the lump-sum op-
tion permits this has no bearing, however, on whether petitioners have dis-
criminated because of sex in offering an annuity option to its employees. 
As we have pointed out above, ante, at note 10, it is no defense to dis-
crimination in the provision of a fringe benefit that another fringe benefit is 
provided on a nondiscriminatory basis. 
Although petititioners contended in the Court of Appeals that their con-
duct was exempted from the reach of Title VII by the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act, 59 Stat. 33, as amended, 15 U. S. C.§ 1011 et seq., they have made no 
mention of the Act in either their petition for certiorari or their brief on the 
merits. "[O]nly in the most exceptional cases will we consider issues not 
raised in the petition," Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 481, n. 15 (1976); see 
Sup. Ct. R. 21(a), and but for the discussion of the question by JUSTICE 
POWELL we would have seen no reason to address a contention that peti-
tioners deliberately chose to abandon after it was rejected by the Court of 
Appeals. 
Since JUSTICE POWELL relies on the Act, however, post, at fr-7, we think 
it is appropriate to lay the matter to rest. The McCarran-Ferguson Act 
provides that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, im-
pair, or supercede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulat-
ing the business of insurance, . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the 
business of insurance." 15 U. S. C. § 1012(b). Although there are no re-
ported Arizona cases indicating the effect of the Arizona statute cited by 
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It is no defense that all annuities immediately available in 
the open market may have been based on sex-segregated ac-
tuarial tables. In context it is reasonably clear that the 
stipulation on which petitioners rely means only that all the 
tables used by the companies taking part in the Arizona plan 
are based on sex, 18 but our conclusion does not depend upon 
JUSTICE POWELL on classifications based on sex in annuity policies, we 
may assume that the statute would permit such classifications, for that as-
sumption does not affect our conclusion that the application of Title VII in 
this case does not supercede the application of any state law regulating 
"the business of insurance." As the Court of Appeals explained, 671 F. 
2d, at 333, the plaintiffs in this case have not challenged the conduct of the 
business of insurance. No insurance company has been joined as a defend-
ant, and our judgment will in no way preclude any insurance company from 
offering annuity benefits that are calculated on the basis of sex-segregated 
actuarial tables. All that is at issue in this case is an employment prac· 
tice: the practice of offering a male employee the opportunity to obtain 
greater monthly annuity benefits than could be obtained by a similarly situ-
ated female employee. It is this conduct of the employer that is prohibited 
by Title VII. By its own terms, the McCarran-Ferguson Act applies only 
to the business of insurance and has no application to employment prac-
tices. Arizona plainly is not itself involved in the business of insurance, 
since it has not underwritten any risks. See Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. 
Pireno, --U.S. --, -- (1982) (McCarran-Ferguson Act was "in-
tended primarily to protect 'intra-industry cooperation' in the underwrit-
ing or risks") (emphasis in original), quoting Group Life & Health Ins. Co. 
v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U. S. 205, 221 (1979); SEC v. Variable Annuity 
Life Ins. Co., 359 U. S. 65, 69 (1959) ("the concept of 'insurance' [for pur-
poses of the McCarran-Ferguson Act] involves some investment risk-tak-
ing on the part of the company"). Because the application of Title VII in 
this case does not supercede any state law governing the business of insur-
ance, see Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n., 691 F. 2d, at 1064; 
EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co., 523 F. Supp. 1256, 1266 (N.D. Ohio 1981), 
we need not decide whether Title VII "specifically relates to the business 
of insurance" within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Cf. 
Women in City Gov't United v. City of New York, 515 F. Supp., at 
302-306. 
18 This is the natural reading of the statement, since it appears in the 
portion of the stipulation discussing the options offered by the companies 
participating in the State's plan. 
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whether petitioner's construction of the stipulation is ac-
cepted or rejected. It is irrelevant whether any other insur-
ers offered annuities on a sex-neutral basis, since the State 
did not simply set aside retirement contributions and let em-
ployees purchase annuities on the open market. On the con-
trary, the State provided the opportunity to obtain an annu-
ity as part of its own deferred compensation plan. It invited 
insurance companies to submit bids outlining the terms on 
which they would supply retirement benefits 19 and selected 
the companies that were permitted to participate in the plan. 
Once the State selected these companies, it entered into con-
tracts with them governing the terms on which benefits were 
to be provided to employees. Employees enrolling in the 
plan could obtain retirement benefits only from one of those 
companies, and no employee could be contacted by a company 
except as permitted by the State. Ariz. Regs. 2-9-06.A, 
2-9-20.A. 
Under these circumstances there can be no serious ques-
tion that petitioners are legally responsible for the discrimi-
natory terms on which annuities are offered by the companies 
chosen to participate in the plan. Having created a plan 
whereby employees can obtain the advantages of using de-
ferred compensation to purchase an annuity only if they in-
vest in one of the companies specifically selected by the 
State, the State cannot disclaim responsibility for the dis-
criminatory features of the insurers' options. 20 Since em-
ployers are ultimately responsible for the "compensation, 
terms, conditions, [and] privileges of employment" provided 
to employees, an employer that adopts a fringe-benefit 
'
9 The State's contract procurement documents asked the bidders to 
quote annuity rates for men and women. 
20 See Peters v. Wayne State University, supra, 691 F. 2d, at 238; EEOC 
v. Colby College, supra, at 1141; Van Alstyne, Equality for Individuals or 
Equality for Groups: Implications of the Supreme Court Decision in the 
Manhart Case, 64 AAUP Bulletin 150, 152-155 (1978). 
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scheme that discriminates among its employees on the basis 
of race, religion, sex, or national origin violates Title VII re-
gardless of whether third parties are also involved in the dis-
crimination. 21 In this case the State of Arizona was itself a 
party to contracts concerning the annuities to be offered by 
the insurance companies, and it is well established that both 
parties to a discriminatory contract are liable for any dis-
criminatory provisions the contract contains, regardless of 
which party initially suggested inclusion of the discrimina-
tory provisions. 22 It would be inconsistent with the broad re-
21 An analogy may usefully be drawn to our decision in Ford Motor Co. v. 
NLRB, 441 U. S. 488 (1979). The employer in that case provided in-plant 
food services to its employees under a contract with an independent ca-
terer. We held that the prices charged for the food constituted "terms 
and conditions of employment" under the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) and were therefore mandatory subjects for collective bargaining. 
We specifically rejected the employer's argument that, because the food 
was provided by a third party, the prices did not implicate "'an aspect of 
the relationship between the employer and employees.'" I d., at 501, 
quoting Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co ., 
404 U. S. 157, 176 (1971). We emphasized that the selection of an inde-
pendent contractor to provide the food did not change the fact that "the 
matter of in-plant food prices and services is an aspect of the relationship 
between Ford and its own employees." 441 U. S., at 501. 
Just as the issue in Ford was whether the employer had refused to bar-
gain with respect to "terms and conditions of employment," 29 U. S. C. 
§ 158(d), the issue here is whether petitioners have discriminated against 
female employees with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions or priv-
ileges of employment." Even more so than in-plant food prices, retire-
ment benefits are matters "of deep concern" to employees, id., at 498, and 
plainly constitute an aspect of the employment relationship. Indeed, in 
Ford we specifically compared in-plant food services to "other kinds of 
benefits, such as health insurance, implicating outside suppliers." Id., at 
503, n. 15. We do not think it makes any more difference here than it did 
in Ford that the employer engaged third parties to provide a particular 
benefit rather than directly providing the benefit itself. 
22 See Williams v. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n, 673 F. 2d 742, 750-751 
(CA5 1982), cert. denied, -- U. S. -- (1983); Williams v. Owens-
Illinois, Inc., 665 F. 2d 918, 926 (CA9), mod. and reh. denied, 28 Fair 
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medial purposes of Title VII 23 to hold that an employer who 
adopts a discriminatory fringe benefit plan can avoid liability 
on the ground that he could not find a third party willing to 
treat his employees on a nondiscriminatory basis. 24 An em-
ployer who confronts such a situation must either supply the 
fringe benefit himself, without the assistance of any third 
party, or not provide it at all. 
IV 
We turn finally to the relief awarded by the District Court. 
The court enjoined petitioners to assure that future annuity 
payments to retired female employees shall be equal to the 
payments received by similarly situated male employees. 25 
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 4~2 U. S. 405 (1975), 
we emphasized that one of the main purposes of Title VII is 
"to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of un-
lawful employment discrimination." Id., at 418. We recog-
Emp. Cas. 1820, cert. denied, -- U. S. -- (1982); Farmer v. ARA 
Services, Inc., 660 F. 2d 1096, 1104 (CA6 1981); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel 
Corp., 635 F. 2d 1007, 1014 (CA2 1980), cert. denied, 452 U. S. 940 (1981); 
United States v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 479 F. 2d 354, 379-380 (CA81973); 
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F. 2d 791, 799 (CA4), cert. dismissed, 404 
u. s. 1006 (1971). 
23 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-418, 421 
(1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S., at 429-430. 
24 Such a result would be particularly anomalous where, as here, the em-
ployer made no effort to determine whether third parties would provide 
the benefit on a neutral basis. Contrast The Chronicle of Higher Educa-
tion, note 15, supra, at 25-26 (explaining how the University of Minnesota 
obtained agreements from two insurance companies to use sex-neutral an-
nuity tables to calculate annuity benefits for its employees). Far from 
bargaining for sex-neutral treatment of its employees, Arizona asked com-
panies seeking to participate in its plan to list their annuity rates for men 
and women separately. 
1 
25 The court did not explain its reasons for choosing this remedy. 
Since respondents did not appeal the District Court's refusal to award 
damages for benefit payments made prior to the court's decision, see n. 5, 
supra, there is no need to consider the correctness of that ruling. 
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nized that there is a strong presumption that "[t]he injured 
party is to be placed, as near as may be, in the situation he 
would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed." 
Id., at 418-419, quoting Wicker v. Hoppock, 6 Wall. 94, 99 
(1867). Once a violation of the statute has been found, retro-
active relief "should be denied only for reasons which, if ap-
plied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory 
purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the econ-
omy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through 
past discrimination." 422 U. S., at 421 (footnote omitted). 
Applying this standard, we held that the mere absence of bad 
faith on the part of the employer is not a sufficient reason for 
denying such relief. I d., at 422-423. 
Although this Court noted in Manhart that "[t]he Albe-
marle presumption in favor of retroactive liability can seldom 
be overcome," 435 U. S., at 719, the Court concluded that 
under the circumstances the District Court had abused its 
discretion in requiring the employer to refund to female em-
ployees all contributions they were required to make in ex-
cess of the contributions demanded of men. The Court ex-
plained that "conscientious and intelligent administrators of 
pension funds, who did not have the benefit of the extensive 
briefs and arguments presented to us, may well have as-
sumed that a program like the Department's was entirely 
lawful," since "[t]he courts had been silent on the question, 
and the administrative agencies had conflicting views." I d., 
at 720 (footnote omitted). The Court also noted that retro-
active relief based on "[d]rastic changes in the legal rules 
governing pension and insurance funds" can "jeopardiz[e] the 
insurer's solvency and, ultimately, the insureds' benefits," 
id., at 721, and that the burden of such relief can fall on inno-
cent third parties. I d., at 722-723. 
While the relief ordered here affects only benefit payments 
made after the date of the District Court's judgment, it does 
not follow that the relief is wholly prospective in nature, as 
an injunction concerning future conduct ordinarily is, and 
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should therefore be routinely awarded once liability is estab-
lished. When a court directs a change in benefits based on 
contributions made before the court's order, the court is 
awarding relief that is fundamentally retroactive in nature. 
This is true because retirement benefits under a plan such as 
that at issue here represent a return on contributions which 
were made during the employee's working years and which 
were intended to fund the benefits without any additional 
contributions from any source after retirement. 
A recognition that the relief awarded by the District Court 
is partly retroactive is only the beginning of the inquiry. 
Absent special circumstances a victim of a Title VII violation 
is entitled to whatever retroactive relief is necessary to undo 
any damage resulting from the violation. See Albemarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S., at 418-419, 421. As to any 
disparity in benefits that is attributable to contributions 
made after our decision in Manhart, there are no special cir-
cumstances justifying the denial of retroactive relief. Our 
1 ruling today was clearly foreshadowed by Manhart. That 
decision should have put petitioners on notice that a man and 
a woman who make the same contributions to a retirement 
plan must be paid the same monthly benefits. 26 To the ex-
26 Only one of the several lower court decisions since Manhart has ac-
cepted the argument that the principle established in that decision is lim-
ited to plans that require women to make greater contributions than men, 
see n. 9, supra, and no court has held that an employer can assert as a de-
fense that the calculation and payment of retirement benefits is made by 
third parties selected by the employer. See also Van Alstyne, supra, 64 
AA UP Bulletin, at 152-155 (predicting that the the involvement of an inde-
pendent insurer would not be recognized as a defense and noting that an 
employer offering a sex-based retirement plan funded by such an insurer 
would be well advised to act expeditiously to bring himself into compliance 
I with the law). After Manhart an employer could not reasonably have as-sumed that a sex-based plan would be lawful. As explained above, supra, 
at 12-13, Arizona did not simply set aside wages and permit employees to 
purchase annuities in the open market; it therefore had no basis for assum-
ing that the open-market exception recognized in Manhart would apply to 
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tent that any disparity in benefits coming due after the date 
of the District Court's judgment is attributable to contribu-
tions made after Manhart, there is therefore no unfairness in 
requiring petitioners to pay retired female employees what-
ever sum is necessary each month to bring them up to the 
benefit level that they would have enjoyed had their post-
M anhart contributions been treated in the same way as those 
of similarly situated male employees. 
To the extent, however, that the disparity in benefits that 
the District Court required petitioners to eliminate is attrib-
utable to contributions made before Manhart, the court gave 
insufficient attention to this Court's recognition in Manhart 
that until that decision the use of sex-based tables might rea-
sonably have been assumed to be lawful. Insofar as this por-
tion of the disparity is concerned, the District Court should 
have inquired into the circumstances in which petitioners, 
after Manhart, could have applied sex-neutral tables to the 
pre-Manhart contributions of a female employee and a simi-
larly situated male employee without violating any contrac-
tual rights that the latter might have had on the basis of his 
pre-M anhart contributions. If, in the case of a particular fe-
male employee and a similarly situated male employee, peti-
tioners could have applied sex-neutral tables to pre-Manhart 
contributions without violating any contractual right of the 
male employee, they should have done so in order to prevent 
further discrimination in the payment of retirement benefits 
in the wake of this Court's ruling in Manhart. 27 Since a fe-
its plan. 
27 Since the actual calculation and payment of retirement benefits was in 
the hands of third parties under the Arizona plan, petitioners would not 
automatically have been able to apply sex-neutral tables to pre-Manhart 
contributions even if pre-existing contractual rights posed no obstacle. 
However, petitioners were in a position to exert influence on the compa-
nies participating in the plan, which depended upon the State for the busi-
ness generated by the deferred compensation plan, and we see no reason 
why petitioners should stand in a better position because they engaged 
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male employee in this situation should have had sex-neutral 
tables applied to her pre-M anhart contributions, it is only 
fair that petitioners be required to supplement any benefits 
coming due after the District Court's judgment by whatever 
sum is necessary to compensate her for their failure to adopt 
sex-neutral tables. 
If, on the other hand, sex-neutral tables could not have 
been applied to the pre-M anhart contributions of a particular 
female employee and any similarly situated male employee 
without violating the male employee's contractual rights, it 
would be inequitable to award such relief. To do so would be 
to require petitioners to compensate the female employee for 
a disparity attributable to pre-M anhart conduct even though 
such conduct might reasonably have been assumed to be law-
ful and petitioners could not have done anything after 
Manhart to eliminate that disparity short of expending State 
funds. With respect to any female employee determined to 
fall in this category, petitioners need only ensure that her 
monthly benefits are no lower than they would have been had 
her post-M anhart contributions been treated in the same 
way as those of a similarly situated male employee. 
The record does not indicate whether some or all of the 
male participants in the plan who had not retired at the time 
Manhart was decided 28 had any contractual right to a particu-
lar level of benefits that would have been impaired by the 
application of sex-neutral tables to their pre-Manhart con-
tributions. The District Court should address this question 
on remand. 
third parties to pay the benefits than they would be in had they run the 
entire plan themselves. 
) 
28 Since the amount of monthly annuity payments is ordinarily fixed by 
the time of retirement, sex-neutral tables presumably could not have been 
applied after Manhart to male employees who had retired before that deci-
sion without violating their contractual rights. 
fri,r-t e J 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-52 
ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITTEE FOR TAX DE-
FERRED ANNUITY AND DEFERRED COMPENSA-
TION PLANS, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. NATHALIE NORRIS ETC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[July-, 1983] 
PER CURIAM. 
Petitioners in this case administer a deferred compensation 
plan for employees of the State of Arizona. The respondent 
class consists of all female employees who are enrolled in the 
plan or will enroll in the plan in the future. Certiorari was 
granted to decide whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., prohibits an 
employer from offering its employees the option of receiving 
retirement benefits from one of several companies selected 
by the employer, all of which pay a woman lower monthly re-
tirement benefits than a man who has made the same con-
tributions; and whether, if so, the relief awarded by the Dis-
trict Court was proper. The Court holds that this practice 
does constitute discrimination on the basis of sex in violation 
of Title VII, and that all retirement benefits derived from 
contributions made after the decision today must be calcu-
lated without regard to the sex of the beneficiary. This posi-
tion is expressed in Parts I, II, and III of the opinion of Jus-
TICE MARSHALL, post, p. --, which are joined by JUSTICE 
BRENNAN, JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE STEVENS, and JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR. The Court further holds that benefits derived 
from contributions made prior to this decision may be calcu-
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lated as provided by the existing terms of the Arizona plan. 
This position is expressed in Part III of the opinion of Jus-
TICE POWELL, post, p. --, which is joined by THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and JUS-
TICE O'CONNOR. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
To: ~he Chief JuattQ 
.Justice Brer:mut. 






From: Justice Marshall 
C1r oulated: -------
Reo'iraUla.ted: JUl 5 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES -----~-
No. 82-52 
ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITTEE FOR TAX DE-
FERRED ANNUITY AND DEFERRED COMPENSA-
TION PLANS, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. NATHALIE NORRIS ETC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[July 6, 1983] 
PER CURIAM. 
Petitioners in this case administer a deferred compensation 
plan for employees of the State of Arizona. The respondent 
class consists of all female employees who are enrolled in the 
plan or will enroll in the plan in the future. Certiorari was 
granted to decide whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, as amended, 42 U.S. C. §2000e et seq., prohibits an 
employer from offering its employees the option of receiving 
retirement benefits from one of several companies selected 
by the employer, all of which pay a woman lower monthly re-
tirement benefits than a man who has made the same con-
tributions; and whether, if so, the relief awarded by the Dis-
trict Court was proper. The Court holds that this practice 
does constitute discrimination on the basis of sex in violation 
of Title VII, and that all retirement benefits derived from 
contributions made after the decision today must be calcu-
lated without regard to the sex of the beneficiary. This posi-
tion is expressed in Parts I, II, and III of the opinion of Jus-
TICE MARSHALL, post, p. --, which are joined by JUSTICE 
BRENNAN, JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE STEVENS, and JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR. The Court further holds that benefits derived 
from contributions made prior to this decision may be calcu-
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lated as provided by the existing terms of the Arizona plan. 
This position is expressed in Part III of the opinion of Jus-
TICE POWELL, post, p. --, which is joined by THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and JUS-
TICE O'CONNOR. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion. The Clerk is directed to issue the judgment August 1, 
1983. 
It is so ordered. 
<!Hihl6-£$ I - I :J 
roo I~OT~s ~4!NC) M !e. If'«.. I::) 
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From: Justice Powell 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAiES. cillat~a: ----
No. 82-52 
ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITTEE FOR TAX DE-
FERRED ANNUITY AND DEFERRED COMPENSA-
TION PLANS, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. NATHALIE NORRIS ETC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[July 6, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Jus-
TICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join as to Parts I 
and II, dissenting in part and with whom THE CHIEF Jus-
TICE, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and JUS-
TICE O'CONNOR join as to Part III, concurring in part. 
The Court today holds that an employer may not offer its 
employees life annuities from a private insurance company 
that uses actuarially sound, sex-based mortality tables. 
This holding will have a far-reaching effect on the operation 
of insurance and pension plans. Employers may be forced to 
discontinue offering life annuities, or potentially disruptive 
changes may be required in long-established methods of cal-
culating insurance and pensions. 1 Either course will work a 
' The cost of continuing to provide annuities may become prohibitive. 
The minimum additional cost necessary to equalize benefits prospectively 
would range from $85 to $93 million each year for at least the next 15 years. 
United States Department of Labor, Cost Study of the Impact of an Equal 
Benefits Rule on Pension Benefits 4 (1983) (hereinafter Department of 
Labor Cost Study). This minimum cost assumes that employers will be 
free to use the least costly method of adjusting benefits. This assumption 
may be unfounded. If employers are required to "top up" benefits-i. e., 
calculate women's benefits at the rate applicable w men rather than apply a 
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major change in the way the cost of insurance is deter-
mined-to the probable detriment of all employees. This is 
contrary to our explicit recognition in Los Angeles Dept. of 
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U~ S. 702, 717 (1978), that 
Title VII "was [not] intended to revolutionize the insurance 
and pension industries." J o"" iS~; • .J 
I 
The State of Arizona provides its employees with a volun-
tary pension plan that allows them to defer receipt of a por-
tion of their compensation until retirement. If an employee 
chooses to participate, an amount designated by the em-
ployee is withheld from each paycheck and invested by the 
State on the employee's behalf. When an employee retires, 
he or she may receive the amount that has accrued in one of 
three ways. The employee may withdraw the total amount 
accrued, arrange for periodic payments of a fixed sum for a 
fixed time, or use the accrued amount to purchase a life 
annuity. 
There is no contention that the State's plan discriminates 
between men and women when an employee contributes to 
the fund. The plan is voluntary and each employee may con-
tribute as much as he or she chooses. ·Nor does anyone con-
tend that either of the first two methods of repaying the ac-
crued amount at retirement is discriminatory. Thus, if 
Arizona had adopted the same contribution plan but provided 
only the first two repayment options, there would be no dis-
pute that its plan complied with Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. The 
first two options, however, have disadvantages. If an em-
unisex rate to both men and women-the cost of providing purely prospec-
tive benefits would range from $428 to $676 million each year for at least 
the next 15 years. Department of Labor Cost Study 31. No one seri-
ously suggests that these costs will not be passed on-in large part-to the 
annuity beneficiaries or, in the case of state and local governments, to the 
public. 
0 ""is~ i ow 
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ployee chooses to take a lump-sum payment, the tax liability 
will be substantial. 2 The second option ameliorates the tax 
problem by spreading the receipt of the accrued amount over 
a fixed period of time. This option, however, does not guard 
against the possibility that the finite number of payments se-
lected by the employee will fail to provide income for the re-
mainder of his or her life. 
The third option-the purchase of a life annuity-resolves 
both of these problems. It reduces an employee's tax liabil-
ity by spreading the payments out over time, and it guaran-
tees that the employee will receive a stream of payments for 
life. State law prevents Arizona from accepting the financial 
uncertainty of funding life annuities. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 3~71(C)(1) (1983). But to achieve tax benefits under fed-
erallaw, the life annuity must be purchased from a company 
designated by the retirement plan. Rev. Rul. 72-25, 1972-1 
Cum. Bull. 127; Rev. Rul. 68-99, 1968-1 Cum. Bull193. Ac-
cordingly, Arizona contracts with private insurance compa-
nies to make life annuities available to its employees. The 
companies that underwrite the life annuities, as do the vast 
majority of private insurance companies in the United States, 
use sex-based mortality tables. Thus, the only effect of Ari-
zona's third option is to allow its employees to purchase at a 
tax saving the same annuities they otherwise would purchase 
on the open market. 
The Court holds that Arizona's voluntary plan violates 
Title VII. In the majority's view, Title VII requires an em-
ployer to follow one of three courses. An employer must 
provide unisex annuities itself, contract with insurance com-
panies to provide such annuities, or provide no annuities to 
its employees. Ante, at 17 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). The first option is largely illu-
sory. Most employers do not have either the financial re-
2 The employee will be required to include the entire amount received as 
income. See 26 U. S. C. § 457; Rev. Rul. 68-99, 1968-1 Cum. Bull193. 
82-52---CONCUR & DISSENT 
4 ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITTEE v. NORRIS 
sources or administrative ability to underwrite annuities. 
Or, as in this case, state law may prevent an employer from 
providing annuities. If unisex annuities are available, an 
employer may contract with private insurance companies to 
provide them. It is stipulated, however, that the insurance 
companies with which Arizona contracts do not provide uni-
sex annuities, nor do insurance companies generally under-
write them. The insurance industry either is prevented by 
state law from doing so 3 or it views unisex mortality tables 
as actuarially unsound. An employer, of course, may choose 
the third option. It simply may decline to offer its employ- I o~i '- ~~It W 
ees the right to purchase annuities at a substantial tax sav-
ing. It is difficult to see the virtue in such a compelled 
choice. 
II 
As indicated above, the consequences of the Court's hold-
ing are unlikely to be beneficial. If the cost to employers of 
offering unisex annuities is prohibitive or if insurance carri-
ers choose not to write such annuities, employees will be de-
nied the opportunity to purchase life annuities-concededly 
the most advantageous pension plan-at lower cost. 4 If, al-
ternatively, insurance carriers and employers choose to offer 
these annuities, the heavy cost burden of equalizing benefits 
3 See Cal. Ins. Code Ann. § 790.03(f) (West) (1983) (requiring differen-
tials based on the sex of the individual insured); Spirt v. Teachers Insur-
ance and Annuity Assn., 691 F. 2d 1054, 1066 (CA2 1982) (noting that 
State of New York has disapproved certain uses of unisex rates). 
• This is precisely what has happened in this case. Faced with the liabil-
ity resulting from the Court of Appeals' judgment, the State of Arizona dis-
continued making life annuities available to its employees. Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 8. Any employee who now wishes to have the security provided by a 
life annuity must withdraw his or her accrued retirement savings from the 
state pension plan, pay federal income tax on the amount withdrawn, and 
then use the remainder to purchase an annuity on the open market-which 
most likely will be sex-based. The adverse effect oftoday's holding appar-
ently will fall primarily on the State's employees. 
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probably will be passed on to current employees. There is 
no evidence that Congress intended Title VII to work such a 
change. Nor does Manhart support such a sweeping read-
ing of this statute. That case expressly recognized the lim-
ited reach of its holding-a limitation grounded in the legisla-
tive history of Title VII and the inapplicability of Title VII's 
policies to the insurance industry. 
A 
We were careful in Manhart to make clear that the ques-
tion before us was narrow. We stated: "All that is at issue 
today is a requirement that men and women make unequal 
contributions to an employer-operated pension fund." 435 
U. S., at 717 (emphasis added). And our holding was lim-
ited expressly to the precise issue before us. We stated that 
"[a]lthough we conclude that the Department's practice vio-
lated Title VII, we do not suggest that the statute was in-
tended to revolutionize the insurance and pension indus-
tries." Ibid. 
The Court in Manhart had good reason for recognizing the 
narrow reach of Title VII in the particular area of the insur-
ance industry. Congress has chosen to leave the primary 
responsibility for regulating the insurance industry to the re-
spective States. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33, 
as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq. 5 This Act reflects the 
5 When this Court held for the first time that the federal government 
had the power to regulate the business of insurance, see United States v. 
South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944) (holding the anti-
trust laws applicable to the business of insurance), Congress responded by 
passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 34, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq. 
As initially proposed, the Act had a narrow focus. It would have provided 
only: "That nothing contained in the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, 
known as the Sherman Act, or the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, 
known as the Clayton Act, shall be construed to apply to the business of 
insurance or to acts in the conduct of that business or in any wise impair 
the regulation of that business by the several States." S. Rep. No. 1112, 
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long-held view that the "continued regulation ... by the sev-
eral States of the business of insurance is in the public inter-
est." 15 U. S. C. § 1011; see SEC v. National Securities, 
Inc., 393 U. S. 453, 458-459 (1969). Given the consistent 
policy of entrusting insurance regulation to the States, the 
majority is not justified in assuming that Congress intended 
in 1964 to require the industry to change long-standing ac-
tuarial methods, approved over decades by state insurance 
commissions. 6 
Nothing in the language of Title VII supports this pre-
78th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1944) (quoting proposed act). This narrow ver-
sion, however, was not accepted. 
Congress subsequently proposed and adopted a much broader bill. It 
recognized, as it previously had, the need to accomodate federal antitrust 
laws and state regulation of insurance. See H. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., 
1st Sess., 3 (1945). But it also recognized that the decision in South-East-
ern Underwriters Association had raised questions as to the general valid-
ity of state laws governing the business of insurance. Some insurance car-
riers were reluctant to comply with state regulatory authority, fearing 
liability for their actions. See id., at 2. Congress thus enacted broad leg-
islation "so that the several States may know that the Congress desires to 
protect the continued regulation . . . of the business of insurance by the 
several States." Ibid. 
The McCarran-Ferguson Act, as adopted, accordingly commits the regu-
lation of the insurance industry presumptively to the States. The intro-
duction to the Act provides that "silence on the part of the Congress shall 
not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of [the] 
business [of insurance] by the several States." 15 U. S. C. § 1011. Sec-
tion 2(b) of the Act further provides: "No Act of Congress shall be con-
strued to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for 
the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act 
specifically relates to the business of insurance." 29 U. S. C. § 1012(b). 
6 Most state laws regulating insurance and annuities explicitly proscribe 
"unfair discrimination between persons in the same class." Bailey, Hutch-
inson & Narber, The Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance Classifica-
tion, 25 Drake L. Rev. 779, 783 (1976). Arizona insurance law similarly 
provides that there shall be "no unfair discrimination between individuals 
of the same class." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-448 (1983). Most States, 
including Arizona, have determined that the use of actuarially sound, sex-
based mortality tables comports with this state definition of discrimination. 
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emption of state jurisdiction. Nor has the majority identi-
fied any evidence in the legislative history that Congress con-
sidered the widespread use of sex-based mortality tables to 
be discriminatory or that it intended to modify its previous 
Given the provision of the McCarran-Ferguson Act that Congress intends 
to supersede state insurance regulation only when it enacts laws that "spe-
cifically relate to the business of insurance," see n. 5, supra, the majority 
offers no satisfactory reason for concluding that Congress intended Title 
VII to pre-empt this important area of state regulation. 
The majority states that the McCarran-Ferguson Act is not relevant be-
cause the petitioners did not raise the issue in their brief. See ante, at 
--, n. 17 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
This misses the point. The question presented is whether Congress in-
tended Title VII to prevent employers from offering their employees-pur-
suant to state law-actuarially sound, sex-based annuitites. The 
McCarran-Ferguson Act is explicitly relevant to determining congressional 
intent. It provides that courts should not presume that Congress in-
tended to supersede state regulation of insurance unless the act in question 
"specifically relates to the business of insurance." See n. 5, supra. It 
therefore is necessary to consider the applicability of the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act in determining Congress' intent in Title VII. This presents two 
questions: whether the action at issue under Title VII involves the "busi-
ness of insurance" and whether the application of Title VII would "invali-
date, impair, or supersede" state law. 
No one doubts that the determination of how risk should be spread 
among classes of insureds is an integral part of the "business of insurance." 
See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U. S. 205, 213 
(1979); SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 U. S. 65, 73 (1959). The major-
ity argues, nevertheless, that the McCarran-Ferguson Act is inapposite 
because Title VII will not supersede any state regulation. Because Title 
VII applies to employers rather than insurance carriers, the majority as-
serts that its view of Title VII will not affect the business of insurance. 
See ante, at--, n. 17 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). This formalistic distinction ignores self-evident facts. State in-
surance laws, such as Arizona's, allow employers to purchase sex-based an-
nuities for their employees. Title VII, as the majority interprets it, would 
prohibit employers from purchasing such annuities for their employees. It 
begs reality to say that a federal law that thus denies the right to do what 
state insurance law allows does not "invalidate, impair, or supersede" state 
law. Cf. SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 U. S., at 67. The majority's 
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grant by the McCarran-Ferguson Act of exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the States to regulate the terms of protection offered 
by insurance companies. Rather, the legislative history in-
dicates precisely the opposite. 
The only reference to this issue occurs in an explanation of 
the Act by Senator Humphrey during the debates on the Sen-
ate floor. He stated that it was "unmistakably clear" that 
Title VII did not prohibit different treatment of men and 
women under industrial benefit plans. 7 See 110 Cong. Rec. 
13663-13664 (1964). As we recognized in Manhart, "[al-
t]hough he did not address differences in employee contribu-
tions based on sex, Senator Humphrey apparently assumed 
that the 1964 Act would have little, if any, impact on existing 
interpretation of Title VII-to the extent it banned the sale of actuarially 
sound, sex-based annuities-effectively would pre-empt state regulatory 
authority. In my view, the commands of the McCarran-Ferguson Act are 
directly relevant to determining Congress' intent in enacting Title VII. 
7 Senator Humphrey's statement was based on the adoption of the Ben-
nett amendment, which incorporated the affirmative defenses of the Equal 
Pay Act, 77 Stat. 56, 29 U. S. C. § 206(d), into Title VII. See County of 
Washington, Ore. v. Gunther, 452 U. S. 161, 175, n. 15 (1981). Although 
not free from ambiguity, the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act pro-
vides ample support for Senator Humphrey's interpretation of that Act. 
In explaining the Equal Pay Act's affirmative defenses, the Senate Report 
on that statute noted that pension costs were "higher for women than men 
. . . because of the longer life span of women." S. Rep. No. 176, 88th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1963). It then explained that the question of addi-
tional costs associated with employing women was one "that can only be 
answered by an ad hoc investigation." Ibid. Thus, it concluded that 
where it could be shown that there were in fact higher costs for women 
than men, an exception to the Equal Pay Act could be permitted "similar to 
those ... for a bona fide seniority system or other exception noted above." 
Ibid . 
Even if other meanings might be drawn from the Equal Pay Act's legis-
lative history, the crucial question is how Congress viewed the Equal Pay 
Act in 1964 when it incorporated it into Title VII. The only relevant leg-
islative history that exists on this point demonstrates unmistakably that 
Congress perceived-with good reason-that "the 1964 Act [Title VII] 
would have little, if any, impact on existing pension plans." Manhart, 435 
U. S., at 714. 
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pension plans." 435 U. S., at 714. This statement was not 
sufficient, as Manhart held, to preclude the application of 
Title VII to an employer-operated plan. See ibid. But Sen-
ator Humphrey's explanation provides strong support for 
Manhart's recognition that Congress intended Title VII to 
have only that indirect effect on the private insurance 
industry. 
B 
As neither the language of the statute nor the legislative 
history supports its holding, the majority is compelled to rely 
on its perception of the policy expressed in Title VII. The 
policy, of course, is broadly to proscribe discrimination in em-
ployment practices. But the statute itself focuses specifi-
cally on the individual and "precludes treatment of individ-
uals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or 
national class." I d., at 708. This specific focus has little rel-
evance to the business of insurance. See id., at 724 (BLACK-
MUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
Insurance and life annuities exist because it is impossible to 
measure accurately how long any one individual will live. 
Insurance companies cannot make individual determinations 
of life expectancy; they must consider instead the life expec-
tancy of identifiable groups. Given a sufficiently large group 
of people, an insurance company can predict with consider-
able reliability the rate and frequency of deaths within the 
group based on the past mortality experience of similar 
groups. Title VII's concern for effect of employment prac-
tices on the individual thus is simply inapplicable to the ac-
tuarial predictions that must be made in writing insurance 
and annuities. 
c 
The accuracy with which an insurance company predicts 
the rate of mortality depends on its ability to identify groups 
with similar mortality rates. The writing of annuities thus 
requires that an insurance company group individuals accord-
ing to attributes that have a significant correlation with mor-
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tality. The most accurate classification system would be to 
identify all attributes that have some verifiable correlation 
with mortality and divide people into groups accordingly, but 
the administrative cost of such an undertaking would be pro-
hibitive. Instead of identifying all relevant attributes, most 
insurance companies classify individuals according to criteria 
that provide both an accurate and efficient measure of lon-
gevity, including a person's age and sex. These particular 
criteria are readily identifiable, stable, and easily verifiable. 
See Benston, The Economics of Gender Discrimination in 
Employee Fringe Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 489, 499-501 (1982). 
It is this practice-the use of a sex-based group classifica-
tion-that the majority ultimately condemns. See ante, at 
8-10 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). The policies underlying Title VII, rather than sup-
porting the majority's decision, strongly suggest-at least for 
me-the opposite conclusion. This remedial statute was en-
acted to eradicate the types of discrimination in employment 
that then were pervasive in our society. The entire thrust of 
Title VII is directed against discriminationr-disparate 
treatment on the basis of race or sex that intentionally or ar-
bitrarily affects an individual. But as JusTICE BLACKMUN 
has stated, life expectancy is a "nonstigmatizing factor that 
demonstrably differentiates females from males and that is 
not measurable on an individual basis . . . . [T]here is noth-
ing arbitrary, irrational, or 'discriminatory' about recogniz-
ing the objective and accepted ... disparity in female-male 
life expectancies in computing rates for retirement plans." 
Manhart, 435 U. S., at 724 (opinion concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). Explicit sexual classifications, 
to be sure, require close examination, but they are not auto-
matically invalid. 8 Sex-based mortality tables reflect objec- ' 
tive actuarial experience. Because their use does not entail 
8 Title VII does not preclude the use of all sex classifications, and there 
is no reason for assuming that Congress intended to do so in this instance. 
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discrimination in any normal understanding of that term, 9 a 
court should hesitate to invalidate this long-approved prac-
tice on the basis of its own policy judgment. 
Congress may choose to forbid the use of any sexual classi-
fications in insurance, but nothing suggests that it intended 
to do so in Title VII. And certainly the policy underlying 
Title VII provides no warrant for extending the reach of the 
statute beyond Congress' intent. 
III 
The District Court held that Arizona's voluntary pension 
plan violates Title VII and ordered that future annuity pay-
ments to female retirees be made equal to payments received 
by similarly situated men. 10 486 F. Supp. 645 (D. Ariz. 
1980). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 
671 F. 2d 330 (1982). The Court today affirms the Court of 
Appeals' judgment insofar as it holds that Arizona's volun-
tary pension plan violates Title VII. But this finding of a 
statutory violation provides no basis for approving the retro-
active relief awarded by the District Court. To approve this 
award would be both unprecedented and manifestly unjust. 
We recognized in Manhart that retroactive relief is nor-
mally appropriate in the typical Title VII case, but concluded 
that the District Court had abused its discretion in awarding 
such relief. 435 U. S., at 719. As we noted, the employer 
Seen. 7, supra. 
9 Indeed, if employers and insurance carriers offer annuities based on 
unisex mortality tables, men as a class will receive less aggregate benefits 
than similarly situated women. 
10 As JUSTICE MARSHALL notes, the relief awarded by the District Court 
is fundamentally retroactive in nature. See ante, at 19 (opinion concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). Annuity payments are funded by the 
employee's past contributions and represent a return on those contribu-
tions. In order to provide women with the higher level of periodic pay-
ments ordered by the District Court, the State of Arizona would be re-
quired to fund retroactively the deficiency in past contributions made by its 
women retirees. 
82-52-CONCUR & DISSENT 
12 ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITTEE v. NORRIS 
in Manhart may well have assumed that its pension program 
was lawful. !d., at 720. More importantly, a retroactive 
remedy would have had a potentially disruptive impact on 
the operation of the employer's pension plan. The business 
of underwriting insurance and life annuities requires careful 
approximation of risk. I d., at 721. Reserves normally are 
sufficient to cover only the cost of funding and administering 
the plan. Should an unforeseen contigency occur, such as a 
drastic change in the legal rules governing pension and insur-
ance funds, both the insurer's solvency and the insured's 
benefits could be jeopardized. Ibid. 
This case presents no different considerations. Manhart 
did put all employer-operated pension funds on notice that 
they could not "requir[e] that men and women make unequal 
contributions to [the] fund," id., at 717, but it expressly con-
firmed that an employer could set aside equal contributions 
and let each retiree purchase whatever benefit his or her con-
tributions could command on the "open market," id., at 718. 
Given this explicit limitation, an employer reasonably could 
have assumed that it would be lawful to make available to its 
employees annuities offered by insurance companies on the 
open market. 
As in Manhart, holding employers liable retroactively 
would have devasting results. The holding applies to all em-
ployer-sponsored pension plans, and the cost of complying 
with the District Court's award of retroactive relief would 
range from $817 to $1260 million annually for the next 15 to 
30 years. 11 Department of Labor Cost Study 32. In this 
11 The cost to employers of equalizing benefits varies according to three 
factors: (i) whether the plan is a defined-contribution or a defined-benefit 
plan; (ii) whether benefits are to be equalized retroactively or prospec-
tively; and (iii) whether the insurer may reallocate resources between men 
and women by applying unisex rates to existing reserves or must top up 
women's benefits. The figures in text assume, as the District Court ap-
peared to hold, see 486 F. Supp. 645, 652, that employers would be re-
quired to top up women's benefits. 
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case, the cost would fall on the State of Arizona. Presum-
ably other state and local governments also would be affected 
directly by today's decision. Imposing such unanticipated fi-
nancial burdens would come at a time when many States and 
local governments are struggling to meet substantial fiscal 
deficits. Income, excise and property taxes are being in-
creased. There is no justification for this Court, particularly 
in view of the question left open in Manhart, to impose this 
magnitude of burden retroactively on the public. Accord-
ingly, liability should be prospective only. 12 
12 In this respect, I agree with JusTICE O'CONNOR that only benefits de-
rived from contributions collected after the effective date of the judgment 
need be calculated without regard to the sex of the employee. See ante, at 
-(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). 
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